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The emigration of the Scots from the 18th to the 20th century has produced a 
diaspora. The thesis outlines how many diasporas are involved in the 
nationalist projects of their homeland. However, over the chronology of this 
study and beyond, whilst there were active movements to amend or end the 
Union of 1707, it has been found that the Scots were not. The thesis then 
proposes some explanations for this. 
Chapters one and two introduce methods, research material and context; they 
describe the Union, the emigrations and diasporas. The study uses for 
comparison purposes the Irish and Norwegian diasporas. Lines of enquiry such 
as nationalism, the use of soft power and gatekeeping behaviour are presented, 
with a discussion of Scottish nationalism.  
The study examines the approach to involving the diaspora of five groups; both 
SHRAs, the International Scots Home Rule League, the National Convention 
and the NPS/SNP. The response of Scottish MPs in the diaspora in England to 
the many attempts to legislate for home rule is also examined.  
The approach to the diaspora was found to be badly executed and targeted. 
Few visits were made, and only to the US and Canada. Communication was 
unfocussed and spasmodic. The Scottish associational clubs were frequently 
used as a conduit. A small part of the whole diaspora, these acted as 
gatekeepers, selectively mobilising for themselves as an elite which had no 
need of nationalism as they could succeed without it. Comparing the Irish, 
whose diaspora successfully supported its nationalist causes at home, is 
instructive. 
The study concludes that the spasmodic and amateurish nature of contact, the 
nature of the Associations and that of the diaspora itself were the main culprits 
in this case of a diaspora indifferent to the fate of nationalism in its home land.  
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Chapter One. Introduction 
 
For over two hundred years the Scots have demonstrated a significant mobility, 
both within the United Kingdom, Europe and beyond.1 Whilst significant, this 
emigration was not unusual for that period, with many Europeans leaving for 
the New World. Many of these nationalities formed diasporas. Diasporas are a 
force in identity formation.2 They reside outside of their kin-state but can in 
some ways claim a stake in it. It is claimed that the Scots formed a diaspora as 
a result of their emigration,3 an issue that will be examined in detail.  
Many diasporas are deeply involved in the nationalist projects of their 
homelands. Insofar as such projects are usually democratic and emancipatory, 
those in the diaspora can feel free to endorse ethnic and exclusionary 
movements.4 This can take many forms. Established generations of 
Irish-Americans made substantial funding available to the Provisional IRA in 
their military intervention in the politics of Northern Ireland.5 Other examples 
might be overseas Israeli nationals returning home en masse to vote in 
elections. Also, Croats abroad paying for the election campaigns of a favoured 
candidate such as Franjo Tudjman, in this case rewarded with 10 percent of the 
seats in parliament dedicated to represent the diaspora.6 The Kurdish PKK 
derived support from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.7 An informal tax of 2% 
levied on Eritreans abroad sustained a war on the Ethiopian border as well as 
helping to shape peace and subsequent re-construction.8 There has been a 
political debate on whether Scotland should have a form of self-government 
from the late nineteenth century to the present day. This thesis is concerned 
with the Scots abroad and their support or otherwise for Scottish Home Rule or 
Nationalism.  
                                                          
1 Brock, 1999, p.232 
2 Shain and Barth, 2003, p.450 
3 Harper, 2005, p.139 
4 Werbner, Diaspora, 2000, p.5 
5 Byman, D., 2005, p.246 
6 Vertovec, 2009, pp.94-5 
7 Romano, 2006, pp. 58-9 
8 Vertovec, 2009, p.95 
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This introduction will lay out the theoretical framework of the thesis. It contains 
a methods section proposing the use of a comparative case study approach 
and the case selection process. It will also introduce the main concepts 
employed. The chapter also examines chronology and introduces matters of 
contextualisation; that of the formation of the Union of 1707, an introduction to 
the migration of the Scots over the period from the Union to the end of the 
chronology of the research and a description of Scottish Nationalism. Finally the 
chapters and their contents will be introduced. 
Theoretical Framework 
The Scots abroad have been described as ‘relatively disinterested’ in Scottish 
nationalism, and have hardly ever become involved in campaigning or political 
organising.9 The first question to be addressed will test the hypothesis that the 
Scots abroad did not support the nationalist movements in their many forms in 
any way which impacted upon their success. If the results support this 
hypothesis then reasons for this failure will be proposed and defended.  
This question drives out several sub-questions which lead to the key concepts 
the study will employ. Firstly, the propensity of diaspora to engage with the 
nationalist projects of their home lands must be gauged. Secondly, the 
conditions which foster such an interest must be understood. Thirdly, the 
conditions that obtain where there is no interest should be investigated. The 
history and nature of emigration, particularly the great nineteenth century 
European emigrations, underpins much of the narrative. There will also be four 
main concepts deployed in the arguments; those of nationalism, diasporas, ‘soft 
power’ and gatekeepers.  
This section will lay out an analytical strategy for the study. The focus will be 
the choice and deployment of comparative case studies and the method of 
case selection. It will further lay out the sources used for the enquiry. The 
purpose of this section is to defend an approach, rather than present competing 
tools. Whilst it is the intention to use comparisons in this thesis, the limitations 
of this method should be recognised and accounted for. 
                                                          
9 Sim, 2011b, p.213 
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Systematic comparative case study is one of the primary means for establishing 
social scientific generalisations in macro political enquiry.10 It is one of the basic 
methods of general empirical propositions.11 Comparison serves several 
purposes in political analysis. Comparison across several cases, usually 
countries, enables research to assess whether a particular phenomenon is 
simply a local issue or part of a broader trend. A further useful function is that of 
developing, testing and refining theories about causal relationships.12 This 
thesis will identify and attempt to explain why the Scottish diaspora had little 
interest in nationalist projects in its home land. It will therefore be appropriate to 
compare the Scottish diaspora with other diasporas to find causal relationships 
between its nature and its behaviour.  
However, the principal problem facing the method in such research is that there 
are many variables and few cases.13 The first issue faces all social research, in 
that the number of relevant variables is very high. The second is a reflection of 
the highly limited number of societies, political cultures and countries,14 around 
two hundred, available for analysis. There are methods available for the 
mitigation of these difficulties. One is to combine two or more variables that 
express an essentially similar underlying characteristic. Thus the number of 
cells in the matrix describing the relationship is reduced. The difficulty of the 
restricted number of cases available can be overcome by focussing the 
analysis on comparable cases. Comparable cases in this context means similar 
in a number of important characteristics that can be treated as constants.15 This 
allows the analysis to concentrate on variables not so controlled. It will be 
demonstrated below that the selection of cases in this enquiry has deployed 
these techniques in order to mitigate the perceived difficulties with the 
comparative method. Case selection will be dealt with first, followed by the 
selection of variables. 
                                                          
10 Goodin and Klingemann, 1992, p.749 
11 Lijphart, 1971, p.682 
12 Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p.285 
13 Lijphart, 1971, p.685 
14 Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p.30 
15 Lijphart, 1971, p.687 
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This chapter began with a list of diasporas which had intervened in some way in 
nationalist or political projects in their home lands. The section later in this 
introduction describing the main concepts deployed in the enquiry will describe 
diasporas and list many more. This list must be reduced in order to bring a 
greater focus onto the subject matter, that of the nationalist projects of a 
Northern European country which is part of a long term Union with another 
state. To do this, a number of characteristics were identified to provide a set of 
variables that could be regarded as constants in case selection. These 
variables need to be related to emigration, which usually causes diasporas, the 
nature of political governance of the subject cases and the existence of a 
nationalist project at home. Those selected are summarised below, with the 
rationale for inclusion. 
Significant contemporary emigration; The Scot’s emigration was significant as a 
proportion of the contemporary population. Migrations make diasporas, so for 
this reason alone this should be part of the selection criteria. Emigration 
characterised as ex-European to the ‘new world’; Scots principally left as part of 
the European process of colonising relatively recently discovered territories, 
particularly those that formed both the first and second British empires. 
Diaspora formed; the enquiry is about the behaviour of a particular diaspora. 
Union with another state; a significant characteristic of the Scottish case, which 
led to the rise of nationalist projects in favour of amending or ending the Union. 
Nationalism at home; there were nationalist projects founded in Scotland, 
therefore comparable cases would also benefit from having a nationalist cause 
at home. 
There is some agreement that the top three exporters of people during the 
nineteenth century emigrations were Ireland, Norway and Scotland.16 These 
satisfy the emigration requirement. The table below summarises the 
performance of these cases in the other characteristics listed above. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Brock, 1999, p.202 
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Table I: Diaspora comparisons; Characteristics of Country of Origin 
 Scotland Ireland Norway 
Significant contemporary emigration       
Ex-European to ‘new world’ emigration       
Diaspora formed        
Union with another state       
Nationalism at home     X 
Sources: Bielenberg, 2000, p.11; Kenny, 2003, p.135. 
Whilst there are similarities which justify a comparison of these diasporas with 
that of the Scots, there are also differences. It is possible that the Irish migration 
could in part be regarded as primed by conflict with the British. However the 
migration was primarily part of a European pattern with diverse reasons for 
leaving.17  The contention that the Norwegian comparison is valid is also driven 
by the many similarities. It appears, however, devoid of one aspect found in the 
others, that of a nationalist movement at home. Chapter two provides further 
granularity of detail to support the choice of the Irish and Norwegian diasporas 
for the case study. This section of this chapter now turns to the identification of 
the variables to be examined to analyse the behaviours of these cases. 
The variables are identified from the behaviours of the selected cases in the 
engagement of the diaspora with the nationalist projects in their home land. 
These will be seen to be; the size and nature of associational aspect of the 
diasporas, the nature of the engagement, the nature of the diasporas and home 
land support for nationalism. These variables are intended to encompass the 
wide range of activities that comprise a diaspora’s transnational behaviours, 
including but not exclusively, remittances, the exercise of soft power, travel, 
newspapers, correspondence, direct political action and violent intervention. 
The proposition is that if a hypothesised relationship between two or more 
variables exists over a wide range of settings then there are stronger grounds 
for arguing that relationship. The complexity of political life in society does not 
render the use of comparisons inappropriate.  
                                                          
17 Bielenburg, 2000, p.11 
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Sources 
To establish the wider context of the emigration of Scottish people, research 
encompassed not only books and papers on the Scots’ emigrations but also on 
the emigrations of other European peoples. This was supplemented by generic 
material on migration including features such as assimilation and remittances. 
This enabled a wider view of Scottish emigration to establish that although it 
was significant for Scotland, it was not unusual. The causes were researched at 
the broadest level, entailing some quantitative work summarised from published 
migration sources. The works of Harper and Brock were particularly useful in 
this respect. 
The research into the people that made up this migration drew on the National 
Library of Scotland (NLS) and its ‘Scots Abroad’ database. This contains over 
300 letters, pamphlets and books published by Scots abroad in North America 
and Australasia, describing their emigration and life in new countries. Whereas 
this was possible for Scots and to a lesser extent the Irish emigrations, little 
such material was available on the Norwegians. Here letters reproduced or 
discussed in published material had to be the sole original resource. The 
National Archives at Kew provided cabinet and ministry papers for historical 
background.  
The nature of diasporas was explored using the extensive discourse available 
in books and journals. The research was conducted mainly through the works 
of Esman, Cohen, Brubaker, Scheffer and Vertovec’s volumes on migration, 
diasporas and transnationalism. In particular, recent work on the involvement of 
diasporas in the nationalist projects of their homelands was useful. This 
research has been mainly based on post-Soviet state making. However, other 
examples of diaspora-supported agencies at work in Asia and the Middle East 
have been useful. In the case of the Scots, the NLS provided sources to gain 
greater granularity into the Scottish associational culture. This was not available 
to the same extent for the Irish and only rarely for the Norwegians. The 
preparation of the commentary on nationalism, soft power and gatekeepers was 
entirely theoretical, and in the main provided by the subject discourse in the 
literature. Background theory on nationalism was largely researched from the 
11 
 
works of Tilly, Billig, Gellner, and Miller and Siedentop. Barth provides guidance 
on the contribution of ethnic groups and Craig, Mitchell and Nairn contributed to 
the discourse on nationalism with a partly Scottish viewpoint. For soft power, 
the original concept from Nye was used, as well as interpretive studies from 
Parmar and Cox. The Irish perspective on the use of soft power was instructed 
principally by Cochrane. The use of gatekeepers as a paradigm in social 
science research was investigated through the work of Bach and Bristow, Van 
Hoof et.al., Garrido, Hanley, and Haralambos. 
The sources for the study of Scottish nationalism and its engagement with the 
diaspora constitute the chief use of original material. The majority of the work 
was based upon several archives in the NLS. The Scottish National Party 
(SNP) has deposited several archives; Acc.6679, 7295, 10754, 13115 and 
11987.  These were used for example to research fund raising committee 
papers particularly those from 1976 to 1980, for evidence of income from 
abroad or attempts to raise money from the diaspora. Correspondence of the 
General Business Committee provided background information on Party 
structure and activities, as did correspondence with the Parliamentary group. 
Particularly useful were files 17-25 in Acc.10754, detailing the correspondence 
with, and papers of, the Scottish National Party Association, set up to oversee 
branches abroad. Acc.11987 contains agendas, minutes and papers for the 
National Council, National Executive Committee and the National Assembly 
from 1964 to the end of the period under review. It also includes papers from 
the General Business Committee and other Party committees as well as the 
National Secretary’s correspondence.  
Items relevant to the Scottish Convention and Scottish Covenant Association as 
well as the SNP are held in Acc.7295. Amongst other papers, this holds 
Scottish National Convention minutes from 1942-1949 as well as papers from 
the Scottish Covenant Association. SNP conference and National Council 
minutes from 1936-37 and 1941-46 are also included, as are many reports and 
papers from the post-war period. There also are some miscellaneous financial 
records. The Scottish Convention material was also available for analysis at 
Dep.242, and Acc.6419. 
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The Scottish Secretariat papers in Acc.3721 provide the personal papers of 
Roland Muirhead and material regarding the second Scottish Home Rule 
Association (SHRA), National Party of Scotland (NPS), SNP and others from 
circa 1916 to circa 1960. It holds 146 boxes containing over 2,500 files. This 
research examined around 180 files for correspondence, support, membership 
details and proof of remittances to the Scottish Home Rule and SNP 
organisations. 
Acc.6038 contains the correspondence of Arthur Donaldson, Chairman of the 
SNP from 1960-69. Acc.11908 also has Donaldson’s papers as well as a large 
amount of Party information. Other personal papers used were those of Robert 
McIntyre, SNP MP for Motherwell and Wishaw in Acc.10090; James A. A. 
Porteous in Acc.7505, whose papers include policy papers on finance and 
taxation; Professor Gavin Kennedy in Acc.11565; George Dott in Acc.5542, 
5927, 8371, 12222 and 12947. Additionally, those of Andrew Gibb in Acc.9188, 
Tom Gibson in Acc.6058, Neil Gunn in Dep.209, Box 15, Gordon Wilson in 
Acc.13099 and D. C. C. Young in Acc.6419 were accessed. The Scotland-UN 
material was sourced at Acc.12735. Compton Mackenzie, of Scots descent but 
born in England, was a founder member of the National Party of Scotland. His 
autobiography, My Life and Times, Octaves 6 and 7, were used to research his 
contribution from the diaspora. 
Additional historical material for research into the diaspora and emigration was 
used; Acc.10623 contained papers from the McArthur Family from Nairn, and 
Acc.8611 was the source of late Jacobite material. The Cunningham diaries 
were sourced from Acc.13089. The Illustrated Oban Magazine archive is to be 
found in the public library in Oban, Argyll. All files accessed are noted in an 
appendix to the bibliography. 
Members of Parliament 
Scots living and working in England who were MPs in Westminster were in a 
unique position to influence the success of the movements established to 
promote Scottish self-government. They alone in the diaspora could contribute 
directly to the peaceful enactment of the legislation to support the aim of these 
movements. The object of chapter five is therefore to identify behaviour 
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supporting Scottish self-government by Scots abroad in Parliament. Here 
research material is provided by books covering the political and parliamentary 
activity of the period. The detail is analysed from online Hansard. Also used 
were the contemporary pamphlets and letters providing comment on the events 
in the Houses of Parliament. For the Commons, individuals were identified from 
Hansard, and then a combination of Wikipedia, Who was Who, biographies, 
and the Dictionary of National Biography were used to obtain biographical and 
therefore location details of the MPs. It was important to locate these people in 
the diaspora.  
There were three main categories of Scots to consider; those Scots who 
represent Scottish constituencies but lived and worked in England, their 
emigration has taken place, they are abroad; secondly those Scots who 
represented English constituencies and lived in England were in the diaspora; 
thirdly there are those who had roles and domiciles in both England and 
Scotland. To avoid doubt over this third category, these transnational emigrants 
have been excluded from the list. Those born and living in Scotland and 
travelling to Westminster for Parliament were visitors. Whilst they may have 
attended Scots Society events in London whilst Parliament was sitting, they 
were not part of the diaspora as there has been no permanent or 
semi-permanent emigration. There are also English, or other nationalities, 
representing Scots constituencies. The research is not concerned with these. 
With regard to those in the House of Lords, the sources used for biographical 
information were Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage, Edition 105, 1978, 
Debrett’s People of Today 2009 and various volumes of Who was Who. Burke’s 
lists over 2,200 persons entitled to sit in the House, so it was difficult to note 
those Lords who had been present but silent. Those who contributed in the 
debates made up the sample. The identification of Scots in the diaspora 
amongst the Lords’ members and amongst those speaking to the early Bills 
was more problematic than it was for those in the Commons in the October 
1974 Parliament. For this latter cohort the criteria were those of identified 
Scots-born persons representing an English constituency. For the earlier 
debates, stretching from 1889 to 1928 over 23 different occasions, MPs who 
represented Scots constituencies but lived and worked in England were 
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selected. The criteria used were residency in England at the time of the debates 
and Scots-born. Additionally some members referred to their Scots lineage in 
their speeches, and thus could be identified. 
Participation in the debates in the Commons on the 23 pre-World War Two Bills 
and motions was analysed. Similar analysis was carried out on those who 
spoke in the devolution debates over the Scotland and Wales Bills of 1976 and 
the Scotland Bill of 1978. For this latter Bill, the passage through the Lords is 
analysed in a similar manner.  
Newspaper Research 1976-79 
To research newspaper correspondence, the method used was to first of all 
establish a timeframe. The period January 1976 to March 1979 was used, to 
encompass the original issue of the White Paper, the Parliamentary debates, 
the introduction of the Bills, the Royal Assent in 1978, and finally the 
referendum in March 1979. Issues of The Times and The Scotsman were 
examined for letters on devolution from Scots abroad, including England, in the 
periods January to August 1976, October to December 1977, January to July 
1978 and January to March 1979. The time periods chosen are aligned with 
periods of activity in the debate and passage of the Bill.  
Main Concepts 
Nationalism 
This section considers the nation and nationalism and applies some 
characteristics of nationalism to the Scottish movements for home rule and 
independence. What is not considered is the nature of democracy and its 
relationship to nationalism through forms of self-government. The nature of 
democracy in the United Kingdom and the host lands of the diaspora changed 
considerably over the chronology of the study, for example through extensions 
of the franchise. These changes are useful context, and are dealt with in later 
chapters.  
An appropriate concept to place at the start of a consideration of nationalism is 
that of the ethnic group. Briefly, this can be defined as; biologically 
self-perpetuating, having fundamental cultural values, characterised by 
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interaction, self-identifying and identified as distinguishable from other such 
groups.18 However the nebulous terms of ‘nationalism’19 and ‘nation’ should not 
be solely based upon ethnicity, as there can be no certain connection between 
descent, which is based upon biology, and interests, which are founded in 
human needs and purposes.20 However, ethnicity is essentially ascriptive in 
character, its status unrelated to achievement, age, sex or religion.21 Therefore 
nationality must spring from additional sources.  
Further tests must be applied. ‘A Nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the 
sacrifices which one has made, and which one is disposed to make again. It 
supposes a past (and the) existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite.’22 
The test of interest is maintained by the everyday actions of its members. The 
members so identified may be seen as a society, a unit which rejects or 
discriminates against others.23 Such a group has an ethnic boundary, 
something which is social in nature but may also have territorial counterparts.24 
Nationality, then, could be a ‘common bond of sentiment whose adequate 
expression would be a state of its own and therefore normally tends to give 
birth to such a state.’25 The implication of such propositions is that every nation 
should have its own state, and correspondingly every state should have its own 
nation. This implies homogeneity, a complete fit between nationality and 
politics.26 Put another way, theories of nationhood imply that ‘a people, place 
and state should be bound in unity.’27 However, one source estimates that the 
number of identifiable ethnic-linguistic groups on the planet is around 8,000. Yet 
there are only around 200 states at present.28 Therefore most states constitute 
several races,29 which supports the case made above for the distinction 
between descent and interests. A nation is not necessarily a state, and 
                                                          
18 Barth,1969, p.11 
19 Mitchell, 1996, p.7 
20 Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.135 
21 Barth, 1969, pp.13-14 
22 Mitchell, 1996, p.20; Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.136 
23 Barth, 1969, p.11 
24 Ibid., p.15 
25 Max Weber quoted in Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.136 
26 Ozirimli, 2003, p.16 
27 Billig, 1995, p.77 
28 Gellner, 2006, p.43 
29 Craig, 2009, p.234 
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although it is not enough to conflate the concepts of nation and state into that of 
‘nation-state,’ it is an analytic truth that the nation state can fulfil the aspirations 
of those who belong to the nation embodied in the state.30 If a state is therefore 
more than simply the geographical boundary of its writ,31 then that is relevant to 
an enquiry into the political actions of its diaspora.  
Nationalism can appear to be based at the periphery of established nations, as 
the property of others, those opposed to that establishment.32 Alternatively, if 
applied to the ideological means by which nation states are reproduced and 
maintained, it becomes a continual process, not intermittent,33 recalling the 
continuous test of interest referred to earlier. In support of the established state 
and those on the periphery, in an ideal form it continues to be reproduced as a 
cause worth more than the individual life.34 Nationalism can also be understood 
as any pursuit by ruling class self-interest and has therefore existed as long as 
the nation state.35 This view, an argument goes, has become narrower in the 
last two hundred years and has distilled into two different phenomena; state-led 
nationalism and state-seeking nationalism.36 In this model, state-led nationalism 
is invoked by rulers who spoke in a nation’s name and asked its citizens to 
identify with it and subordinate their interests to those of the state. This grew 
from the need to extract the ever expanding needs of war and to substitute 
direct top to bottom government for indirect rule through semi-autonomous 
feudal intermediaries.37 
Alternatively, state-seeking nationalism would be invoked by representatives of 
a group that did not have collective control over an area and claimed 
autonomous political status, even a separate state, on the grounds that the 
group had a distinct coherent identity.38 However, the articulation of national 
slogans is frequently not the exclusive enterprise of a single elite leadership. In 
                                                          
30 Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.141 
31 Ibid., p.140 
32 Billig, 1995, p.5 
33 Ibid., p.6 
34 Ibid., p.177 
35 Tilly, 1994, p.133 
36 Ibid. 
37 Tilly, 1994, p.138 
38 Ibid., p.133 
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some respects the UK acts like this, with the elite groups in the constituent 
states having different priorities. This could lead to a future of incessant 
splintering of states into segments controlled by one ostensibly unified group or 
another.39 This scenario recalls the importance of interests discussed above.  
Consideration of nationalism enquires how the many ethnic groups and social 
norms of the past were homogenised. The notion implies that there has to be a 
mechanism, or mechanisms, that eliminate or reduce ethnic and social 
differences so as to fit people into the common national mould. One solution is 
to imagine a continuum of such mechanisms between voluntary practices on 
the one hand and vicious practices on the other.40 Another view is to regard 
nationalism as a response to the unequal development of global capitalism as it 
created those in need of development or modernisation, who were then fallen 
victim to some kind of domination, to which the only response was the local 
popular struggle of nationalism.41 This overview of nation and nationalism has 
provided some characteristics with which to examine the Scottish movements 
formed to support home rule and independence.  
Firstly, a nation is not solely a singular ethnic construction, but is maintained by 
actions conforming to interests. Secondly, nationalism is about a common bond 
of sentiment where existing states re-enforce allegiance, as well as about 
minorities seeking statehood; the established and peripheral, the state-led and 
the state-seeking. Thirdly, whilst there has been an historic movement towards 
self-determination through state-seeking nationalism, state-led nationalism has 
also strengthened allegiance to existing structures. Fourthly, the mechanism 
that grinds toward homogeneity can be peaceful or violent. Fifthly, no state is 
homogenous and cultural similarities can hide political differences driven by 
differing interests. Finally, these differences may combine to result in a 
continual sub-division of polities. Therefore it may be concluded that all states 
are artificial and that state boundaries are not fixed in perpetuity, as the history 
of the UK demonstrates.42 
                                                          
39 Tilly, 1994, p.144 
40 Ozirimli, 2003, p.17 
41 Nairn, 1981, p.128 
42 Mitchell, 2014, p.4 
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Diasporas  
Diasporas are neither recent nor ancient objects. They have for the main part 
been a by-product of emigration. Diasporas are made up of the original 
immigrants plus subsequent generations, as long as they choose or are forced 
to remain a separate community.43 They arrive as conquerors and settlers, like 
Spaniards in America or the Normans in England; as refugees escaping war or 
persecution, like Tamils in Canada or Huguenots in South Africa; as labourers, 
or as merchants or highly educated professionals.44 However, not all these 
movements have resulted in a diaspora. The British Isles has been the subject 
of many inward migrations; Saxon, Angle and Danish for example, but there is 
no talk of a Saxon or Danish diaspora in Britain today. However there have also 
been Irish, Pakistani and Polish immigrants and they are referred to as having 
formed a diaspora. Defining diasporas has become more difficult as the word 
has been applied to ever more populations of migrants. Many groups of modern 
migrants, once known by names such as exile groups, overseas communities, 
or ethnic minorities are now characterised as diasporas.45  
In view of this proliferation, there is a need to present some primary 
characteristics of diasporas. First, the term diaspora. The widening theorisation 
of diasporas amongst academics includes disciplines such as history, literature, 
anthropology and sociology amongst forty five sub-groups identified in a 
sampling.46 A Google search on the word ‘diaspora’ yielded over 54 million 
hits.47 One list of diasporas distinguishes between historical and modern, 
naming amongst the former; Armenian, Greek, Gypsy, Indian and Jewish, 
amongst the latter; African American, Iranian, Irish, Italian and Kurdish. Neither 
list includes the Scots.48  Another refers to twenty-nine other ‘putative ethno-
cultural or country defined diasporas’ from academic literature, including that of 
the English and Scots, as well as minority groups formed by the movement of 
borders across people, as with, for example, Russians in Latvia.49 A diaspora is 
not just constituted of a number of immigrants of various generations; it is those 
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who proactively make claims about their descent, who practice, project and 
claim that ethnicity.50  
It is possible, by drawing on the contributions of writers on diasporas, to distil 
four characteristics.51 Developed further in chapter two, these are introduced 
here. The first is special dispersal. The second, orientation to a homeland and 
the third, boundary maintenance. Lastly, ethnic consciousness should be 
sustained over a long period of time. This is of importance in considering the 
Scots, as their migration took place over a period of over two hundred years. 
The descendants of first generation migrants of the late nineteenth century 
were fourth or fifth generation in the mid-twentieth century, and yet may still 
populate the diaspora alongside first generation new arrivals.  
Soft power 
Power means a more or less organised hierarchical cluster of relations.52 Soft 
power, as applied to international relations, is characterised by the ability to 
influence others without visible threat or coercion.53 It is the power of attraction, 
the influence of example. It is the ability of a state, or other actor, to get what it 
wants by persuading others to adopt its goals.54 It differs from hard power 
insofar as it does not use economic and military power to bend others to its will. 
Soft power co-opts rather than coerces.55 It can be attractive because it is 
cheaper. The resources of a state that produce soft power are thought to be its 
culture, its policies and its values.56 To this could be added the substance, 
tactics and style of foreign policy.57 However, the model has to be further 
refined. 
When ideas impact policy it is usually at the level of policy making elites. 
Therefore where soft power affects public attitudes it can only be successful 
where the elite are influenced, especially with regard to foreign and security 
policy.58 The case can also be made that the post-war success of the US was a 
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result not just of its acceptable culture and policies but also of its military 
preponderance.59 There is a further difficulty with the paradigm of soft power in 
this thesis as it concerns non-state actors, diasporas.  
Chapter two will elaborate further on how diasporas influence political outcomes 
in their homelands. Diasporas generally only have soft power attributes to wield 
influence, having little military power, save remittances to buy arms and the 
ability to send men to fight. The soft power of a diaspora will vary with its 
organisation, the wealth of its members and their sense of responsibility for the 
outcomes to be influenced. Nye infers that it is the internet that has made the 
soft power of non-state actors a factor in international relations.60 However this 
enquiry predates the internet.  These caveats make the apparent success of 
the Irish and Irish-Americans in exercising soft power over part of the American 
policy-making elite less easy to understand. However, an attempt must be 
made, as the Scots failed to replicate it. 
This soft power paradigm was devised with interstate relations in mind. Soft 
power flows from one actor influencing another, as was earlier noted, to do its 
bidding using resources such as culture, values and policies to bring this about. 
Whilst accepting that there may be alternative concepts of power,61 Cochrane 
extends the soft power model to intrastate relations.62 As pressure groups can 
only work with soft power, influencing legislators, this appears a reasonable 
position to take. Diasporas are complex constructs, with their own cultural and 
political elites. Any homeland nation’s attempt to define a community as a 
diaspora and create a privileged relationship with co-ethnics is a tricky 
enterprise. It must distinguish between the membership of a trans-state 
community and the rights and duties of the legal construct of citizenship of the 
host state.63 This notion of soft power as exercised by a diaspora is used to 
discuss the successful influence of the Irish diaspora during the Northern 
Ireland ‘Troubles’ from 1969. 
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Gatekeepers as Actors in Social and Political Domains 
The concept of the gatekeeper is one which will be used to illustrate the 
position of the Scottish Associations with regard to both the rest of the diaspora 
and the Home Rule and Independence groups courting it for support. 
Gatekeeping has widespread use as a metaphor for national government 
responses to unwelcome developments.64 It is also used to theorise the action 
of intermediaries in the supply of many categories of public goods and services. 
Two brief examples follow. 
Pharmacists act as gatekeepers with regard to medium risk drugs such as 
paracetamol and codeine, by asking questions of the customer to ensure the 
drug is taken responsibly.65 Secondly, a feature of many primary care health 
systems is the requirement to visit a generalist, a GP in the UK, acting as a 
gatekeeper and coordinator of care. 66 However, there is an understanding that 
national governments, as with other institutions and associations, cannot be 
‘black boxed’ with uniform assumptions about their responses but must be 
nuanced to reflect their heterogeneity and that of their networks.67 Further 
examples will follow in chapter six. 
With some exceptions, the main avenue of communication with the diaspora 
was through the Scottish Associations. It was only later in the period that the 
futility of this was appreciated. However, the nature of the associations is the 
key to understanding their response; the nuancing will be effected by examining 
the ‘black box’ and looking in detail at the objectives of these organisations, the 
people they attracted and the politics they manifest. The next section of this 
introduction deals with some subjects of context. 
The Union 
This thesis seeks to address the reasons why Scots abroad lent little support to 
the various movements for home rule and independence. However, without the 
Union of Scotland and England in 1707 there would have been no such 
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movements. This section addresses the reasons for that Union and the events 
that formed it.  
When Queen Elizabeth of England died in March 1603 she had no children or 
surviving siblings. Accordingly, her cousin James VI of Scotland became James 
I of England.68 James’s Union was a dual monarchy, enlarging his territories.69 
He styled himself King of Great Britain.70 However, he would need to harmonise 
the British imperial monarchy with the Scottish perspective of upholding 
aristocratic republicanism and an Anglo-centric view which threatened to 
reduce Scotland to political dependency.71 The idea of an Incorporating Union 
was mooted by James in 1603.72 There was opposition to virtually every aspect 
of his proposal in Scotland and England.73 Even some watered down proposals 
were dropped in 1607.74 
This demonstrated how far the two nations were from a union. Mutual dislike 
between the Scots and English was nothing new, and it had intensified in the 
aftermath of 1603.75 Three parties would need to be convinced of the need for a 
union; the Crown would have to realise that nothing short of union would solve 
the executive difficulties of ruling Scotland in absentia, the English Parliament 
would have to be persuaded that the gains would offset the disagreeable 
prospect of sharing their spoils with the Scots76 and the Scots would have to 
feel there were enough advantages to warrant them joining with such a bitter 
historical enemy.77 It was economic friction that caused Charles II to start 
negotiations for a Union.78 These were to fail, and there were no further 
endorsements by Charles of union negotiations.79  
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At his accession to the throne in 1685, James II and VII began trade talks which 
failed.80 In Scotland, the fact that James was ‘the only Papist we have been 
plagued with since the Reformation,’ and had a son, galvanised Presbyterian 
opposition.81 After rejecting James in favour of William and Mary, the Scottish 
Convention unanimously decided to make overtures to the English Parliament 
on a union. This was ignored in Westminster.82 With the Revolution of 1689-91, 
James was replaced by his elder daughter Mary and her husband William of 
Orange, William III. The Act of Settlement left William to rule Scotland with 
whatever tools of patronage and persuasion that he could fashion.83  
William’s opposition to France had a negative impact on Scottish trade. William 
was unable to prevent the Company of Scotland breaking the monopoly of the 
(English) East India Company. He was also unable to prevent the Scottish 
Company from founding a colony in Central America at Darien, the property of 
the Spanish crown, William’s ally in his opposition to Louis XIV of France. This 
attempt to establish an international empire without the heavy cost of territorial 
empire or Navy ended in abysmal failure.84 The failure of the project brought the 
truth that the composite monarchy was no longer serving Scottish interests to 
the forefront of Scottish political consciousness.85 It has been claimed that the 
main importance of Darien was that it converted the English Crown to the idea 
of a union.86  
There were other issues facing Scotland. There was the future of a regal union 
with a neighbour that looked first to its own interest,87 the issue of succession 
gave a patriotic fillip to Scottish Jacobitism.88 There was also considerable 
anxiety amongst Presbyterians, faced with a regionally strong Episcopalian 
body and a resurgent Roman Catholic Church. There were worries about the 
economy and finally Scotland’s Parliament was unable to defend the nation’s 
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sovereign interests and to promote its agriculture, commercial needs, or 
manufacturing.89  
Scotland was a distinctive, though not major, European state, with trade with 
the Stuarts’ overseas dominions as well as the Swedes, Dutch and the 
Danes.90 The timing of the Act of Union was influenced by the War of the 
Spanish Succession in various ways.91 The alienation of Scotland by dragging it 
into the War threatened relations between England and Scotland and reduced 
the acceptability in Scotland of the Hanoverian succession.92 French diplomats 
granted Scotland favoured nation status in Louis XIV’s war against William III. 
Supporters of Jacobitism and opponents of any Union with England, the French 
infiltrated money and agents into Scotland.93 
The re-orientation of Scottish export trade during the seventeenth century to 
England fed a desire for an economic union.94 It also made it easier to point the 
finger of blame at England. A letter written in 1704 by Andrew Fletcher of 
Saltoun, an intellectually accomplished and well-travelled member of the 1702 
parliament,95 who was initially in favour of union, described that ‘our Trade was 
formally flourishing’ and that trade with France had been very advantageous.96 
Fletcher also notes that whilst the latter had declined, so had Scotland’s 
traditional markets in the Baltic, ‘before the Dutch had wholly possessed 
themselves of that advantageous Traffick.’97 He goes on ‘Upon the Union of the 
Crowns not only all this went to decay but our Mony was spent in England not 
amongst ourselves.’ However, the most pressing of Scotland’s burdens in the 
1690s were the years of bad harvests which led to famine in 1697.98 These 
were coupled with political infighting amongst influential Scots magnates vying 
for a monopoly of influence on the King. The result was an ungovernable and 
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non-viable kingdom.99 By 1700 it seemed that the overthrow of the Stuarts had 
been followed by a decade of human and natural disasters.100  
Also by 1700, William had concluded that the only solution to the governance 
issues was an incorporating union.101 The death of the remaining child of Anne, 
who was to succeed William in 1702, rendered some urgency to the issue of 
the succession, both in Scotland and England. The English Parliament 
responded with the 1701 Act of Settlement, choosing the Hanoverian elector, 
George. The serious possibility that Scotland would not accept the Hanoverian 
succession coupled with the issues caused by the war with France, threatened 
the Regal Union and England’s security.102  
A new Scottish Parliament had to be called within 20 days of William III’s death 
in 1702. Elected after the Darien disaster, it was likely to be anti-English.103 
Britain was again at war with France; a war that was unpopular in Scotland due 
to its effect on trade, the fact that Scotland had not been consulted, and the 
additional burden of taxation on an impoverished country. The Jacobite 
supporters in Scotland made much of this, opposed as they were to war against 
Louis XIV, supporter and financier of their pretender James.104 
The conversion of the English to a pro-union position came as a result of events 
in Edinburgh in 1703 and 1704. The new Scottish Parliament was more 
independent than any had anticipated. Its members were aligned around 
informal groupings. The largest was the Court Party, the party of government. 
The Country Party was a loose confederation connected mainly by antagonism 
to the governing clique. The Jacobites (or Cavaliers) would pragmatically align 
with the Country Party. This Scottish Parliament proceeded to pass acts which 
gave Scotland the option of opting out of a British (English) Foreign Policy that 
had done them nothing but harm since 1689.105 Scotland could now exercise a 
veto over its participation in any British war.106  
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Parliament in England now had to deal with the problem of the Scots.107 English 
ministers decided there was no solution possible but a Union.108 As a result in 
1705 they passed the Alien Act; unless the Scots appointed commissioners to 
start negotiations for Union and recognise the Hanoverian succession by 
December 25th 1705, their citizens not domiciled in England would be treated 
as aliens and their trade blocked.109 The Scots’ reaction to this was hostile.110 
However, the Scottish Parliament took only three months to conclude that the 
Scots should enter a treaty with England and that the Queen should appoint 
commissioners from Scotland to negotiate the terms.111 Even so, there were 
few openly supportive MPs, only a great inclination to get a treaty under way.112 
In 1706 the Scots agreed to political incorporation and the Hanoverian 
succession in exchange for free access to British and colonial markets.113 By 
passing a separate Act for Securing the Scottish Religion, opposition to union 
from the Kirk was blunted.114 At the same time there was no agreement as to 
an alternative. Union with Holland or France and even a new republic had been 
loosely discussed.115 However, such proposals found little support.116 Scotland 
needed a strong government and constitutional solution; no other serious 
remedy had been put forward. Roxburgh, leader of the Country Party reluctantly 
stated ‘I know no way but this union.’117 Following this brief description of the 
causes and events that led to the Union, a further contextual discussion is 
included in this introduction. This is on Scottish nationalism. 
Scottish Nationalism: A Description with Reference to Some 
Paradigms of Nationalism  
Any discussion on post-1885 Scottish Nationalism should start with the United 
Kingdom, one of a short list of countries that has been identified as truly 
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multinational.118 Whilst reflecting the characteristic of un-homogeneity, the 
United Kingdom is something of an exception to the view above of nationhood 
binding people, place and state. 
As a would-be nation, rather than a name, Great Britain was invented in 1707, 
with the Act of Union.119 Scotland joined England and Wales in a union of policy 
rather than affection.120 The United Kingdom was formed when the union was 
extended to Ireland in 1801. It is populated not by ‘United Kingdonians’ but by 
Irish, Scots, Welsh and English. These groupings, who think of themselves as 
nations, can also think collectively of Britain, and of themselves sometimes as 
British.121 The UK can be thought of as a collection of different Unions rather 
than a homogenous state.122  However, ‘English’ can be a sub-text for ‘British’ 
and this was a big issue for early Scottish Home Rule organisations. A writer in 
the home rule journal ‘Scottish Nation’ used the early mobilisations of the First 
World War to bitterly object to the Army being described as English in national 
newspapers.123 
Moreover, at the time of the Union and for at least a hundred years hence, 
attachment to Scotland, and even England, was complicated by the fact that 
these countries were neither united in themselves nor distinct from each other. 
In terms of language, religion, levels of literacy, social organisation and ethnicity 
the Scottish Lowlanders had more in common with people in Northern England 
than they did with their own fellow countrymen in the Highlands.124 What was 
central to eighteenth century Britain was the Protestant religion. The division 
between Catholic and Protestant was enshrined in law from the late 
seventeenth century to 1829, and whereas Protestant dissenters from England 
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and Wales and Scottish Presbyterians had access to all levels of the political 
system, anti-Catholicism was a powerful and pervasive force.125  
The proposition that Scottish and British nationalism exist side by side is 
something that is difficult to ignore by those who pursue more Scottish 
self-government.126 The British dimension is a powerful force.127 Adam Smith 
and David Hume did not think of themselves as Scottish, ‘habitually referring to 
themselves as North Britons.’128 It was, and is, possible for the Scots to do well 
in the British political system. Yet although the existence of this British nation is 
a central fact,129 it clearly co-exists with other claimants. Research carried out in 
the mid-1960s claimed that ‘Scotland belongs to those territorial entities less 
than the nation, which are potentially capable of becoming nations 
themselves.’130 Not surprising as before the Union, Scotland was a nation with 
a state.  
This thesis does not attempt to relate a history of Scottish Nationalism, but to 
record and try to explain its relationship with the Scottish diaspora. However, 
having provided a brief summary of nationalism, it is appropriate to try to 
summarise the Scottish variety. The words National or Nationalist started to 
appear in Scottish self-government organisations in the 1920s, with the 
Glasgow University Scottish National Association, the Scots National League 
and the Scottish National Movement. These groups formed the NPS, described 
in more detail in chapter three, which later was to become the SNP. Whereas 
the SHRA had been in the tradition of Labour/Liberal radicalism, the National 
League was descended from the traditions of Gaelic cultural independence 
movements.131 With the formation of the NPS and then the SNP, the notion of 
Scottish nationalism as the principle that nation and political unit are congruent 
had a ready application,132 and provides a working definition of the 
phenomenon.   
                                                          
125 Ibid., pp.18-19 
126 Mitchell, 1996, p.49 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ozirimli, 2003, p.17 
129 Woolf, 1996, p.198 
130 Budge and Unwin, 1966, p.130 
131 Brand, 1978, pp.182-3 
132 Lynch, 2002, p.3 
29 
 
The movements formed to support Scottish self-government can be divided into 
two groups with distinct aims; those seeking a parliament within the UK, or 
home rule, and those seeking a separate state for the nation of Scots. The SNP 
affirmed its objective as independence before the end of the Second World 
War, its decision to campaign on oil as well as independence in the 1970s saw 
an increase in its electoral success.133  
Home Rule Movements 
An examination of pamphlets written by and in support of the first SHRA helps 
to frame the movement in the context of nationalism.134 The objectives of the 
SHRA were ‘To maintain the integrity of the Empire and secure that the voice of 
Scotland be heard in the Imperial Parliament’; to establish a parliament in 
Scotland with government over all Scottish affairs except military and diplomatic 
and to foster the national sentiment of Scotland. Membership was open not only 
to Scots but all British subjects.135 This organisation was not explicitly state 
seeking, but asking for self-government within a larger entity, the Empire. It 
supported Scots ethnicity but allowed non-Scots to be members. Scottish 
interests were recognised as being served poorly by the extant arrangements. 
Some felt that Scotland suffered an ‘unceasing drain upon our people such that 
all with wealth, talent or learning are being drawn to London, as towards the 
rising sun.’136 
Despite this, there is re-enforcement of allegiance to the Empire as well as to 
Scotland. This organisation is more state-led than state-seeking. It is not part of 
the movement to break up larger units into smaller, more homogenous polities. 
It is not supporting a singular ethnicity. The interests it represents are not purely 
Scottish, but more diverse, to include Britons and the Empire. It is not 
nationalist in the terms stated earlier.  
The International Scots Home Rule League, (the League) established in 1913 
to address the failure of the SHRA to engage with the Scots abroad, had as its 
objectives to unite home rulers throughout the world in promoting a national 
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parliament in Scotland.137 The first edition of its journal, The Scottish Nation, 
refers to ‘the call of the Race’ an appeal to the ethnic Scot wherever in the 
world to support the call for a Scottish Parliament.  The secretary of the St. 
Louis (USA) branch of the League, Walter Macintyre, wrote at length about the 
loyalty, interest and patriotism that the Scots, or descendants of Scots, have. 
He supported home rule for Scotland, but did not link this to the interests of his 
brother Scots in the US.138 Such patriotism ‘in no way conflicts with the 
leal-hearted devotion to the highest interests of the empire.’139 There is an 
allegiance to existing structures. Whereas there is an ethnic strain to its appeal 
to the Scottish race, the unity of interests is not clear from the evidence of the 
US member. This ambiguous patriotism is clear in the support of the League for 
the 1914-18 War. The August edition of the journal features a picture of King 
George V and a later edition associates volunteering for war duty with 
patriotism, asserting that the ‘striking patriotism of the Colonies derives its 
strength from its Scottish elements.’140 
There were two further major home rule organisations which can be examined 
for their adherence to the nationalist model, the second SHRA, and the Scottish 
Convention, later becoming the Scottish Covenant Association. The aims of the 
second SHRA were similar to those of the first, a Scottish parliament in the 
context of the British Empire. The experience of Ireland and the loss of faith in 
the Labour Party to push the Home Rule issue141 led to a change not only in 
strategy, from that of pressure group to that of electing MPs to Westminster, but 
also in objectives. Scotland experienced a multiplicity of national movements at 
this time. The founder of the second SHRA, Roland Muirhead, remarked upon 
this in a letter in 1919, emphasising to a Scottish MP that the organisation was 
operating along different lines to other groups ‘at present in existence.’142  
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Independence Movements 
The Scots National League, the Scottish National Movement, the SHRA and 
the Glasgow University Scottish National Movement existed at the same time 
and merged to form the NPS.  Muirhead referred to this as the ‘strong 
spearhead of the Scottish Nationalist movement.’143 The new party was split 
along a fault line between moderates, who supported home rule and 
nationalists who supported independence.144 The conference of 1933 saw a 
vote between the two approaches, won by the home rulers 69 to 45.145 The 
emergence of the Scottish Party (self-styled ‘Moderates’146) in 1932 
encouraged the moderate wing of the NPS to try to broaden its appeal with a 
merger.147 In 1934 this formed the SNP. 
A further major split in the Party, that of a group of moderates being ejected in 
1942, subsequently formed the National Convention.148 This Convention saw its 
main task as drafting a home rule bill,149 but on becoming the Covenant 
Association stated its task to be ‘to secure the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament in Scotland’.150 It was well organised with a network of active 
branches.151 However, this ambition, decidedly not state-seeking, co-existed 
with other views. After the Convention’s demise in the mid-1950s,152 the SNP 
remained the chief proponent of what was by then a claim for independence.153 
During the 1960s, the SNP began to behave like a political party and this 
decade saw some electoral success.154 It can be argued that the post-1960 
success of the SNP was not only a question of better organisation and the 
Scotland’s Oil campaigns. The decay of the United Kingdom in the wake of the 
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Empire’s decline can be seen as the political substance of the nationalist 
revivals in the British Isles.155 
This is the moment to consider the various shades of Scottish Nationalism in 
the light of the earlier discussion on nationalism and its characteristics. The 
continuum begins with an appeal to Scots ethnicity. The League appealed to 
the ‘Scots’ Race,’ the NPS to a form of British nationalism.156 Originally 
focussed on restoring its parliament, the NPS became state-seeking, wanting 
independent national status, but state-maintaining in its hope to be part of the 
British family of nations and the Commonwealth.157 The appeal to the common 
bond of sentiment which re-enforces existing state allegiance, which is also 
about minorities seeking statehood is reflected in the movement’s habitual 
re-assertion of the role of the British Empire in the SNP’s 1934 constitution.158 
The political differences that can be hidden under cultural similarity were 
evident from the need after the formation of the NPS to ‘cover all divergences of 
nationalist opinion.’159 By 1937-8 the SNP constitution had been amended to a 
straightforward demand for a parliament with authority over all Scottish 
affairs.160 
In summary, through much of the length of time dealt with by this enquiry, there 
was evidence of an ambivalence in Scottish Nationalism which led to a 
multiplication of agencies vying for ownership of the issue. There is one further 
feature of Scottish Nationalism to explore, and that is the almost complete 
absence of violence throughout its history. 
The presence, or absence of violence in the nationalist pressure for 
homogeneity was reflected earlier as a continuum. It will be seen that Scottish 
nationalism exists at the peaceful end of that continuum. The SNP were and 
are committed to independence by democratic, electoral methods. The 
organisation has always been social-democratic not revolutionary and there has 
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never been a sanctioning of political violence.161 A supporter wrote to Arthur 
Donaldson, who held senior posts in the SNP, to say he was ‘100% against any 
armed uprising or bomb throwing activities.’162 The very nature of nationalism 
implies a conflict over how best to organise and govern a section of a society. 
Yet the nature of the movement has been one of non-violence. A brief look at a 
conflict analytical framework163 shows that this is only of limited use in an 
examination of the movement for Scottish home rule or independence.   
However, whilst there has been little violence between the two parties in the 
conflict, the UK and Scotland, there is nevertheless a conflict, if only of views, 
on the ‘best’ way to govern the constituents of the United Kingdom. Therefore 
there is a conflict in the emergent state which never uses violence to resolve its 
differences. To a limited extent then it can be argued that other nationalist 
conflict situations can instruct an examination of that of the Scots. Specifically, 
of the two examples chosen for comparison, the Norwegian national liberation 
was non-violent, whilst that of the Irish was violent. 
Chronology 
The starting point for this research is the Secretary for Scotland Act, 1885, and 
the end point is the Scottish devolution referendum of 1979. This time frame is 
then split into two sections, with the 1939-45 World War providing a convenient 
if arbitrary dividing line. Although they are not entirely consistent with the time 
frame, the two parts deal with different types of groups promoting home rule 
and independence. The first section deals with groups trying to influence those 
in power, known as pressure groups. The second deals with one group seeking 
to achieve its aim through electoral power itself, a political party. Although 
during the period between the two World Wars groups began to seek political 
power, the pressure group activity really ends with the demise of the Scottish 
Convention in 1951.164 Therefore the second period deals predominantly with 
the party which pursued independence and devolution through electoral politics 
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and ends with the 1979 referendum. In each case this analysis of groups and 
events and their engagement with the diaspora is contextualised with a brief 
reference to Scottish migration during that period. In order to provide a 
contemporary context, contact and remittance activity by the diaspora is 
compared with that of other diasporas, the details of which are laid out in this 
introduction.  
The Chapters 
Chapter one has already been introduced. Chapter two provides an 
examination of the Scottish emigrations and the phenomena of diasporas. It 
identifies types of diaspora both by the nature of the original dispersal and by 
the role the emigrants played in their new host lands. These typologies then 
allow the presentation of the comparison diasporas; those of the Irish and the 
Norwegians. The concept of conflict generated diasporas and whether or not 
the Jacobite émigrés constituted one, is examined. 
Chapters three and four cover the detail of the diaspora’s engagement with 
Scottish nationalism, including such practical contributions as funds through 
remittances. The engagement of nationalism with the Scottish diaspora is 
detailed, as is the contribution the diaspora made to the nationalist movements. 
This will include the efforts of those in positions of legislative influence in the 
diaspora in the rest of the UK. The contributions of the Irish and Norwegian 
diasporas to their respective independence movements are included as a 
comparison of the engagement of two other major European migrating peoples. 
Chapter four also relates the attempts by Scottish Nationalists to bring their 
case to the United Nations, and attempts to understand this in terms of an 
understanding of the operation of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye165 and 
extended by others. 
Chapter five deals with a particular location, England, and particular members 
of the diaspora, politicians. As such it details the many interventions made in 
the Houses of Parliament to promote Scottish home rule, including detailed 
descriptions of the devolution debates. There were many attempts to achieve 
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the engagement of the UK legislators in the Westminster Parliament. The 
chapter concerns itself with the support in Parliament these attempts received 
from the Scots in the diaspora in Parliament. Despite some definitional and 
research difficulties, the chapter confronts the issue that the Scots in Parliament 
by and large acted either severally or in party groups rather than as a Scottish 
faction. 
Chapter six offers some explanations for the nature of the engagement 
between the diaspora and the nationalist organisations. Hypotheses concerning 
the reasons for the nature of this engagement between a long standing 
nationalist cause and a long standing diaspora are proposed. It examines the 
nature of the diaspora and the nature of the engagement to find explanations 
for the lack of support. Of particular note is the repeated engagement by 
nationalist movements with the associational Scots in their Caledonian Clubs 
and St. Andrews Societies. The nature of these societies and their role as 
gatekeepers to the diaspora in this involvement is examined.  
Chapter seven offers context, particularly for the emigration of the Scots, 
discussion of a number of issues brought out in the thesis and finally the 
summarising of the comparison diasporas and the utility of that work. It explores 
the context of the results of the enquiry. It also provides greater detail about the 
comparison diasporas. The discussion section looks further into diasporas and 
assimilation, acknowledging that this is an area where greater study would 
reveal more insight into the matter under discussion in this thesis. It provides a 
closer look at the operation of soft power and offers an explanation for why the 
Irish were apparently successful with it and the Scots a failure. The prediction 
by a nationalist supporter that success abroad would only come with success at 
home is tested and refuted. Chapter eight offers a summary of the research 
under the headings of diaspora and emigration as well as the engagement of 
home rule groups and the SNP with the diaspora.  Additionally there will be 
suggestions as to where further research may be profitable, providing a 
conclusion to the enquiry.  
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Summary 
This introduction has served to set the scene for this enquiry into the 
relationship between the Scots abroad and the movements to give Scotland 
more self-government. It has dealt with the timeframe, with an overview of the 
chapters, with methods used and research sources. It has provided a brief 
context for Scotland’s significant emigrations, with nationalism in general and 
Scottish in particular and introduced the concept of gatekeepers as social and 
political actors. The conception of the Union which the self-government 
movements attempt to amend or destroy has been detailed. Chapter two will 
deal with the Scottish migrations of the relevant time period in more detail and 
introduce the phenomenon of diasporas and their activities as agents in 
international affairs and as actors in the nationalist projects of their homelands. 
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Chapter Two: The Scots Abroad, Diasporas as 
International Actors 
 
This chapter describes the size and destinations of the Scottish emigrations 
from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. They were not unique in 
their time, and further context and explanations for this exodus will be provided 
in chapter seven. The longitudinal timeframe of this study begins in the late 
nineteenth century. The diaspora that would have been extant at the founding 
of the first SHRA had been substantially built in that century. For that reason 
the chapter concentrates on the later emigrations. 
Then follows a description and typologising of diasporas, using both the original 
dispersal and the role diasporas play in their new homelands. These are used 
to identify the nature of the diaspora formed by the Scots. The role of diasporas 
as actors in international relations and in the nationalist projects of their 
homelands are examined, as well as the types of actions they may take. Lastly 
the case for the comparison diasporas is made.  
The Scottish Emigrations 
It is clear that the Scots have always emigrated in significant numbers.166 
Migration, movement within the same country and emigration to a different 
country was long a feature of Scottish economic and social life. The Highlands 
particularly provided conditions of famine and shortage which resulted in 
Highlanders seeking work and residence elsewhere.167 Periods of hardship 
were relatively frequent in the Highlands; there was exceptional hardship in 
1782-3, 1806-7, 1811, 1816-17, 1836-7 and the famine of 1846-55, all of which 
produced considerable movement to South and East Scotland168 as well as 
emigration. Emigration was also driven by seasonal factors in the fishing and 
agricultural economies. It could take 12 years for a Highlander to migrate to 
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Glasgow.169 This urban growth eventually drew in Lowland as well as Highland 
Scots.170 Scots were therefore internally mobile, as well as being successful 
emigrants.  
Nineteenth Century Emigration 
The Scots colonised all areas of the British Empire in all trades, as well as 
soldiers, businessmen, educators and doctors.171 During the Napoleonic Wars, 
ships bringing timber from British North America to Britain needed cargo for 
their return trips, and cheaper travel, £3 or £4 for a crossing, encouraged more 
to travel.172 For a voyage in better conditions, with provisions added, the price 
for an adult in 1801 was £10, falling to £5 in 1802.173 
In Scotland the emigration issue was also one of national concern at the 
depletion of labour for the fields and fisheries, and for the manning of 
regiments.174 The first Passenger Act was passed in 1803 in an attempt to limit 
emigration.175 Nonetheless, the post-Napoleonic wars recession in Britain saw 
emigration rising again. The extent of nineteenth century emigration has been 
woven into Scottish life and lore. Scots accounted for 12% of extra-European 
departures from the British Isles in this period, representing the loss of around 
two million people, a significant drain on resources from a country whose 
population at the 1911 census was only 4,760,900.176 These numbers do not 
include departures to England and Wales.  
This was an ‘emigration of rising expectations.’177 In an era of self-finance, the 
truly destitute had little chance of making the crossing.178 This was initially an 
emigration of those in the middle ranks with capital, and also those with 
connections overseas. In the Highlands, the reality of seasonal migration to the 
Lowlands for work had more long term significance for the region at this time.179 
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The famines in mid-century caused great out-migration from the Highlands with 
some islands losing a half or a third of their population.180 Although much of the 
migration was to Lowland destinations over the decade of the mid-nineteenth 
century famine,181 more than 16,000 were assisted to emigrate to Canada or 
Australia by various means.182 Reorganisation of agriculture in the rural 
Lowlands was unable to provide jobs for the natural increases in population.183 
These land pressures were in stark contrast to the surplus of cheap land in the 
Americas. 
Figures for the first half of the nineteenth century are estimates, but there are 
indications that current emigration, those who left, was 1,841,534 for the period 
1825 to 1914.184 Current emigration between 1861 and 1911 was 1,171,908.185  
Whilst emigration across the border to England was hard to estimate for the first 
half of the nineteenth century, the 1851 census recorded 137,087 Scots-born 
residents in England and Wales.186 Improved records and censuses allow more 
confidence in numbers for the second half of the century.  
The destinations of these emigrants changed over the period. In the first half of 
the century, Scots showed a preference for Canada. However, over the 
century, 44% went to the United States, 28% to Canada and 25% to 
Australasia,187 the latter destination becoming more popular in the second half 
of the century. Fewer went to other destinations like South Africa and India.188 
Initial destinations do not tell the whole story of this migration however. The 
example of F. G. Cunningham, of Ayrshire, demonstrates the nature of some 
Scots’ migrations. He was born in 1835, the son of a sojourner, a major in the 
Indian Army.189 He left Ayr for Australia and became a sheep farmer. In 1858, 
he left Australia with 2,000 head of sheep to emigrate to Otago in New Zealand. 
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In 1885 he once more moved, this time to England, where he died in 1911.190 
Just that one man had lived in four parts of the Empire.  
Current emigration figures usefully draw attention to the size of the leaving 
population. The demography of Scotland was influenced by net emigration 
numbers, those who left minus those who returned. The following table shows 
the scale of the net emigration of the period. 
Table II. Scottish Net Emigration by Decade, 1861-1901 
Decade Total 
1861–1871 116,181 
1871-1881 96,221 
1881–1891 215,604 
1891–1901 54,304 
Total 482,310 
From Brock, 1999, Appendix 10 page 328 
These people would write to their relatives at home, their letters giving a sense 
of their reasons for departure, and why they stayed. Duncan Macarthur had 
emigrated to Montreal to work for the Hudson Bay Company. He wrote to his 
sister Bella in Nairn for many years. Duncan was joined by his brother James 
and companions who had taken 12 days in their crossing. They immediately 
went looking for work.191 The same letter confirms a remittance to home. This 
one letter shows remittance behaviour and Scots abroad welcoming their 
relations to Canada. 
Twentieth Century Emigration 
Scotland’s emigration continued after the First World War. English emigration 
figures are available to enable a comparison. Between 1901 and 1914, Scottish 
emigration was taking place at almost twice the rate of that of England, 11.2 
departures per 1000 versus six departures per 1000 in England and Wales. 192 
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This period of emigration has been divided into census periods for the century 
in table III below. 
Table III. Net Emigration from Scotland, 1901-81 
Period Total Of which to the rest of the UK 
1901–11 254,000 Not available 
1911–21 238,000 Not available193 
1921–31 390,000 330,000 
1931-51194 220,000 210,000 
1951–61 282,000 140,000 
1961–71 326,000 169,000 
1971–81 151,000 52,000 
Total 1,861,000  901,000 
 Adapted from Lindsay, in Devine, ed. 1992. p.155, Brock, 1999, p.328 gives a figure of 
253,822 for 1901-11. 
These are not all overseas emigrants; ‘this remarkable outflow was directed 
more towards England than overseas.’195 The period divides around the 
Second World War. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of strong 
encouragement for emigration to countries like Canada, Australia, South Africa 
and Rhodesia. Ironically, the improved post-war prosperity in Scotland gave 
more Scots the resources to undertake long distance migration with 
confidence.196 As table III shows, despite the encouragement to move abroad, 
47% of those from 1951-81 moved to England. 
Without ever ranking as the highest exporter of people in a particular time span, 
Scotland achieved centuries of exceptionally high emigration.197  
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The Drivers of Emigration 
From the mid-eighteenth century the forces of long term change of land use 
were most evident in the Highlands, though the issue was as much the 
Highlander’s response as their environment. It is best to avoid short term 
analysis that concentrates on the clearances.198 The generic causes of the 
great European exodus of the nineteenth century are outlined in chapter seven. 
To argue that Scotland was different to other European countries in responding 
to these conditions would be difficult. Equally, famine, clearance and enclosure 
were not unique to Scotland. Changes in long term land use, also to be seen in 
Ireland and Norway, were not the whole story. The causes were not only in 
rural conditions at home but also in attractions elsewhere. Advice on 
emigration, given by a visiting Scottish surveyor on his return, asserted that 
‘Farms can be purchased (in America) at a small cost, not more than the rent of 
poor land in Scotland.’199   
These complexities can be observed in the Macarthur family. A letter from 
Duncan in May 1871 to his brother David in Nairn reflects on the relative merits 
of David staying in Nairn, or going to Canada or London. David apparently has 
a poor view of his prospects in Nairn. Duncan’s advice is that if he had had 
£100 to put into a business in Nairn 10 years ago he ‘should never think of 
leaving it.’ Duncan’s advice to David is to set up in business with his brother 
James and stay in Nairn. As for going to Canada, he says ‘I cannot 
conscientiously advise you to do that’, as his own prospects ‘are not yet 
settled.’200 Duncan was contracted to the Hudson Bay Company for seven 
years on low wages, probably the original pull factor for him, aided by the push 
of insufficient capital to set up at home.201 Duncan eventually secured a 
banking agency in Manitoba. Later he wrote to his sister Bella of his 
involvement in local politics and was remitting £20 to her several times a 
year.202 The pull factor of this kind of testament worked into complex forces of 
rearrangement in the home society, which were real changes in the structure of 
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the social and economic life of the country.203 In this example, people were lost 
but capital was returned. 
Although emigration was always an essential part of Scottish life as a device for 
self-improvement,204 the decision was not always straightforward. However, the 
Scot at home did receive encouragement from the Scot abroad. D. M. Arthur 
wrote to a friend in Oban from New Zealand in 1862 and the letter was 
published in the Illustrated Oban Magazine. ’I have no hesitation’ Arthur writes, 
‘in saying this is a very fine country’… ‘there is plenty of employment, an 
abundance of good food and good wages for those who want to work.’205 A 
year later, Arthur follows up with an encouraging letter to the magazine, 
announcing that ‘the town is built!’206  
Within a few years of the end of the First World War, the spectre of mass 
unemployment loomed and a change in Government policy towards populating 
the Empire began to take hold.207 This new interventionism created a number of 
schemes to assist the passage of emigrants to the Empire and the US. 
Unfortunately, the timing of the largest scheme coincided with the US 
establishing regional quotas on immigrants in 1921-23. Even so, the British 
schemes like the Empire Settlement Acts for Canada and Australia in 1922, 
assisted over 400,000 people to leave the British Isles between 1922 and 1935. 
This was a third of all those who left at that time.208 Research carried out in the 
post-World War Two period demonstrated that economic factors made up only 
about a third of motivation to emigrate. The desire for change and new 
experience was at least as strong.209 
Those who returned did so for a number of reasons, but they can be classified 
in three useful ways. Firstly, there were those in the military who served abroad 
and were neither killed nor tempted to remain with land grants.210 Secondly, 
there were those who never intended to remain, who took administrative, 
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skilled, seasonal, or teaching posts abroad or in England and Wales, with the 
intention of returning with money. The Yarmouth herring industry, for example, 
was a seasonal source of income for 38,000 Scots at its peak in 1913.211 A 
different type of temporary migration is referred to by the Illustrated Oban 
Magazine which published the results of the 1862 Civil Service of India entry 
competitions, mentioning that thirteen were Scots.212 The successful might 
return to patronage and political positions. In 1805, a Scottish Lord wrote to 
Henry Dundas asking for his support in getting his son, ‘who is coming home 
from India’ to ‘succeed General Maitland in the representation of this 
Borough.’213 Finally, there were those for whom the emigrant experience had 
ended in failure and disillusionment. Robert Louis Stevenson met hundreds of 
these heading home, as he headed west through America.214  
What is most likely is that those who did return did so out of conscious 
preference. By one estimate, more than a third of those who emigrated in the 
second half of the nineteenth century came home again.215 Return migration 
probably increased in importance in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
after the introduction of steamship travel made transient or deliberate temporary 
migration financially possible.216 For these sojourners the focus remained on 
remitting or saving capital for the home trip.217 What is clear is that the 
temporary migrant and career nation builder both cultivated networks of fellow 
Scots with the aim of developing an ethnically based social and economic 
support group.218 
In summary, the emigration of the Scottish people from the eighteenth to the 
twentieth centuries was significant for Scotland. It took place in the context of a 
much wider European emigration, a product not only of the conditions in 
Scotland but also of the nature of the Scottish people, to whom both migration 
and emigration were an acceptable strategy for improvement. Whilst the 
                                                          
211 Devine, 1992, p.120, see also Harper 2012, pp.20-21 
212 Oban Illustrated Magazine, 1st August 1863 
213 MS.1053, Letter from Lord Elcho to Dundas, Lord Melville, dated 10th January 1805 
214 Stevenson, 1984, pp.128-9 
215 Harper, 2003, p.282 
216 Devine, 1992, pp.120-121 
217 Harper, 2003, p.283 
218 Mackenzie, 2007, pp.246-248 
45 
 
Highland emigrations may take on the appearance of exile, most left from 
Lowland counties at a time of strong economic growth, creating a paradox of 
simultaneous boom at home, emigration abroad and immigration of other 
nations to take up opportunities in the mills and factories. Emigration peaked 
after the forcible evictions had ended.219 Emigration was certainly the result of 
‘discontent’, a word used in a report of 1802,220 and ‘differences’ with the local 
powers that be.221 However they were also drawn by cheap land and 
encouraged by those that had gone before.  
Once abroad, the Scots formed an associational culture that has been 
preserved to this day through changing circumstances, creating a distinct 
grouping of many millions. Scotland not only exported large numbers of its 
people to Empire locations around the globe, it also exported versions of its 
institutions such as Law, Schools and Churches.222 It is in this ‘global Scotland’ 
that much of the popular facets of modern Scottish culture were to be 
established, from Burn’s Night to St. Andrew’s Day.223 These Scots abroad are 
frequently collectively referred to as the Scottish Diaspora.224 The purpose of 
the next section is to introduce the concept of diasporas and to examine 
diasporas as actors in both international relations and in nationalist projects in 
their homelands.  
Diasporas 
Characterizing features of a diaspora are usually focused around the physical 
and social. It will be seen that there is evidence that many diasporas are 
involved in the nationalist projects of their homelands. Those in a diaspora can 
feel free to endorse ethnic movements, including those committed to the use of 
force.225 For some the nature of diasporas is such that they will tend to be 
involved in the political affairs of home and host land politics.226  Firstly, the 
characteristics of a diaspora, introduced in chapter one, should be developed 
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further. Recall the four characteristics distilled in that introduction.227 The first of 
these is special dispersal. The second, orientation to a homeland and the third, 
boundary maintenance. Lastly, ethnic consciousness should be sustained over 
a long period of time. The descendants of first generation migrants of the late 
nineteenth century were fourth or fifth generation in the mid-twentieth century, 
and yet may still populate the diaspora alongside first generation new arrivals. 
The dispersal is examined first. 
Special Dispersal 
Diasporas feature a dispersion from an original place to two or more locations. 
Some see a diaspora simply as a ‘segment of a people living outside of a 
homeland’228 though this is usually extended as ‘the collective forced dispersion 
of a religious and/or ethnic group, precipitated by a disaster, often of a political 
nature.’ 229 This may be coupled with a lack of acceptance in the new host 
countries.230 This definition lies close to the centre of the classical notions of 
diaspora, of which that of the Jews is paramount. Whilst all study of diasporas 
must recognise this tradition,231 such studies are now long past the stage of 
being confined to that forced dispersal.232 The need for the dispersal to be 
disaster led is not universal. Diasporas, even from the earliest times, are far 
more diverse.233  
Many groups can be identified as diasporas even if their migratory journey had 
not involved violence or persecution.234 Based on the dispersal, diasporas can 
be identified as Victim, Labour, Imperial, Trade or Deterritorialised.235 
Additionally, another distinction is whether or not the diaspora is predominantly 
conflict-generated. There is evidence that such groups involve themselves in 
and may perpetuate nationalist conflicts.236 These diaspora types are 
summarised in table IV below. 
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Table IV: Main Types of Diaspora by Nature of Dispersal 
Type Nature of 
dispersal 
Dominant 
examples 
Similar groups Other features 
Victim Forced by 
slavery or 
catastrophe 
possibly conflict 
generated 
African, 
Armenian, 
Jews, Tamil 
and Albanian 
Many 
contemporary 
refugees may 
be incipient 
victim diasporas 
Homeland 
orientation, 
return 
movement, 
mobilisation as a 
diaspora  
Labour Migration in 
search of work 
Indentured 
Indians 
Italians in the 
US, Turks in 
Europe  
May not form a 
diaspora in time 
Imperial Search for 
opportunity, 
land and work 
British, Irish, 
Early Tamil 
Other colonial 
powers 
Colonisation. 
Thread of state 
involvement 
Trade Merchants 
migrating to 
form networks 
to trade  goods 
and services 
Lebanese, 
Chinese 
Venetians, 
professional 
Indians 
Interrelated net 
of commercial 
communities 
Deterritorialised Voluntary 
secondary 
migration to find 
work or 
opportunity 
Caribbean 
people, Sindhis 
Parsis,237 
Scots Irish 
Multiply 
dispersed, 
interconnected, 
displaced by a 
more amenable 
diaspora 
Source: Cohen, 2008, pp.17, 39-40, 61, 69, 83 and 125. 
The majority of these are not initiated by disaster. Dispersal from a homeland 
can be either traumatically pushed, or pulled in a more voluntary fashion in 
search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions.238 In the case 
of deterritorialised diaspora, people did not return to their homeland but 
emigrated in search of opportunities in more favourable locations, such as the 
Scots who migrated to Ireland, thence to the US,239 or Caribbean peoples to the 
UK or Panama.240  
Table IV generalises dispersal, which may hide detail. Within victim groups 
there may be conflict-generated dispersals. For example; Albanian, Armenian, 
Jewish/Israeli, Sikh, Tamil and Palestinian.241 Thus diasporas, for example the 
Tamils, may develop over time with more than one type of dispersal.242  
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Dispersal is a straightforward notion and can be applied to instances of forced 
or voluntary movement. Many different types of dispersal can result in the 
formation of a diaspora. However, not all dispersals form diasporas. Temporary 
migrations for work, for example, need not lead to a diaspora forming. Other 
conditions need to be present, conditions that are more explanatory of what 
diasporas do, as opposed to their origins. 
Home Land Orientation 
Home land orientation is the orientation of a group to a real or imagined home 
land as a source of loyalty, inspiration and identity. It could include a collective 
memory or myth about a home land including its idealisation and a commitment 
to its maintenance or restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation. It 
may feature a movement to encourage return that remains strong among the 
group,243 whereas in some cases only maintaining regular or occasional 
contacts is sufficient.244 There may be a collective memory about the original 
home land’s location, history and achievements, and a commitment to its 
maintenance, but this memory may be leavened with mythology. This centring 
on a home land excludes many dispersed groups with a desire to create a 
culture in diverse locations, for example the African or South Asian 
diasporas.245 Although attempts were made, for example in Liberia, Freetown 
and Lagos, and notwithstanding the symbolic importance of Ethiopia to 
Rastas,246 a specific homeland cannot be restored to African Americans.247 The 
reality of an origin is present in many of the groups listed earlier, if not the 
possibility of return. A defined origin may create the desire to maintain links, 
culture and myths of that origin, leading to the third core feature of a diaspora, 
boundary maintenance, the preservation of a distinct identity. 
Boundary Maintenance over Time 
Having decided to permanently settle, members of a group may regard 
themselves as of the same ethnic or national origin and identify with groups 
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seen as of the same background in other countries.248 The boundary may have 
security functions. The group may believe that they are not, and maybe can 
never be, accepted by the host society.249 This may be tempered by the 
possibility of a distinctive enriching life bringing economic or political success in 
the host country.250  
Boundary maintenance should occur over an extended time. This is crucial, as 
it must defeat the tension of the boundary erosion tendencies of assimilation.251 
The group’s will to transmit its heritage acts to preserve its identity and thence 
the will to survive as a distinct minority. Boundary maintenance can be affected 
by the host lands of a diaspora making some diasporas more visible than 
others. Catholic immigrants in a Protestant host land are more visible due to 
their beliefs and religious practices. Racial differences are also visible. This 
visibility or invisibility will characterise the experience and role of the migrants in 
their chosen host society. It is boundary maintenance which makes a diaspora 
more than a collection of people with some secondary characteristic such as a 
surname associated with a country or region.252 It is this that enables a 
diaspora to be seen as a distinct community. Members of such a group are 
active in cultural, social, economic and political spheres.253 They establish 
transnational networks that reflect complex relationships among the diaspora, 
host countries, home lands and international actors. 
The concept of boundary maintenance therefore introduces a 
sub-characterisation to diasporas, that of transnationalism.254 Here boundaries 
are being crossed, rather than being maintained. Yet it is by transnational 
actions that a diaspora maintains the boundary around itself, an activity that 
potentially erodes the boundaries of the host states.255 However, that migrants 
maintain boundaries is only to be expected. What defines a given group as a 
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diaspora is that it maintains these boundaries over at least two generations.256 
Now to apply these characteristics to the Scots abroad.  
The Case of the Scots 
The lengthy Scottish dispersal has been described. Whilst it was largely 
voluntary, there were episodes when conditions in Scotland led to emigration 
being a forced solution. The emigration was to more than one location, and was 
both significant in European terms and in terms of the country’s population. On 
both volume and dispersal, the Scots’ emigration fulfils the criteria of a 
diaspora. It was an Imperial diaspora in the main, not comprised chiefly of 
victims. Its participants mostly fulfilled the role of settler in the lands to which 
they emigrated.  
The distinction between a stateless diaspora and a state linked one, important 
in considering the likelihood of diaspora intervention in homeland nationalist 
projects, provides a conundrum for the Scots. Prior to the Union, regardless of 
the Union of Crowns, Scotland was the state of the Scots. During the period of 
the emigration after the 1707 Union, the Scots’ home state was Great Britain, 
then after the Union with Ireland in 1801, it was the UK. However, they were not 
a majority in it. Moreover, there is evidence from Caledonian Societies to be 
presented later, that the Scots members could regard themselves as British, a 
word sometimes used for those living in the UK. Their own place of birth, 
Scotland, where they were a majority, was part of that larger governance.  In 
that sense they could be described as a nation without a state.257 Recalling the 
earlier definition of a nation, as a grand solidarity, and nationality a common 
bond of sentiment, there could be a case for this. However, the same could be 
said of the English, another nation without a state.258 There have, however, 
been movements supporting either home rule or Scottish separation from the 
UK since 1885. This means that in the case of the Scots, the distinction 
between stateless and state-linked should be treated with caution. Most 
distinguish between British and Scottish, some are happy to be both. 
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Once abroad, the Scots’ nostalgia for Scotland was often cultivated with 
remarkable passion, persistence and effectiveness.259 This was anchored in a 
number of factors; the religion of the Kirk, philanthropy, culture and the sporting 
activities of the Highland games.260 An example from Australia in 1922 serves; 
‘a crowd of Scots got together and decided the place wasn’t a place without a 
pipe band and decided to set the pipe band up’261 The same town had a 
Caledonian club and a Burn’s club. 
National history has always been ‘able to accommodate and revive memories 
of a distant and mythicized path’.262 The notion of a distinct Scottish identity 
being maintained after emigration is widespread.263 The maintenance of 
Scottish civil society and religion after the Union may be a reason for this.264 
When a large inward migration of Scots occurred in Corby in Northamptonshire 
in the 1930s, Scots on both sides of the border contributed to the building of a 
Church of Scotland.265 For the Scots abroad, home land orientation was strong. 
There exists for many a collective memory of the home land so that there may 
be second or third generation Scots abroad who have no direct Highland 
ancestry but still relate to the Highland culture. Lowlanders appropriated 
Highland emblems through cultural events such as dances.266 Some also 
regard the Highland Clearances as part of their own heritage even though the 
emigration of their forebears was at a much later period.267  
The will to transmit a heritage is abundantly evidenced by this considerable 
adhesion by generations of Scots abroad to a cultural norm of representative 
dance, music and dress, often Highland in nature. A letter written in 1804 
confirmed that the ‘Highland Society of London have resolved to print (the 
poems of) Ossian in the original Gaelic.’268 There is homeland orientation in 
abundance among the Scots abroad. However, despite the regular repatriation 
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of emigrants, there is little evidence of a return movement. The return to 
Scotland by descendants of its past migrants may presuppose the existence of 
a return movement but for leisure rather than a permanent return.269 Although 
there is no evidence to suggest the Scots-Americans might re-locate,270 recent 
‘homecomings’ demonstrate a propensity for roots tourism.271 
The longevity of the associational culture of the Scots abroad has ensured a 
strong element of boundary maintenance in their settler societies. The Scots 
Charitable Society of Boston, was founded in 1657.272 The Scots set up a wide 
array of these societies, clubs and institutions. Some were cultural such as 
Burn’s societies and some philanthropic, caring for less fortunate Scots 
migrants. They all helped to preserve and celebrate Scots identity.273 St. 
Andrew’s societies, Thistle societies and Caledonian clubs became established 
wherever the Scots settled. In London alone there were 28 Scottish clubs at the 
beginning of the twentieth century with a total membership of 4,000 to 5,000.274 
The Sheffield Caledonian society, founded in 1822, is still active today.275 Such 
associations have become an ‘enduring public vehicle for constructions of 
Scottishness’.276 Scotland has become a global nation from the street patterns 
of Dunedin to Bonny Doon in California.277  
Two cautionary observations should be made. Firstly, these were not 
necessarily clubs for all strata of Scots emigrant society.  Some had to forgo the 
social pleasures as they were too costly, providing some support for claims that 
these national, regional and clan societies were often elite clubs.278 Secondly, 
whilst the evidence is difficult to amass, the membership of these associations 
was probably a small part of the whole diaspora. These issues will be explored 
further, as will the strong suggestion that the societies provided newcomers 
                                                          
269 Sim and Macintosh,  2007, p.108 
270 Sim, 2011b, pp.179-181 
271 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homecoming_Scotland_2009 and 
http://www.visitscotland.com/see-do/homecoming-scotland-2014/ accessed 11/11/14 
272 http://scots-charitable.org, accessed 31/5/13 
273 Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.4 
274 Ibid., p.24 
275 The author presented a paper to the club in March 2012 
276 Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.101 
277 Craig, 2009, p.238 
278 McCarthy, 2006, p.207 
53 
 
with opportunities, social cohesion, jobs and accommodation through networks 
with fellow Scots, although their objectives were predominantly social.279  
Scottish associational culture helps fulfil two of the essential criteria for the 
identification of a diaspora. The orientation to a real or imagined homeland as a 
source of identity, loyalty and values can be found in the multitude of Scots 
societies.280 The second criterion is the requirement for boundary maintenance, 
for the preservation of an identity separate from that of the host lands. They 
give the Scot a distinct identity held together by an active solidarity combined 
with the social relationships created therein.  
One further element of the Scottish Diaspora remains to be described in this 
overview, that of a conflict-generated diaspora. Whilst outwith the chronology of 
this study, there was one clear case of a conflict generated Scottish diaspora, 
that of the Jacobites. Between the Williamite Revolution of 1688-9 and the final 
rising of 1745-6, each successive attempt to restore the House of Stuart to the 
British throne produced a crop of refugees.281 Many of these were soldiers, both 
Irish and Scottish, following the existing tradition of Scots serving overseas.282 
These Jacobites were few in number, with exiled Scottish regiments in France 
and Sweden.283 However, many of them were aristocrats who came to form a 
network across France, Spain and Italy as well as Austria, Sweden, Prussia 
and Russia.284 The Jacobite community in Europe was therefore mostly 
patrician in composition,285 supported in its exile by Catholic co-religionists.286  
There were many Jacobite supporters in England and Wales when the Jacobite 
army invaded England in 1745, but by and large they failed to support it.287 One 
exception to this was the Manchester Regiment, but this failed to play a 
significant role in the fighting.288 Following the defeat of the Jacobites, hundreds 
of war captives began to arrive as bound servants in Maryland and the West 
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Indies, but proposals to exile whole communities of Highlanders brought 
opposition from local landowners.289 This Jacobite diaspora provided support 
for the Stuart claim during the risings between 1689 and 1746.290 However, the 
failure of support from France in 1749 defeated the cause that had kept the 
Jacobite aristocratic diaspora apart from its host societies.291 The result of this 
was assimilation, which began before the ’45 and was said to be complete by 
1784, when Pitt the Younger returned estates confiscated after the ’45 to the 
heirs of Jacobite families.292  
The plotters of rebellion had turned into respectable Frenchmen, Spaniards, 
Swedes, Austrians or Italians.293 Thus the small conflict-generated segment of 
the long Scottish emigration ended in assimilation a hundred years before the 
first Home Rule association was founded. This cannot therefore be considered 
in the arguments to be presented later for the Scottish diaspora’s indifference to 
home rule. 
It is hard to conclude other than that the Scots abroad form a diaspora even 
though they were not expelled by a single act of violence, and have not by and 
large had difficult relationships in their host countries. Indeed, they transmitted 
aspects of their own civil society to the lands which they settled, rather than 
being at loggerheads with an established industrialised society. In their 
connivance in the defeat of American, Australasian and African ‘first nations’ 
they were no different to other historical conquerors. It can be argued that they 
exhibit the characteristics of a diaspora, although this assumption will be 
revisited during the concluding chapter.  Having established this, the activities 
of diasporas in the international space should be considered. This will allow a 
determination of the conditions under which a diaspora is likely to be involved in 
the nationalist projects of its home land.  
 
 
                                                          
289 Plank, 2006, p.79 
290 Lenman, 1980, pp. 8-10 
291 Wills, 2002, p.231 
292 Lenman, 1980, p.10 
293 Ibid., p.10 
55 
 
Diasporas in International Relations 
Non-state actors do encroach upon the activities of territorially bound states 
which are the traditional actors on the international arena.294 These include 
international corporations, financial institutions and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) of many types. Numbered amongst these NGOs are the 
world’s diasporas.295 Diasporas can impact international relations in many 
ways, some of these are examined below. Furthermore, as national minorities, 
they serve as political conduits for conflict and intervention.296 Both media and 
academic studies point to the influence of diasporas on international 
behaviour.297 Much of the activity that makes a diaspora what it is can be 
transnational; remittances, cultural identity, following sports and political events, 
and in some cases voting in national and local elections.298 A diaspora must 
exist in transnational space in order to remain a diaspora. Members may be 
physically and occupationally in the host country but socially and culturally in 
the home land they have left behind.299 Because diasporas bridge the gap 
between the global and the local, globalisation has enhanced their roles.300 
Diasporas influence host or home land in several ways. Equally host or home 
land impact upon diasporas. Some of these influences are listed below,301 with 
some of the many types of action that demonstrate where such influence has 
existed.  
Members of diasporas can follow political events in the home land, in the way 
that Albanian Kosovans in Austria joined the Democratic League of Kosovo.302 
Diasporas may attempt to influence home land events by direct action. It was 
the overseas Chinese that overthrew the C’hing dynasty in 1911. From the 
safety of their host country, diasporas can sustain conflicts in their erstwhile 
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home land.303 As soon as they secured the right to vote, the Irish in America 
used their ballots to affect British rule in Ireland.304  
Diasporas may also attempt to influence their host government or international 
organisations to act for or against the interests of their home country 
government. The American Irish, angry with Woodrow Wilson’s attitude to 
Ireland, voted against him in 1916 and 1920. When the nationalists declared a 
Republic in 1919, the Irish cause received strong congressional support.305 
Home land governments may attempt to use their diasporas to support their 
strategic or economic goals. The Scottish Parliament in Holyrood reached out 
to the Scottish diaspora in 2006-9 to develop international links and connect 
with the Scottish identity of the diaspora communities, encouraging Scots to 
return ‘home.’306 A diaspora may seek protection from its home government. 
The Jews in Ethiopia suffered persecution. In the late 1970s their emigration 
was organised by Israel, facilitated by money raised by world Jewry and some 
intervention by the US. About 40,000 people were relocated from Ethiopia to 
Israel.307  
Host governments may call on a diaspora to support their strategic or economic 
goals. The growing suspicion of German-Americans’ possible allegiance to the 
Pan-German movement in World War One prompted demands for their total 
assimilation in the US. The German-Americans ‘swatted the hyphen’ as other 
Americans made clear their opposition to things German.308 Diasporas may 
contribute to the political, educational and economic development of their 
former homeland.309 Croatian diaspora remittances for such a purpose 
amounted to $50 million.310  
Finally, to weigh against this, the threat of violent attacks by elements of 
terrorist organisations has cast suspicion on several diaspora communities.311 
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Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the US, the IRA, Sikh separatists, Croat militias and 
both Palestinians and Jews in America had been critical players in conflict in 
their home lands.312 In a post 9/11 environment, the dual political loyalties 
suggested by a diaspora raises fears of the ‘enemy within’ and mobilised fifth 
columns. 
Diasporas therefore can be mobilised in a number of ways. From the despatch 
of weapons and other resources to positive action such as lobbying 
governments and international organisations.313 The diasporic actors who are 
‘outside the state but inside the people’ can have weight on the international 
scene because of their stature, means, institutions and connections.314 
Diasporas can be invaluable to the dominant core ethnic of their host state for 
this very reason.315 It has been argued that diasporas have the luxury of living 
in the past whilst home governments have the day-to-day to manage, and 
equally that the diaspora’s faith in issues of kinship reminds the home state to 
preserve certain values key to the state’s raison d’être.316  
Diasporas and Home Land Nationalist Projects  
This section will argue that diasporas do become involved in home land 
nationalist movements. Here the nationalism referred to is taken to be that 
termed state seeking, that is to say representatives of some population that 
currently did not have collective control of a state claim an autonomous political 
status, or even a separate state, because that population had a distinct, 
coherent cultural identity.317 All nationalist projects defined as state seeking 
usually involve a form of conflict with the status quo. The Scottish case is one 
where differences are recognised and given concrete expression,318 but those 
differences have been subject to attempted resolution through peaceful means. 
As a result, any comparison with diasporas involved in violent nationalist 
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conflicts has its limitations in understanding the Scottish case. This is not to say 
that they cannot be instructive.  
A diaspora’s role in a conflict situation will depend on many factors, such as the 
issues at stake in the home country, the level of organisation in the host, and 
the international attention given to the issues.319 Once involved, they can exert 
political, economic, military and socio-cultural influences on a separatist 
conflict.320 Some factors have been identified which affect the nature and 
likelihood of involvement. Firstly, a significant factor in diaspora involvement is 
the nature of the dispersal. If this has been mainly or partially generated by a 
nationalist conflict, then such conflict generated diasporas are considered more 
likely to maintain a myth of return, attachment to the home land territory and to 
display radical attitudes to home land political processes.321 
Secondly, the extent to which the diaspora is involved depends on the nature of 
the host state, of the home state, of economics and organisation.322 The nature 
of the host state is crucial. Before steam ship travel made migration and return 
relatively easy, its location may also have served as a strong factor. In the 
globalised world, the ease with which communities in a host country were 
‘permitted’ ethnic nationalism became important. At the turn of the twentieth 
century many of the American diasporas, whose group identity had been 
dormant, became ardent nationalists, inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s 
proclamation of the principle of self-determination, and became increasingly 
interested in the independence of their countries of origin. Poles, Ukrainians, 
Lithuanians, Armenians, Albanians and Croats mobilised into powerful forces 
promoting the cause of their home land’s independence.323 Yet this support was 
not extended by the American Scot to the cause of Scottish Home Rule.324 
The diaspora’s role in home land conflict perpetuation or resolution can be so 
powerful that home land leaders ignore diaspora preferences at their peril.325 
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Examples of such intervention can be found in many conflicts. Israel regards 
the Jewish diaspora, particularly Jewish-Americans, as a strategic asset. This 
diaspora influences the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict.326 The Armenian 
diaspora supports Armenians in the Karabagh conflict,327 transferring 
substantial remittances there.328 From 1916 until the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, 
concern with Irish affairs reached a new intensity in the U.S. and Canada.329 A 
World Bank Study concluded that:  
’by far the strongest effect on war or the risk of subsequent war works 
through diasporas. After five years of post-conflict peace the risk of 
renewed conflict is around six times higher in those countries with 
diasporas in America than those without American diasporas.’330  
Countries that have recently had a civil war and have a large diaspora in the US 
have a 36% chance of conflict renewal. Those with a small diaspora have only 
a 6% chance of this taking place.331 
Diasporas provide a supply of money, weapons and recruits as well as acting 
as a propaganda platform.332 They lobby host governments and other 
international actors.333 Economic assistance can be important as it can bring 
resources to those who might otherwise be denied it, vital if conflict is in poor or 
less developed states. Diasporas mitigate home land conflicts by aiding 
economic development. Between 12%-14% of the GDP per capita of post 
conflict economies may be sustained by diaspora remittances.334  
Remitting monies home is for many an accepted part of the emigrant 
experience.335 The size of these remittances can be considerable. In the early 
1990s global annual remittances stood at around $30 billion. By 2012, official 
remittance flows to developing countries was estimated at $401 billion.336 Nor is 
                                                          
326 Sheffer, 2003, p.188 
327 Shain, 2008, p.108 
328 Sheffer, 2003, p.188 
329 Campbell, 2001, p.75 
330 Shain, 2008, p.127 italics in the original.  
331 Koinova, 2011a, p.440 
332 Koinova, 2011b, p.355 
333 Shain, 2008, p.109 
334 Koinova, 2011a, p.440 
335 Magee and Thompson, 2006b, p.539; Delaney, 2007, p.41 
336 Cross, 2014, p.28 
60 
 
this a modern phenomenon. Between 1848 and 1900, £52 million at 
contemporary value was estimated to have been remitted from the U.S. to the 
UK, although the data is of doubtful quality.337 If there were to be an indication 
of the propensity of Scots to remit, it would follow that there was a potential for 
Scots to send money for political purposes. It has been difficult to discover 
research of remittances to Scotland alone. Nevertheless, there is research on 
remittances by emigrants from the British Isles, and this can at least provide an 
indication of Scots remittances. Not all types of emigrants sent remittances. 
Those attempting to set up in farming in the U.S., for example, would have little 
spare cash to send home.338 
Remittances to the UK from the Empire between 1875 and 1913 are estimated 
to have been between £130 million and £200 million in equivalent 1913 
pounds.339 Establishing whether these remitters were English, Welsh, Scottish 
or Irish is, however, more problematic but it has been suggested that most of 
these funds came from the Irish.340 The research claims remittances are driven 
by five causes. Firstly, if emigration is part of a familial strategy to maximise 
income and well-being,341 the emigrant compensates family members for 
helping him or her find better circumstances. There is a sense of obligation. 
These required remittances enable future emigration to be funded by the 
earnings of previous emigrants.342 Affordable remittances are most likely to be 
from temporary emigrants whose intentions are to return home with capital 
rather than fund further emigration. Desired remittances involve the movement 
of capital between locations to improve its value, for example to attain higher 
interest rates. Remittances help family and community members with one-off 
specific difficulties, such as relief in times of distress. Lastly, autonomous 
remittances are the ‘general background of remitting behaviour.’343  
Remittances are therefore an important way in which the diaspora may bolster 
the resources of family, village, country or causes at home. However, remitting 
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could be restricted by capital requirements in the host country. For example, in 
Wisconsin, farming was capital hungry and so emigrants could not send money 
home.344 It could be determined by marital circumstances; as the 
responsibilities of a migrant increased in the U.S., obligations in the home 
country diminished, so they sent home less money.345 Complaints about 
children not sending money home could also be heard.346 
The sense of obligation that binds members to an ethnic community, be it 
spiritual, cultural or political will affect the propensity to remit. First and second 
generation Irish-Americans and Irish-Australians gave generously to Parnell’s 
Land League and Redmond’s Home Rule funds respectively. Magee and 
Thompson conclude that such remittances would be less contractual and more 
in the nature of gifts, with the migrant as a benefactor.347 It would be reasonable 
to conclude that it would be from this final category of remitting that any 
donations to Scottish home rule organisations would come, from those Scots 
abroad still feeling the binds of the Scottish community. 
The Comparison Diasporas 
It has been demonstrated that diasporas are one of the prominent actors that 
link the domestic and international spheres of political activity. They may be 
committed to the use of force, engaging, under some circumstances, in ‘long 
distance nationalism’ without accountability.348 The proposal to compare the 
Scottish diaspora with others initiates the search for suitable candidates.  
Using the diaspora characteristics previously identified, the criteria for 
establishing the candidates would be as follows. Firstly a proportionately large 
emigration in the main driven by the search for opportunity, land and work. 
Secondly, a diaspora is formed. Thirdly, that it is predominantly a settler 
population in the host countries. Fourth, there should be a state seeking 
nationalist project in the home country. Lastly, these conditions should be 
roughly contemporary, providing historical context.  
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One diaspora presents itself immediately, that of the Irish. The Irish nationalist 
movement coincided with Scots home rule activity from 1885-1921, with the 
Ulster civil disruption occupying the last 10 years of the time frame, 1969-79. 
There was a large migration over a similar period to that of the Scots, and a 
diaspora formed in some of the same places. That the emigration was in the 
main driven by the search for opportunity, land and work rather than conflict is a 
matter for exploration below. 
A second choice, though not as extensively researched in the discourse, is that 
of Norway. The size of its emigration, spurred by the search for work and 
opportunity, its settler nature and diaspora are all a good fit. The struggle to end 
the Union with Sweden provides a non-violent nationalist project. This 
overlapped Scottish home rule activities from 1885 to 1906. Scotland was 
different in one factor. Ireland and Norway were overwhelmingly rural and 
Scotland was a highly industrialised and urbanised country.349  See table V 
below for a summary of characteristics 
Ireland 
From 1541, English monarchs ruled Ireland in a regal union. In 1801, Ireland 
was integrated into the expanded United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
until that ended, after a violent struggle, in 1921. The island of Ireland was 
divided, Republican Catholic Eire in the south and Unionist Protestant Ulster in 
the north.350 The Irish emigration was significant. Nineteenth century current 
emigration to the U.S. is estimated at almost five million,351 considerably in 
excess of that of the Scots.352 No other European country suffered such a 
sustained depopulation in that period.353 
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Table V. Summary of Case Study Attributes Compared with Scotland 
Country 
of Origin 
Emigration Diaspora  
dispersal 
Nationalist 
Project 
Engagement Main host 
countries 
Ireland From 1700 onwards, 
9-10 M. Mainly for 
opportunity. About 
one-fifth due to famine 
Imperial 
and labour 
diaspora  
Violent and 
peaceful 
struggle to 
leave the UK  
Diaspora sent 
arms, money, 
violence in 
host countries   
U.S., 
Britain 
Norway 19th century, 800,000. 
Opportunity seeking 
Labour 
diaspora  
Non-violent  
end of union 
with Sweden 
Negligible U.S. 
Scotland From 1700 onwards, 
3.6M. Mostly opportunity 
seeking. Some famine 
victims 
Imperial 
diaspora, 
minority  
victim 
element 
Peaceful 
seeking of 
home rule or 
complete 
departure 
from UK 
Sparse, 
intermittent 
and ultimately 
not significant 
Canada, 
U.S., 
Australasia, 
England 
Sources: Kenny, 2003, p.135. 
In the early nineteenth century, Britain was the preferred destination, with 
50,000 arriving each year.354 From the 1840s to 1920 the US took 75% of Irish 
emigrants. From 1921, Britain was re-established as the destination of choice. 
The Irish dispersal was much larger than that of the Scots, both in absolute and 
relative terms.355 An Irish settler reported in 1832 that ‘so numerous have been 
the arrivals of settlers, with considerable capital, that within a year three 
hundred thousand sovereigns (one sovereign = £120 in the value of the time) 
have been deposited in the bank of Upper Canada.’356 This is testament to both 
the number and wealth of the settlers in this part of Canada.  
The reasons for this dispersal have differences and similarities with that of the 
Scots. Despite the longevity of the Irish dispersal, that triggered by the Great 
Famine has to an extent been characterised as a single catastrophic event, in 
the classic diasporic sense.357 This should not be overplayed. Although two 
million left as a result of the famine, nearly four times as many left at other 
times for other reasons.358 Despite the prevalence of the ‘exile’ image, few 
emigrants were compelled by force or famine to leave Ireland during 1855-
1922.359 When Thomas Magrath, an Irishman in Toronto, wrote to his friend the 
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Rev. Thomas Radcliffe, he welcomed the fact that Radcliffe’s sons were coming 
to Canada and there is no hint of compulsion about their departure.360 In Ireland 
as in Scotland, emigration was a commonplace device for self-improvement 
and part of the national fabric.361 One significant difference was that very few 
Irish went home.362  
Norway 
From 1387 to 1814 Norway was either a part of Sweden or latterly a province of 
Denmark. In 1814, at the Treaty of Kiev, it was ceded in a regal and political 
union to Sweden.363 This Union was different from that of Scotland or Ireland. 
Norway never accepted it and contended that the sovereignty renounced by 
Denmark reverted to the Norwegian people.364 Although the King of Sweden 
became King of Norway, this was by gift of the existing Norwegian parliament 
or Storting. The Norwegians strenuously resisted attempts to consolidate the 
two states, asserting that sovereignty rested with the Storting, not the Crown. 
Therefore the King of Sweden was the King of Norway by permission of the 
parliament.365 The initial formation of the Union was peaceful as both countries 
were exhausted by war and famine. The continued existence of the Storting 
was key to the eventual peaceful and successful separation from Sweden. 
The Storting made various attempts during the 19th century to amend the 
conditions of the Union to suit the Norwegians, initially between 1814 and 1836 
and then from 1859 onwards.366 In 1881 the country split into parties over the 
constitution, in particular over the King’s veto over constitutional legislation. 
These parties, a Royal party, a radical opposition and a republican party, fought 
the 1882 general election and the radicals got a hefty majority of 80 to 34.367 In 
1883 the principle was introduced that Norwegian ministers were not servants 
of the King but of the state.368 Norway was at that time ruled by a ministry 
                                                          
360 Magrath, 1833, pp.15-18 
361 Harper, 2003, p.3 
362 Ibid., p.148 
363 Sperry et. al., 1907, p.441 
364 Boyesen, 1893, pp.68-9 
365 Boyesen, 1893, p.69 
366 Burgess, 1886, pp.273-4 
367 Ibid., p.281 
368 Ibid., p.292 
65 
 
staffed by Norwegians and the only element of government that was common 
to both countries was the consular and diplomatic service.369 In 1893 the 
government had passed a law setting up a separate consular service which the 
King had refused to sign. This was seen as a ‘mere entering wedge’ leading 
sooner or later to a claim for independence.370  
It can be seen from this brief summary that the liberation in 1905 was the result 
of constitutional efforts over time by the Storting. In this respect it was quite 
different from the Scots’ efforts to end their Union, as it was achieved by 
legislators in a parliament that had remained in being. There was never really a 
violent option as the King was head of the Army and a considerable portion of 
the Norwegians would not tolerate a resort to arms.371 In this respect they were 
similar to the Scots, though quite different to the Irish. 
There was a tradition of movement in Norway and as a result of ‘American 
Fever’, the U.S. was the main destination.372 Between 1846 and 1930, 850,000 
left373 from a population that was only 800,000 in 1801.374 In the period 1866 to 
1914, Norway lost over 40 per cent of its natural increase in population, the 
highest recorded save for Ireland.375 Emigration was such a strong force in 
Norwegian life that after 1909 a Society for the Restriction of Emigration was 
established.376 
From the second half of the nineteenth century, there were not enough jobs at 
home, and what had been a rural emigration became predominantly urban from 
1873 onwards.377 Whereas the pull factor of higher wages and plentiful jobs in 
America were undoubtedly a factor in Norwegian emigration, the push factor of 
rapid structural change from the rural to the industrial economy meant that for 
the rural population the move to a Norwegian city and the move to the U.S. 
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were to some extent alternatives.378 Unlike the Irish, some Norwegians did 
return. In 1920 there were 50,000 Norwegian-Americans living in Norway.  
The Norwegian emigration experience was proportional to that of the Irish and 
Scots. There was, however, no element of tragic dispersal such as the famine 
of Ireland or the dearths and clearances of Scotland, additionally, the vast 
majority of Norwegians went to America. Recalling that the ‘tragic’ dispersal 
occasions were not the major part of the Scots or Irish dispersals, then on the 
emigration’s significance alone, it can be argued that Norway is a contender for 
comparison.  
The Norwegians thought much of their home land. They modelled their 
associational activities around similar activities in Norway. This served as a way 
of emphasising Norwegian ethnic awareness so demonstrated boundary 
maintenance. The spontaneous support received from Norwegian-Americans 
during the independence negotiations of 1905 led one commentator to assert 
that ‘the desire for tying lasting bonds and encouraging all possible cooperation 
between Norwegians at home and abroad is now strong on both sides of the 
ocean.’379 The centenary of Norway’s constitution was fervently celebrated by 
Norwegians in the U.S. on May 17th 1914. Twenty thousand Norwegian-
Americans went to Norway for the commemoration.380  
Norwegians showed considerable remittance activity. From the 1850s they sent 
considerable sums home and an estimated 12-15 million kroner were sent 
annually from 1905-14,381  and $10 million per annum after 1910.382 Money was 
raised for victims of natural disasters in Norway,383 the commemorations of 
independence in 1905 and the centenary of the constitution in 1914.384 
Norwegian-Americans made a decisive contribution to the founding of the 
Norwegian-American shipping line, and during the Nazi occupation they 
organised aid of $8 million to Norway.385  
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Boundary maintenance is evidenced by the close association of the 
Norwegians with the mid-west states in America.386 Further evidence is to be 
found amongst their many associational activities. As with the Scots, 
Norwegian-Americans were active in forming associations. Many of these 
centred on the church, but there were also women’s, young people’s and many 
singing societies.387 They also founded rifle clubs in imitation of those in 
Norway. They would gather to share the task of a major project, like building a 
barn. These occasions would have music and dancing.388 From the late 
nineteenth century, the descendants or emigrants from Norway’s many regions 
formed 50 bygdelags, annual assemblies to celebrate their home land 
culture.389 Created in 1895, the Sons of Norway, a lodge-based society with 
12,000 members by 1914, provided social activities and insurance.390 Evidence 
of boundary maintenance over time is, therefore, abundant. 
Summary 
This chapter has undertaken a detailed examination of the Scottish emigration 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The case has been presented that, 
although not unusual in a contemporary European context, the volume of 
emigration was significant for Scotland with the order of 3.5 million leaving 
between 1825 and 1981. The most favoured destinations were England, the 
US, Canada and Australasia. Once abroad, the Scots, like the Irish, English 
and Norwegians, formed an associational culture which presented visible 
evidence of the formation of a diaspora. 
The chapter described the phenomena of diasporas, their characteristics and 
their undertakings as transnational actors. The agreement has been made that 
that although the term has been overused it provides a useful framework with 
which to examine the involvement of Scots abroad in the nationalist projects of 
their home land. In point of fact the broad usage of the term in the discourse 
eases the argument that the Scots abroad can be regarded as such. Diasporas 
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are typologised using both the nature of their dispersal and the role they play in 
the host lands to which they emigrate. To facilitate the analysis of the 
engagement of the Scottish diaspora with nationalist projects in its home land, 
comparison diasporas have been identified. It has been advanced that those of 
the Irish and the Norwegians are appropriate due to their nationally significant 
emigrations, associational culture, destination host lands and vigorous 
opposition to an unpopular Union between the home land and another state. 
The following chapter looks at the first period of Scottish activism in the search 
for home rule and independence, that of 1885 to 1951, the period when 
pressure groups performed a prominent role in the pursuit of the Scottish 
nationalist project. 
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Chapter Three:  Pressure Groups and Parties; 1885 - 
1951  
 
‘To the Scot abroad, - who, enjoying himself the blessings of home rule 
may assist in restoring them to the dear fatherland - the following 
pamphlet is respectfully dedicated by the author.’391 W. Mitchell, Hon. 
Treasurer, SHRA 
This chapter seeks to understand the engagement of the Scottish diaspora with 
the nationalist projects of its home land. It begins with scene setting and 
historical context. A brief introduction to the political context of interest in 
Scottish home rule is provided, as well as a description of contemporary 
emigration. Further, it lays out the broader picture of democratic and 
constitutional progress over the period of the chapter. The chapter then 
examines four of the groups established to promote Scottish Home Rule and 
Independence. It does not provide a history of these groups; rather to ask how 
they used the diaspora to further their ends. It describes the methods of 
operation of pressure groups in general and the home rule groups in particular 
to identify how the diaspora could have helped. It then looks at examples of the 
behaviour of the groups and their contact with Scots abroad. Finally, the actions 
of the comparison diasporas are examined. 
Judging Success of the SHRAs 
It is important to understand by what measurement the relative successes and 
failures of the two SHRAs should be determined or judged, and on whose 
grounds or from whose perspective such judgments can be made. In assessing 
the success and failures of the two SHRAs in their ability to garner support from 
the diaspora, their own statements of what they understood they were asking of 
the diaspora are an essential starting point. At no time was there any formal 
measurement of their engagement. Their success or otherwise can then be 
judged fairly impartially by an observer of the outcomes of their activities. Both 
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organisations were implicitly to be judged by those to whom they directed their 
message. 
For the first SHRA, although it sought to gather public support, the message 
was, most directly, aimed at legislators in Westminster, the people who could 
bring their objective into effect.392 For the second SHRA, whilst also needing to 
engage legislators, the scope of influence was much wider. Reflecting the 
extended franchise of its time, there was more emphasis on public opinion, an 
active and numerous body of members and the support and affiliation of public 
bodies.  
SHRA 1886 
At the second Annual Conference of the first SHRA, held in Dundee on the 25th   
of September 1889, 393 it was unanimously resolved that with a view to 
educating public opinion on the subject, an appeal be “made to Scotsmen, all 
over the world, for funds” 394 Mitchell, who wrote this appeal in the 1892 
prospectus of the SHRA, revealed that the SHRA wanted support from the 
Scottish diaspora and that it wanted that support in the form of money. A year 
earlier, the SHRA had made an Appeal to the Scot Abroad for 'pecuniary aid,’395 
that they might organise committees and disseminate information throughout 
the length and breadth of the United Kingdom.396 
A week earlier, in Melbourne, Australia, the Scottish Home Rule Association of 
Victoria was established. It resolved to take steps to ‘establish branches 
throughout the colony.’ The call to ‘Agitate and Organise’ was made in an 
undated private letter to anticipated supporters, as well as to ask for as big a 
donation as possible.397 There was a clear need for money to promote the 
prospectus of the organisation, and an understanding that, in Australia at least, 
that would come from a branch organisation.  
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The success of the organisation would be judged by its successful influence of 
legislators to pass a bill enabling a parliament in Scotland. The success of its 
methods in tapping the resources of the diaspora would be found in funds from 
abroad and branches overseas. 
SHRA 1918 
When Roland Muirhead wrote to 80 newspapers in Australia, he made some 
comment as to what he hoped for in the way of support from the Scottish 
diaspora there.398 Firstly he asked for publicity, to advise Scottish readers of the 
establishment of this new SHRA. Secondly he asked for members to join, to 
give moral as well as material support to the Association. He emphasised the 
failure of Parliamentary efforts reflected in the failure of six bills in the twentieth 
century to date.  
His replies to the correspondents who responded to the articles offered a little 
more granularity. Although the replies were individually drafted, a small number 
of themes persisted. He usually stated his overall objective: Scotland’s freedom 
from English authority and for the betterment of the conditions of the Scottish 
people,399 in some form or other, reflecting the correspondents’ queries.  
He noted that the SHRA had come to the conclusion that Scotland ‘is not the 
only part that seems interested in this onward movement of ours,’400 hence the 
appeal to what he referred to as the colonies. He suggested the establishment 
of local branches of the SHRA, and desired ‘as large a number of members as 
possible.’401 Additionally, Caledonian societies could be affiliated to the 
SHRA.402 The distribution of literature to keep up the propaganda battle would 
be a feature of the assistance of the diaspora that it might bring to the 
knowledge of the powers that be their demand for self-government. Finally, a 
constant was the request for money. His replies advised of an Annual 
subscription of a minimum of 1/- ; the SHRA was ‘always in need of finance.’403 
He was, however, less clear about specific actions outside of these broad 
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parameters.  As to how they should go about it, he felt that should reflect local 
conditions; ‘I shall leave you to determine the method by which you can best 
assist us.’404 Having dealt with the issue of judging the success or failure of 
these organisations, the chapter will now provide context which determined the 
political climate in which groups proposing a Scottish parliament operated. 
Home Rule and Political Parties 
The SHRA was established in 1886 after the publication of Gladstone’s Bill for 
Irish Home Rule. It appreciated from the outset that it would encounter 
prejudice in using the words ‘home rule’ on account of the negative association 
with nationalist disaffection in Ireland.405 Additionally the notion of a Scottish 
Parliament was seen as ‘an anachronism, an absurdity’ by some.406 Gladstone 
only mentioned Scotland once in his Midlothian campaign of 1879-80.407 He 
was afraid that Scottish home rule would harm England and was worried it 
would hinder the case in Ireland.408 He did consider a scheme for a Scottish 
Parliament but it was not received well by some at the time.409 Gladstone, with 
Scottish ancestry but residing in England and representing an English 
constituency, was part of the diaspora. He seemed a likely source of 
encouragement for the SHRA, due to his support for home rule for Ireland and 
for his speeches in favour of home rule all round.410 However, after the second 
Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in 1893, the SHRA was critical of his efforts, 
doubting that he had embraced the notion of home rule for anywhere but 
Ireland.411  
The introduction of the first Home Rule Bill in April 1886 had a relevance for 
Scotland. Scotland gave the Liberals a large and solid vote, so the electorate of 
Scotland were being relied upon by Gladstone’s Liberals to pass the Home 
Rule Bill.412 When asked, he refused to be a Patron of the organisation, 
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reportedly considering himself too old to take on additional responsibilities.413 
Gladstone continued to be a target for the home rulers and they dangled their 
support for him as a quid pro quo for his support of Scottish Home Rule as well 
as Irish. They continued to be disappointed,414 even though in 1894 Charles 
Waddie (founder of the SHRA) could write that ‘the average Gladstonian elector 
assures me that he is as good a Scottish Home Ruler as I am.’415 
The campaign to establish a Scottish Office genuinely excited public opinion.416 
The moves towards Irish Home Rule, however, must have provided the 
significant driver, with resentment that the Irish were receiving more 
consideration than the Scots in the home rule debates in the early 1880s.417 
Cabinet records of the time cited the inevitability of home rule for Ireland.418 On 
October 11th, 1888, Lord Hartington expressed the feeling at the time in the 
‘Scottish Highlander’ that home rule for Ireland means Scotland and Wales will 
soon follow.419  The political situation contemporary to the first SHRA had much 
to encourage the debate of home rule for Scotland. 
Emigration, 1885 to 1951  
Net emigration during the period this chapter examines is relevant as 
contemporary migration can make remittances more likely. It also acts as a 
counterweight to assimilation to maintain the size and activity of a diaspora. 
Those emigrating may take with them the political themes and issues of the 
home land. Scottish emigration continued strongly, with 1.5 million of net 
migration, of which 540,000 was to the rest of the UK. This was not lost on at 
least one of the leaders of the new nationalist movements, Roland Muirhead.  
He identified the emigrants as partly responsible for the state of affairs in 
Scotland: ‘Scots folk who go to Canada or elsewhere abroad have some 
responsibility for the state of affairs in Scotland’; ‘reared and educated at much 
expense to Scotland’ should ‘give some help to the country of their origin.’420  
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They took steps to try to include Scots abroad in their campaigns so as to 
encourage that help.421 It has been shown that help from a diaspora could 
come in many forms; for the SHRA, as a pressure group, money and influence 
were the major part of what they wanted. 
Democracy and Constitutional Change in the Diaspora Host 
Countries 
The onset of liberal democracy and extended franchises seldom comes as a 
neat package, but develops over a long period, varying considerably in its 
completeness over time.422 Table VI below takes the extension of the franchise 
as one measure of liberal democracy in selected countries referred to in this 
thesis. It can be seen that the period of analysis is one of great change in the 
countries of the diaspora’s location. Except for parts of the U.S. which began in 
the 1820s and Australia that had extended the franchise in the 1850s, none of 
the major countries of origin or settlement had granted male suffrage when the 
SHRA was founded in 1886. Participation was extremely low in the U.S. 
however, and African Americans did not begin to get the vote until after the Civil 
War. 
Further political context can be provided by dates for the establishment of 
statehood in the diaspora host lands. The SHRA was asking the Scots abroad 
to sanction home rule for Scotland, the SNP later demanding independence. 
Therefore it is reasonable to compare the progress of the colonial destinations 
towards home rule and statehood. This would demonstrate whether the 
diaspora was rooted in states that had established themselves as independent 
actors, as they were being asked to support Scotland in a similar journey. Table 
VII below provides a high level summary of this progress in selected countries.  
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Table VI: Extension of the Franchise, Selected Countries 
Country Male suffrage Universal Suffrage 
United Kingdom 1918 1929 
Ireland 1918 1923 
Norway 1898 1915 
United States 1820s423 1965424 
Canada 1920425 1920 
Australia 1856-1890 1902 
New Zealand 1893 1893 
South Africa  1931426 1930 
Sources: Adapted from: Fukuyama, 2014, p.415; 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/womens-suffrage/ 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/franchise/ http://hsf.org.za/resource-
centre/hsf-briefs/a-long-walk-to-universal-franchise-in-south-africa-1 ; Tilly, 2007, pp.96-98 
 
Table VII: Progress towards Home Rule and Statehood, Selected 
Countries 
Country Home rule or self- 
governing constitution 
Statehood  
United States n/a 1783 
Canada 1848 1931 
Australia 1855,1856, 1859 and 1890 1901 (Dominium) 
New Zealand 1857 1907 (Dominium) 
South Africa 1910427 1931 
Ireland n/a 1921428 
Norway 1819429 1906 
Sources: Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973, pp.148-9; Peel and Twomey, 2011, p.43; Sinclair, 
2000, p.223; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Australia#Colonial_self-
government_and_the_gold_rushes; Ross, Mager and Nasson, 2011, p. 211. 
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Pressure Groups, Ways of Working  
There were to be many groups formed over this period to promote 
self-government for Scotland in some way. Such pressure groups, formed to 
change something in society that requires legislation as opposed to some moral 
shift, need to influence those who make laws. In the case of the United 
Kingdom this was the Parliament at Westminster.  
Pressure groups comprise individuals using rights of free assembly and 
expression to combine to achieve the introduction, prevention, continuation or 
abolition of whatever measures are important to them.430 Pressure groups can 
be distinguished from political parties as groups which ‘seek to influence power 
whilst remaining apart from it.’431  Political parties ‘strive to acquire power and to 
exercise it.’432 Pressure groups can be more or less subordinate to political 
parties, or the reverse may be true. In some cases there can be equality and 
common purpose.433 Some are mass organisations with large memberships 
made up of individuals, others compose of groups of affiliated like-minded 
organisations, yet others consist of small cadres of people with common 
aims.434  
They can be further distinguished into groups which are ‘for’ something or ‘of’ 
something. The latter may also be thought of as a sectional group, interested in 
promoting the interests of a section of the population, the former a promotional 
group, proselytising a particular cause.435 The home rule pressure groups may 
be thought of as being promotional.436 Many of these characteristics were 
shown by the groups that were formed to promote the cause of self-government 
for Scotland, sometimes changing from one type to another.437  
A second type of distinction would be that of insider and outsider groups. In 
order to achieve their aims, most of these groups had to influence MPs at 
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Westminster and the government of the day. To be considered insiders, a 
group could be useful in some way to the government achieving its aims, or 
able to provide helpful technical expertise. Sectional groups are more likely to 
have insider status, and promotional groups less so. This does not mean that 
insiders are more successful than outsiders.438 Home rule organisations have 
tended to be outsider promotional types.  
The approaches used by pressure groups are typically shaped by the 
characteristics of the political system in which they are operating. In the UK, the 
most effective way is to establish good links with Whitehall. However, for many 
promotional groups, the government is classified as the enemy.439 The first 
SHRA was an outsider body, and one which was pressing for radical change.440 
Popular sovereignty was part of the group’s objectives and so an appeal to the 
public was unavoidable.441 The group spread its message through 
pamphlets,442 the press, speeches at meetings and through the support of 
influential figures of the time, and they had to convince the lawmakers, MPs, to 
support them with legislation.  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as government expanded 
into areas of education, welfare, health and leisure, a variety of public groups 
emerged to promote specific political agendas.443 The nineteenth century 
SHRA, whilst devoting considerable effort to promoting bills in Parliament, was 
denied influence in Parliament and so took a range of arguments through 
letters, news articles and publications to make plain the case to the reading 
public.444 The post-World War One SHRA summarised its methods as follows: 
Hold public meetings, get favourable press coverage, secure pledges from 
political candidates in return for supporting them, publish literature and hold a 
National Convention.445 
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The First SHRA, 1886 - 1906 
The aims of the first SHRA were to promote the establishment of a legislature in 
Scotland with full control over purely Scottish matters and with an executive 
government responsible to the Crown, excluding the control of the military, 
diplomacy and the collection of Imperial revenue. It also wished to accomplish 
this whilst maintaining the integrity of the Empire and Scotland’s voice in 
Imperial affairs.446 All British subjects or persons of Scottish descent were 
eligible to join the Association which made no distinction as to whether they 
were nearby or far away,447 an implied invitation to the Scots abroad. The 
SHRA membership was a cadre of MPs, academics and other prominent Scots. 
They included R. B. Cunninghame Graham, a diaspora returnee, who had been 
a cattle rancher in Argentina. He was a Liberal MP in 1886 and an SHRA Vice 
President in 1887.  
This period featured other public activity to support home rule for Scotland, that 
of several moves to get the subject discussed and legislation promoted at 
Westminster. Appendix I contains the detail of these activities. Between 1889 
and 1914 there were fifteen attempts under four prime ministers to promote 
either an amendment or a Bill in favour of more self-government for Scotland. 
Two of the prime ministers, Gladstone and Rosebery, could be regarded as 
diaspora Scots. None of these attempts progressed further than a second 
reading. This activity demonstrates that, except for a gap between 1895 and 
1908 when there were Conservative administrations under Salisbury and 
Balfour, there was regular discussion of the matter in the legislature. Despite 
this, the diaspora remained lacking in support. The response of the Scots in the 
House will be dealt with in detail, in chapter five. 
To provide further context, it is interesting to examine the position of the SHRA 
on an extension of the franchise. A pamphlet by Professor J.S. Blackie written 
in 1892 lists grievances. The lack of a Scots parliament for all Scottish matters, 
ecclesiastical freedom from Episcopalianism and the treatment of the higher 
education system. There is no mention of manhood or universal suffrage.448 
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Likewise, Mitchell, writing in the same year, lists political, financial and social 
grievances but asks for no improvement in the franchise for the electors of the 
parliament he demands for Scotland.449  
However, Charles Waddie’s draft of the Government of Scotland Bill of 1892 
does contain comment on the intended franchise. There are to be four classes 
of voters, the bottom two (artisans and labourers) would elect 70 MPs using full 
manhood suffrage. The middle class would elect 30 MPs, if they had a 
household worth £50 or were income tax payers. Towns and villages would 
elect 26 MPs but the qualification was not made clear. There was no mention of 
women.450 
Contemporary literature published by, and sympathetic with, the SHRA is 
supportive of the Empire, and specifically placed Scotland as a peer of Canada 
or Australia, worthy of Dominion status. ‘home rule all round’ in the Empire 
meant to them home rule for Scotland as well.451  
The SHRA asked for support from the Scots abroad and in England. There was 
a Colonial Secretary, Thomas McNaught, and it was his job to engage the 
Scots abroad in dialogue with the Association. McNaught wrote claiming that 
‘the whole of the colonial press, with the exception of The Commercial 
published in Winnipeg, has proclaimed itself in favour of the SHR movement’, 
that in South Africa and Australia especially. He claimed that ‘committees are 
being formed in every part of the empire where there are Scots.’ He notes there 
is one in Trinidad as well as in Jamaica, and Guiana.452 Testing the truth of 
these assertions is best done by location. 
The US and Canada 
McNaught went on tour in the U.S. and Canada in September of 1888, and 
there is a report of a visit to Chicago in the Inter Ocean, a Chicago newspaper. 
On 5th September 1888 there was a long article in the New York Herald about 
McNaught, home rule and his aim to raise £100,000 for a ‘parliamentary fund’ 
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to fight for home rule.453 No evidence has come to light of this level of funds 
being raised by the Scots abroad or at home, although it will be demonstrated 
that contemporaneous Irish contributions to their nationalist cause may have 
made it seem possible.  There was some evidence of support in the US. 
Waddie wrote to the Daily Mail passing on the contents of a letter from Robert 
Duncan of Boston, in which he referred to the report in the New York Herald of 
the 5th September 1888, quoted earlier, of an interview given about the 
SHRA.454 
The request for support from the Scots abroad resulted in the establishment of 
a small number of overseas branches. The New York SHRA was founded and 
was still in existence in 1913 when it organised meetings with sympathisers in 
the US for the visit of the International Scots Home Rule League.455 There was 
support from Andrew Carnegie who spoke in favour of American republicanism 
and democracy and home rule. In a particular instance, he addressed the 
Glasgow Junior Liberal Association on the subject of ‘Home Rule in America.’456 
The SHRA published a pamphlet on the speech which also supported Home 
Rule for Scotland.457 
Australasia 
In 1891 the Scottish Home Rule Association of Victoria was formed with £100 
donated by its chairman, Theodore Napier.458 There was evidence of the 
support of the Irish National League of Victoria with a visit of one of its 
members at the next meeting of the Association.459 The Association’s name 
was changed at the meeting on 14th January 1892, to the National Association 
to counter objections to the name. The Melbourne Argus reports that 
attendance was not numerous and the name change was felt by Napier to be 
necessary to get more members.460 There were many Scots in Victoria. In 1881 
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Scots-born people made up a greater percentage of the population than was 
the case for Australia as a whole.461 Perhaps because of the number of Scots in 
Melbourne, and also because it was managed by a Scottish family,462 the 
Melbourne Argus provided occasional reports on Scottish home rule activity in 
its pages, in the context of other political news from the UK.463 In 1892 Napier 
published one of many of his pamphlets in support of Scottish home rule,464 and 
Napier was to sail to Scotland where he was to publish a number of pamphlets 
on home rule whilst in the UK.465 Born in Melbourne and therefore a returnee, 
Napier was an activist on behalf of the SHRA, petitioning Queen Victoria over 
the use of the term England rather than Britain.466 
London 
There was a so-called ‘London Committee’ which appeared to be organised by 
Mitchell, SHRA treasurer. He recognised that the SHRA ‘has been under great 
obligations’ to a few London Scotsmen. He also understood that this connection 
did not reach out to the broader numbers of Scots in the city,467 and attempted 
to appeal to this wider audience. 
Therefore, help was sought from the diaspora, and there is evidence that some 
was given. Appeals were made by the SHRA in various forms. An appeal was 
made to ‘our countrymen scattered all over the world for pecuniary aid’ to 
support home rule all round.468 By 1895, the reserves of the organisation had 
declined from an initial balance of £300 to £33, an indication that the support 
expected from abroad or home was not forthcoming.469 The Victorian 
Association issued an appeal to Scotsmen in Australia.470 However, there had 
been signs in 1893 that the Association was losing its momentum,471 and by 
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1906 it was defunct.472 The fund raising and support gathering from the 
diaspora was a failure in practical terms as it did not support the organisation 
with sufficient funds and publicity to fulfil its aims. The notes above about 
remittances from the US and Australia are the only evidence of contributions 
from the diaspora identified in the research. This is in stark contrast to the Irish 
experience, which will be examined later. From 1909, continued interest in 
home rule in Scotland was driven by a very active Liberal interest group, The 
Young Scots Society.473 Which included Roland Muirhead amongst its 
members. 474 However this group was not exclusively about Scots 
self-government. 475  
The International Scots Home Rule League (the League) 
The League was formed in May 1913 by Councillor F. J. Robertson. The very 
name of the organisation proclaims from the outset that its focus was 
international and its declared object was to ‘unite Scots Home Rulers 
throughout the world, in promoting the establishment of a National Parliament in 
Scotland.’476 Robertson was a former member of the Scottish Home Rule 
Council, set up by the government to enquire into how Scotland may run more 
of her own affairs. The League published a monthly periodical, The Scottish 
Nation, (Nation) and at once began appeals to Scots abroad for support. A 
specific section of the paper, ‘News from Afar’ was established and both a 
domestic and an overseas edition was published. The League was ‘anxious to 
enrol members, and for branches in all parts of the world.’477 The intention was 
specifically to make the demand for a National Parliament come from not only 
Scotland but from the Scottish race.478 Thousands of Scottish Societies around 
the world were issued with a circular letter giving information about the League 
and Nation.479   
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In late 1913, Robertson sailed to America and travelled over 13,000 miles to 
speak to Scots and their descendants in many cities in North America and 
Canada. Branches were established in New York, Philadelphia, St Louis, 
Chicago, Minneapolis, Seattle, Vancouver, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, 
Albany and Boston.480 A year later, additional agents in the U.S., Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were being called for to push the sale 
of the Nation’s overseas edition.481 There were ‘Honourable Presidents’ in 
London, Toronto and New York as well as Scotland.482 By 1914 there were 130 
Honourable Presidents of branches of the League, 28 of which were based in 
the US or Canada and a further five in England.483 In 1916 the number of 
overseas branches was broadly similar, with 34 out of 124 being outside 
Scotland.484 
Lists of office bearers were published which emphasised the influential nature 
of those involved. Mr William Beattie, described as a ‘moving spirit in Scottish 
circles in Toronto’ and John Cairns, ‘actively associated with Scottish societies 
in Saskatoon’ appear on the Canadian list. Eighteen US office bearers are 
listed, emphasising their connection with other associations and organs of the 
Scots in the US; a past Royal Chief, an editor of The Scotsman (in Boston), an 
editor of the Scottish American, and two officials of the SHRA.485 For the most 
part these are men and women ranking in the Scots associational culture in the 
US and Canada. A campaign fund of £1,000 was called for and contributions 
requested from all members. There was an expectation on the part of the 
League of receiving material assistance as well as sympathy from its 
supporters all over the world.486 
This seems to confirm the involvement of the Scots abroad in this League. Two 
caveats must be applied however. Firstly, those involved are Scots engaged in 
cultural or associational activities.  Secondly, it is unclear what real support in 
the form of money or representation was given. Although there may have been 
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others, there is reported in the Nation only one instance of an overseas branch 
sending its resolutions to Asquith, the British Prime Minister, in 1914.487 Without 
direct evidence of the accounts of the League it is difficult to be certain about 
the existence of support through funding. However, unlike in the later similar 
periodical, the Scots Independent, there are no references to donations in the 
Nation, only unspecified notes of the generosity of its supporters. Therefore the 
lists of branches in the Nation are the only real indication of the size of support. 
The League continued into the war years of 1914 to 1918, but its efforts were 
focussed more towards the war’s effects on Scots people. The question of 
home rule was declared to be a lower priority until peace returned and the 
organisation did ‘not conduct propagandist work’ during the crisis.488  The view 
taken by the Irish Nationalist movement was very different, as will be discussed 
below. Reports from the ‘International Scots’ section of the Nation show 
meetings taking place, but notes of the meetings do not reveal any deep 
political debate, just lists of officers and cultural activities.489 It is hard to 
imagine what would have been the outcome of the League’s efforts if the war 
had not begun when it did. The Scots abroad, whilst showing some sympathy 
amongst those already in Associations in the US and Canada do not appear to 
have been any more forthcoming to the League than they were to the SHRA.  
The Second SHRA and its Successors and the Scottish 
Convention, 1918-51 
The period after the war saw an increase in the nationalist debate.490 There had 
been conferences in 1917 and 1919 on the Empire, stating it should be based 
on the principle of nationhood. A Welsh home rule conference had been 
organised in 1922 and a Government of Wales Bill produced in the same 
year.491 Plaid Cymru was founded in 1925 providing a single focus for the wish 
to establish a government in Wales.492 However, the overwhelming social and 
economic conditions associated with the 1930s caused a drop in the Labour 
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party’s support for nationalism.493 Socialism proposed centralising power so 
that the problems of capitalism could be solved by a potent source of authority, 
home rule was not an important policy for Labour at this time.494  
Nevertheless there was some parliamentary activity. Seven Bills supporting 
Scottish self-government were introduced between 1919 and 1928. One of 
these, the 1924 Government of Scotland Bill, was introduced during the 
premiership of Ramsay Macdonald, a Scot in England, whose correspondence 
with Muirhead is discussed below. The 1927 Bill of James Barr was regarded 
as radical as it argued for Dominion status and the removal of Scottish MPs 
from the Commons.495 None of these attempts got beyond a second reading. 
The detail can be found in appendix I and the comments from MPs in the 
diaspora will be analysed in chapter five. 
In 1918, the second SHRA was founded. Although some members were the 
same as the pre-war group, this organisation was more of the Labour 
establishment rather than Scottish Liberal.496 Roland Muirhead was its founder 
and Cunninghame Graham was its president from 1925.497 Letters were sent to 
MPs of Scottish constituencies to invite them to the SHRA’s first annual 
meeting and demonstration on the 29th March 1919. It notes that the SHRA 
wished to appeal to a broad cross-section of Scottish society rather than a 
partisan section and had many organisations as affiliates, such as 
co-operatives, trades unions and other labour bodies.498 Therefore, even 
though this SHRA had as its members followers of Labour and the left, it 
attempted to be non-partisan.  
Like the first SHRA before it, the second SHRA failed in its efforts to change the 
governance of Scotland. There was no commitment to home rule in the 
manifestoes of any of the major parties for the 1924 election.499 This was 
recognised by Muirhead as a failure of method.500 A new party whose MPs 
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would put the question of home rule above all others was needed;501 the NPS 
was formed in 1928. This was an amalgam of several movements; The 
Glasgow University Students’ Nationalist Association, The Scots National 
League, The Scottish National Movement and the SHRA.502 The Scottish 
National Party (SNP) was founded in 1934 on the merging of the NPS 
(1928-34) and the moderate-rightist Scottish Party (1930-34).503 The root cause 
for its foundation had been the failure of attempts to bring about the reform of 
government in Scotland.  
Muirhead wrote of the diaspora; ‘If we could prevail on an outstanding Scot to 
go to America or the Dominions and take a series of meetings it should be 
possible to raise funds.’ He offered to assist by getting in touch with the 
‘Scottish organisations’.504 The SHRA had determined it needed support from 
abroad. Efforts to make contact were similar in structure to those methods 
previously used. A journal, the Scots Independent (SI) was available at home 
and abroad, there were visits by dignitaries of the movement and addresses to 
Clan, Burns and St. Andrews associations in the US and Canada. The SI was 
originally the organ of the Scots National League and continued to be published 
by the SNP. It provides one source of information on the activities of 
nationalists at home and abroad. 
Evidence of the involvement of Scots abroad in the nationalist movement can 
be found in the reports from Party branches to the SI and also in letters and 
articles. Entreaties to the ‘Overseas Scot’ appeared in the paper,505 adversely 
comparing the situation of Scotland to the former colonies that had thrown off 
the rule of the English and asking for help. Early on, the sort of help asked for 
was the linking ‘of all Scots societies’ establishing branches of the Scots 
National League in all centres where Scots congregate. League Branches were 
asked to disseminate information about Scotland not only to other Scottish 
societies but also the politicians and press of their own state.506 Sales of the SI 
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were a source of income and propaganda and there are many references to 
subscriptions to the paper in Muirhead’s correspondence with overseas 
sympathisers.507 The detail is best observed by location.  
Australasia 
The SHRA appealed to the Scots in Australia through letters to the editors of 
eighty newspapers in the country. Thirty-six Sidney papers, twenty-two in 
Melbourne, nine in Adelaide, two in Brisbane, ten in Perth and one in Tasmania 
were sent a short letter in June 1921 stating the Association’s aims and asking 
sympathisers to contact Muirhead.508 This was a break with the established 
route of using the Scottish associations. Muirhead replied to the thirteen 
resulting enquiries with statements of aims, leaflets to distribute and 
newsletters. Additionally he stated that members’ annual subscriptions were a 
minimum of one shilling a year and that (we are) ‘always in need of finance’.509 
The replies are all nearly a year late, due to an administrative error, a sign of 
lack of organisation. In a reply to a letter prompted by the insertion in the 
Tasmanian World of Hobart, Muirhead said ‘In every part of the world, wherever 
Scotsmen dwell, we find support is freely given.’ He talked of extending 
operations, sending literature and suggested the correspondent established a 
Branch.510 However, Mrs Kennan of Melbourne, a second generation Scot who 
saw the insert in the Catholic Herald, reported that she ‘hears little of Scots in 
Australia’ though was keen to help. Muirhead’s reply may indicate naivety. If the 
government knew, he wrote, that ‘Scots sojourning in our colonies’ were so 
determined, demands would be met much sooner.511 
The inserts in the Melbourne papers also prompted a reply from J. M. Watson, 
secretary of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, still constituted some 
30 years after its foundation.512 A later letter from Melbourne reached Muirhead 
which was intended for the Rosyth Daily Mail (which did not exist). In his reply, 
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Muirhead asked Watson to be their corresponding representative; to pass 
information on that might be of interest, and suggested that the Victoria 
association affiliated itself to the Scottish movement. He made a specific 
request, recalling the way pressure groups must pressurise legislators to attain 
their ends. He asked if Commonwealth members would press forward a 
resolution in the Federal House in favour of Scottish self-government, and 
asked for Watson’s opinion on this. He also asked if any Australian Scots would 
come over and speak in favour of home rule.513 There was no offer of 
expenses, so it is difficult to assess how serious this was. The Victorian 
Association was probably exceptional in Australia, as other correspondents said 
they were unaware of the movement,514 or that there was local opposition to 
addressing the local Scottish club on the subject.515 A correspondent in New 
Zealand sent money, but was not going to join.516 This reference to the 
opposition of the Scottish clubs is a theme to be examined later.  
Senator Grant, of the Australian Senate, wrote to Muirhead asking for a copy of 
the speech and Bill of the Reverend J. Barr, who had introduced a Government 
of Scotland Bill as a private member in the Commons.517 One letter in the 
correspondence is a formal one from the MP for Wellington Central, New 
Zealand. It replies to an earlier letter from a constituent, Mr Ross Nelson. The 
MP did not think there was any chance of a Representative putting a motion to 
the House of Representatives asking the British Government to re-establish a 
Scottish Parliament, or of it being passed. It would be a waste of time and 
detrimental to the cause of home rule. He asserted that if the Labour Party in 
Britain were to do this first, he would ‘do his best’ to have a similar resolution 
introduced to the House of Representatives. Mr Nelson, his correspondent, sent 
this to Muirhead suggesting he forward it to Ramsey Macdonald, then leader of 
the opposition in Parliament.518  
                                                          
513 Ibid., Muirhead to J.M. Watson 26th July 1926 
514 Ibid., letter from Anderson in Adelaide, 25th August 1921 
515 Ibid., letter from Maclean of Sydney, 5th April 1923 
516 Ibid., letter from Heriot, Sydney, 12th November 1923 
517 Ibid., letter dated 5th August 1926. Although the Bill was read in Parliament in 1927, the 
Covenant had agreed it by July of 1926 
518 Ibid., Letter from Mr Ross Nelson of Wellington, 7th May 1926 
89 
 
In 1929, the High Commissioner for Australia was advised by the SHRA of the 
amalgamation of the SHRA, the Scots National League and Scots National 
Movement into the NPS. It appears that the High Commissioner was sending 
copies of debates in the Australian Parliament to the SHRA.519 This indicates a 
thread of involvement through the 1920s. However, when the occasional and 
sparse sources of financial contributions are taken into account they indicate 
that the earlier appeal to Australian Scots through newspapers received a poor 
response. A tour of New Zealand in 1927 by home rule supporter Reverend 
James Barr offered Roland Muirhead only six contacts who had claimed to be 
in favour of Scottish self-government. Five were from New Zealand and one 
from Australia.520 Muirhead contacted them,521 and held a long personal 
correspondence with Jessie Mackay of the Christchurch branch.522 
In December 1929 the SI reported that steps were being taken in Melbourne to 
form a branch. The Christchurch branch reported that Scots in New Zealand 
were being canvassed for support, and there is a correspondent in the Fiji 
Isles.523 The Christchurch branch of the SHRA was in existence in 1928, led by 
Jessie Mackay. At its Annual Meeting in the Caledonian Society’s Hall, ten 
office holders were elected, but no numbers for the meeting are given in 
Jessie’s letter or its accompanying newspaper cutting.524 The branch’s name 
was changed later to the Christchurch branch of the National Party of 
Scotland.525 This seems to have continued to be a small group as Jessie refers 
to their ‘little association’526 and the correspondence is more of a one to one 
nature with Muirhead rather than her writing on behalf of a group.527 There was 
mention of a Melbourne Branch in one of her letters to Muirhead in 1933.528 
An undated pencil diagram of overseas branches of the movement shows eight 
branches in Canada, controlled by a central body, six branches in the US 
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controlled from Detroit and four in New Zealand. There is mention made of 
Australia, South Africa and England.529 There was also a proposed constitution 
for a federation of Scottish Nationalist Societies in the US and the constitution 
of the Canadian Branch of the SNP.530 The diagram must be part reality, part 
ambition as it is known that the US was organised from Detroit and Muirhead 
wanted a similar arrangement for Canada.531 There was then some response to 
request for support. Promises were reported from Canada and the US as well 
as South Africa by December 1926, with London branches re-established a few 
months later.532 
Reports from NPS branches at this time included details of meetings from 
overseas branches, as well as English ones.533 A list of branches in the August 
1932 edition of the SI gives 122 branches of the party, of which 101 are in 
Scotland, three in England and 18 overseas, roughly proportionate to the 
participation of ‘Honorary Presidents’ from overseas of the League before it, 
and more than the ten branches of the League mentioned in the Nation. Those 
overseas included eight in Canada, four in the USA, one apiece in Australia, 
New Zealand, Java and Persia and two in South Africa.534 This position may be 
partially verified by an undated list of branch secretaries in the Muirhead 
archive, save that there were five claimed in the US, not four, and one in 
Argentina.535   
The US and Canada 
The ambition to succeed in North America is all the more understandable as 
there was good reason to believe that the Scots there were both many in 
number and not without resources. The Glasgow Herald reported in 1928 that 
the order of Scottish Clans in America was 24,000 to 25,000 strong with $1.3 
million in the bank.536 In 1930 there were 5,000 members of the Order of 
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Scottish Clans in New York,537 and the Edinburgh Evening News had reported 
on the 29th July 1929 that the Order of the Clans in the US was 30,000 
strong.538 A contribution of a dollar was made by James Boyd, Royal Deputy of 
the Order.539 Advice to use the Order was being given to Muirhead by a 
correspondent in Canada almost 20 years later, in 1948.540 
At the June conference in 1927 the overseas secretary, Angus Clark, reported 
some hundreds of copies of the SI had been sold in Canada. In a later edition 
Clark reports increasing correspondence from ‘kinsmen overseas.’541  
In June 1928, the NPS planned to ask ex-bailie William Thompson to travel to 
America and Canada to promote interest in the nationalist cause. Arthur 
Donaldson, future organiser in the US, reported to the SI of forty meetings in 
forty-five days, all with ‘Scots colonies anxious to see him’. Thompson, 
however, is cautious in his summary; ‘it should not be assumed that the Scots 
of Canada and the United States have gone Nationalist’ but that the Scots in 
those countries are in step with the Nationalists. His final comments were a 
warning that success at home must precede success abroad.542 
In August 1929 the work of organising overseas branches was described as ‘a 
slow business.’543 However the Overseas report at the NPS conference held in 
November of that year reports ‘heartening progress,’544 in what is perhaps an 
optimistic report to the Party Conference. 
Tracing the progress of the movement reveals the slow development of the 
overseas branches. US organiser, Arthur Donaldson, was based in Detroit. On 
his return to the UK, Donaldson was to occupy several senior roles in the SNP, 
including that of chairman. His participation, insofar as it is relevant to the Scots 
abroad, is examined in chapter four. The branch in Rochester, New York, had 
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21 paid up members in 1929.545 Rochester, home to only about 1,000 Scots546 
had an active branch with a dedicated secretary, John McQuat. Muirhead 
corresponded with McQuat between 1929 and 1950. Although there is little 
about the branch after 1935, it was still in existence then.547 In 1929 Donaldson 
reports contact with up to one thousand sympathisers, but even though Detroit 
had 15,000 Scots, he was doubtful of a big turnout to greet Muirhead during his 
intended visit in 1929.548 Muirhead went to Detroit to meet Donaldson, where he 
spoke to a small meeting. At Rochester he addressed a meeting of over 100 
according to an article in the Rochester Herald.549 There are a number of such 
visits referred to in the SI.  
At this time there was an Overseas Department of the NPS, headed by Neil 
MacCormick, to whom Muirhead reported progress on his visit. This progress 
sounded slow, meeting Mr Little in Quebec and Miss Cooper in Montreal in 
what appear to be small gatherings. Muirhead reported addressing ‘prominent 
American Scots.’550 There is a note of a dollar sent by an unknown friend in 
Chicago.  A branch was formed by Little in Quebec, and its constitution 
survives, though undated, amongst papers from the late 1920s. Its objectives 
are interesting as the society takes on the role of not just ‘support(ing) the 
National Movement for self-government within the British Commonwealth’ but 
also to ‘help brither Scots in sickness.’551 This combined one of the traditional 
roles of the Scottish societies abroad, that of charitable aid, with the less 
traditional support for nationalism.   
There were further visits by nationalists to the US and Canada. These were not 
trips dedicated to raising nationalist support in these countries, but were 
primarily visits in pursuit of the visitors’ own business. Although Muirhead’s own 
visit was principally for his own business he was able to fit in some talks to 
sympathisers. There is evidence that the trips focussed on addressing the 
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Scottish Associations from a letter from Muirhead to the Caledonian Society of 
Montreal about Thompson’s visit of April 1930.552   
Thompson’s own report of one of the three trips he made appeared in the SI in 
1931 and 1932. Thompson’s report to Muirhead of his 1930 trip is found in 
correspondence between them from April to July of that year. Thompson’s 
report is encouraging. In Montreal, his meeting was ‘small but keen’; in Ottawa 
there were a hundred; Syracuse twenty; Rochester, thanks to McQuat, two 
hundred. Branches were formed at New York, Brooklyn, Lynn, Montreal, 
Ottawa, Syracuse and possibly Toronto. Finally, his meeting in Vancouver had 
800 attend and a branch was formed.553  
There was also a visit to the US by J. M. MacCormick, Hon. Secretary of the 
SNP.554 His availability for addressing sympathisers was limited as his visit was 
primarily on behalf of Glasgow University. However, MacCormick was not 
‘sanguine about getting material support from Americans’ and describes his 
meetings with Scots as ‘not fruitful but not a waste of time entirely.’555 He does 
not make mention of the visit in his book on his involvement in the home rule 
movement, nor of Thompson’s visits.556 The SI reported a letter from the 
secretary of the New York Robert Burns Memorial Association, saying the visit 
of Thompson ‘is still the talk of those Scots you interested. You found them an 
unkneaded mass of dough, and MacCormick was better understood after you 
had laid the train.’557 
The detail of the meetings of the ‘overseas branches’ as reported by the SI 
reveal the nature of their activities. The  Robert Burns Memorial Association in 
New York refers to Thompson’s last visit, indicating that the associational 
Scottish cultural societies were once again the target of the nationalist 
approach in the US and Canada. The same edition had a report from the 
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Rochester branch which was said to be ‘flourishing’ in 1929,558 and reported 
discussing papers on Russia and India at its January and February meetings. 
As before, the attempts to raise interest in nationalism were focussed on raising 
the ‘interest (of) the various Clan Associations.’559 A meeting of the Montreal 
group held in December 1930 was reported as being held in the home of a 
member, therefore probably not a large group. The meeting discussed the aims 
and aspirations of the Scottish National movement and a favourable election 
result in East Renfrewshire was seen as a sign of progress in the movement.560 
The March meeting of the same group was in the same member’s house and 
was very much a cultural evening, with songs and poetry whilst a reading of 
Thompson’s letters seem to be the only nationalist content.561  
Reference to these branches in letters from Scots abroad would be valuable 
context as would comment from Scottish non-members. This has not been 
evidenced by research to date. Contemporary letters from Ernest Younger in 
Toronto contain nothing but a record of a busy work and social life.562 Diaries 
from George Dott, later an NPS member, in Ottawa are likewise silent on home 
rule matters, despite a clear craving for home.563  
In 1935, Muirhead lists the overseas branches for MacNeil, the new Overseas 
Secretary. They are; Toronto, New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Syracuse, 
Edmonton and Vancouver. The Overseas Council is still in existence at this 
time, and MacNeil’s predecessor had sent out 2,000 letters to recruit members 
whilst in office, demonstrating a continued commitment of some kind to connect 
with the diaspora.564 The slow progress in the US and Canada can in part be 
explained by a letter to the S.I. in 1930. The writer asked ‘What can we do here 
anyway? The fight will be won in Scotland.’565 
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London 
Despite the importance of London as the seat of government, there was limited 
branch organisation there. Whilst the SHRA of London was described as 
‘thriving’ in 1920, in fact its membership was limited to those in the National 
Liberal Club and anticipated activity seemed to be confined to a dinner to be 
arranged.566 Muirhead wrote to the Editor of Forward: ‘if the Scots MPs cannot 
get what they need in London, they should, in order to keep faith with the 
people, explain why they cannot get in London what is so urgently needed in 
Scotland.’567 Muirhead told Cunninghame Graham in 1925 that they had ‘few 
members in London, no branch’ and that it would be a costly business to set 
one up. 
However, there was a London branch of the Scots National League in existence 
in 1925.568 In February 1927, 21 League district secretaries are listed, of which 
four are in England.569 One of these was in London, which reported a 
successful gathering on the 12th March 1927 on the subject of ‘The Practicality 
of Scottish Independence’. The meeting was judged a success, and called for 
more workers to sell the SI at more gatherings of Scots throughout the 
capital.570 The London branch of the NPS sent representatives to the 1930 
conference, including Compton Mackenzie, and the address to the conference 
highlighted the ‘strong band from London.’571 One of its leaders, Angus Clark, 
seems to have been particularly extreme in their nationalist views, as according 
to MacCormick the expulsion of the branch was necessary to smooth the way 
for the merger with the Scottish Party.572  
The early promise of the visits and correspondence in the late 1920s and early 
1930s did not develop, as MacCormick had predicted, into a source of 
significant material support. Muirhead himself had written to Cunninghame 
Graham on his return from his US and Canada trip. He saw a large potential but 
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little practical support until the movement in Scotland was much more in the 
public eye and the press.573 In 1938 a list of overseas members was given to 
Muirhead, it had 136 names on it.574 
Before the Second World War the SNP had little political impact, reflected in 
their continued electoral failure, and were split in their aims between 
nationalists and home rulers. The differences resulted in a walkout of some 
members, led by John MacCormick, from the 1942 conference of the SNP. 
Those leaving the conference set up the Scottish Convention under his 
leadership. This organisation would not seek to stand candidates for election to 
Westminster, but would seek to influence existing political parties and other 
organisations,575 in other words, a pressure group. 
Scottish Convention and Scottish Covenant Association 
The first meeting of the Convention on the 4th June 1942 was chaired by 
William Power and attended by thirteen supporters. Letters of support from the 
Rosyth branch of the SNP and six other sympathisers were read out by 
MacCormick. The confidence of the meeting was such that MacCormick was 
authorised to approach the SNP with a view to taking over its assets and 
liabilities, including the S.I.576 The accrual of new members was described as 
steady.577 The organisation had 364 members by the end of August 1942 and 
at the end of the year 584 members were enrolled.578 Its activities were those of 
a pressure group, publication of literature and propaganda, public meetings and 
press advertisements.579 However, the organisation was short of money.580  
The Convention launched a National Covenant to provide a mandate for its 
position by mobilising all Scots to sign a covenant asking for more power to run 
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their own affairs.581 By 1951 this became the major focus of affairs and the 
Convention merged with the National Convention committee to form the 
Scottish Convention Association.582 Its aims were to ‘secure the establishment 
in Scotland of a Scottish Parliament in Scotland.’583  
Despite the success of their covenant with 1.7 million signatures in support of 
its aims, and a membership of over 4,700 by June 1946,584 the covenanters 
failed even to get a meeting with Attlee, the Prime Minister of the time, and the 
Convention and Covenant movements lost impetus and decayed.585 The 
Scottish Covenant Association only listed 120 members for the years 1953 to 
1955 none of whom were abroad or in England.586 However, this register is 
almost certainly incorrect as the 1953 ledger of Newsletter payments includes a 
charge of four shillings a month to London for 40 newsletters.587 This indicated 
a continuity of support from a London branch that had been in existence since 
1946.  
There is no mention of branches overseas in the 1942 meetings, perhaps due 
to the War.588 Advertisements were purely in Scottish newspapers.589 Although 
throughout the period 1942-46 minutes of meetings and AGMs contain no 
indication that the Scots abroad were being targeted in any way, there are 
mentions of a Leeds branch590 and a ‘small but successful’ London branch.591 
However the list of members by branch dated 2nd December 1944 mentions 
neither.592 The minutes of a meeting of the National Committee on 3rd June 
1944 noted a request from the New South Wales Government Office requesting 
information on the Association’s new approach to self-government.593 The fifth 
AGM, held on 22nd June 1946 includes apologies for absence from two London 
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and one Leeds members.594 There was therefore some meagre support by 
Scots in England. A long report on activities in September 1946 contained no 
comment about the Scots abroad595 and minutes of meetings until February 
1949 contain no references whatsoever.596 The Convention constitution 
contains no mention of the wider Scottish population abroad,597 although its 
appeal is to ‘every citizen of Scotland and everyone interested in the welfare of 
Scotland.’598 Recalling MacCormick’s earlier pessimism with regard to 
fundraising in America, this is not surprising. However, this is the first major 
group, membership was 4,773 in 1946,599 examined whose only attempt at 
exploiting the diaspora was a single visit to the US and Canada. 
The visit took place in June 1950,600 its purpose being to explain the Covenant 
position to Scots there. These Scots turned out to be the very same 
associational Scots targeted by home rulers and SNP alike in earlier years. 
MacCormick himself was not personally very enthusiastic,601 but nevertheless 
spoke to Scottish Societies in New York, Washington, Toronto and Chicago.602 
His conclusion from the trip was as follows; 
‘The Scot in America is a somewhat peculiar creature… the ties that bind him 
are one of kailyard sentimentality and it would never occur to him that he had 
any serious responsibility toward the home that nurtured him.’603  
The reception in Canada was much warmer, and the party were received by the 
Mayor of Toronto.604 There was no definitive outcome of the trip, which was 
financed by the individuals themselves. The transatlantic voyage had been 
undertaken to demonstrate to Scots abroad that it was not an irresponsible and 
unrepresentative body. Whilst it dispelled some of these impressions, the trip 
worked against the Covenant by associating MacCormick with an isolationist 
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figure in the US and led to claims he was stirring up hatred of Britain, in a 
fashion comparable to De Valera, Irish separatist leader and Taoiseach.605 
The SNP meanwhile represented a more extreme position606 with the aim of 
establishing full self-government as an equal within the Commonwealth of 
Nations and the restoration of Scottish sovereignty. The analysis will return to 
the SNP in chapter four. The issue of remittances from abroad for all these 
organisations is addressed next. 
Remittances from the Diaspora 
Fundraising would be a key part of any contribution that the diaspora might play 
in support of home rule. In the case of those abroad, however, funds to be sent 
to a group for political purposes had to compete with other demands on an 
emigrant’s cash. The expectation driven from the analysis in chapter two is that 
Scots would have made considerable remittances back home.  
Some research, covering the period 1875-1913, helps to provide evidence of 
background remittance activity. It took the pool of potential remitters to be all 
British passengers arriving in the previous five years or longer. Net migration 
from Scotland was 21% higher in the period 1911-51 than 1885-1913.  
However, economic conditions were undoubtedly difficult during the later period 
which contained two World Wars and the depression. One Scot in Canada 
claimed that ‘the 30s were desperate years’ and this particular Scot was not 
able to clear his debts run up in the depression until 1952.607 The number and 
size of remittances from the US to Ireland dropped rapidly in response to the 
recession, falling by two thirds between 1930 and 1939. It is reasonable to 
assume that Scots’ remittances also fell in the same period, just as it can be 
assumed that the increased migration would have resulted in some remitting 
after 1918.  
Autonomous remittances were much larger in proportion to the whole from the 
US than they were from Canada or Australia.608 This reflected a much greater 
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tendency for temporary migration to the US due to faster and cheaper 
transatlantic travel, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth century.609 The 
US was an important destination for the Scots, being the destination of choice 
for 44% of Scots 1825-1914610 and still taking 20% in the 1919-38 period.611 If 
sums of remittances as a whole were more significant from the US, this held 
weight for the Scots. 
There was some significant Scottish autonomous remittance activity for 
example the effort to raise funds for a new Celtic Chair at Edinburgh University. 
It was Professor Blackie’s intention to contact Scottish associations throughout 
the world to raise £10,000 for the endowment.612 More than £10,000 had been 
raised by 1877. The chair was established in 1882.613 Recalling the typology of 
remittances, these funds raised from the diaspora represent remittances similar 
in nature to potential contributions to the home rule organisations. Blackie wrote 
to many Scots associations around the world, in particular to a Scot in New 
Zealand, McClean, who lived near Oamaru, New Zealand. As well as raising 
awareness of the appeal with members of the Oamaru Caledonian Society, 
McClean donated £200 himself.614 In Australia, the North Melbourne Advertiser 
reported that promises of funds from the colony had reached £500.615 The Clan 
Mackay collected £100 from members in England, Ceylon and New Zealand, 
and Blackie had expectations of £1,000 from a lunch for Scots in London.616 
The Toronto Caledonian Society donated £100, and smaller donations were 
made by working men in, for example, Adelaide.617 Scots abroad did therefore 
donate for non-family reasons. 
Therefore, although the research into UK remittances reveals little about the 
level of Scots’ funds, it can provide pointers to what could be expected. Firstly, 
if it is assumed that Scots would not be substantially different to their fellow 
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Britons in their remittance activity, and the research indicates that there was 
remittance activity, then it is reasonable to assume there would have been 
some Scottish activity. Secondly, insofar as support for home rule organisations 
would be categorised as autonomous remittances, activity could be expected to 
be greatest in the US, a major Scots destination.618 Thirdly, there are accounts 
of large sums being remitted to Scotland, for other than family reasons, as can 
be seen in the example above. Furthermore, the profits of Scots businesses 
abroad were being remitted to Scotland in the mid-1880s.619 Personal accounts 
show Scots sent money home.620 For example, in July 1926, Ernest Younger 
repaid money lent to him by a family member, Sandy, to set up in Canada.621 
Three years later, he was still sending money drafts to his mother and father in 
Alloa. 622 
The first SHRA appealed in its publications to the Scots abroad for financial 
support and one pamphlet is dedicated to a J. B. White of Fort Wayne, Indiana 
for his generous support.623 There is no mention of the size of White’s donation 
but the dedication indicates it was of interest. Evidence of only one other 
donation has been uncovered by the research; The Melbourne Argus confirmed 
later that in 1893, £205 had been donated by the local Association to the 
SHRA.624 
There was also cash from outside Scotland for the second SHRA. However the 
correspondence that Muirhead had with his most active US sympathisers, 
McQuat in Rochester, New York and Donaldson in Detroit demonstrates how 
small these remittances were.625 Letters over a six year period from 1929 
include reference to a total of $75.40, £24 13/- and $10 worth of cotton 
garments sent as a contribution to the fund raising bazaar held in Glasgow. 
There were local difficulties for McQuat, as he was unable to collect cash at a 
well-attended picnic in 1930 due to local by-laws.626 There is evidence to 
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suggest that the NPS were naive in their approach to fundraising. A tour of the 
US and Canada by the Duke of Montrose was suggested, and McQuat was 
asked by the Overseas Secretary what financial benefit might be expected. 
McQuat was unsure, but proposed pledge cards and suggested that this could 
gather $500 per annum if other centres were involved. Although Muirhead was 
in favour, neither action materialised.627  
Donaldson’s experience was similar to McQuat’s; in July 1931 he was able to 
send $10 from two members, in September $4 from four new members and $10 
later in the year.628 At that time, Muirhead was hoping to raise forty £150 
deposits to fight seats in the General Election.629 McQuat’s earlier experience 
was mirrored in the correspondence with Jessie MacKay, Correspondence 
Secretary of the Christchurch branch of the SHRA, later SNP, in New Zealand 
between 1929 and 1937. Remittances of £193 were recorded during this 
period, of which the major part were subscriptions for the SI.630 In 1930 
Muirhead appealed directly to T. D. MacAuley, President of the Sun Life 
Association of Canada. He asked for £1,000 to fund two organisers and form a 
by-election fighting fund.631 MacAuley refused to get involved. He wrote that the 
NPS’s views were ‘so extreme I really have no sympathy for them.’632 The 
difficulties of raising money for home rule are plainly seen in the accounts of the 
SHRA from 1921-28. In these years there was a deficit of expenditure over 
income. Usually, Muirhead made up the difference. Annual expenditure was 
around £2,500, but the organisation persistently failed to raise this.633 
The Scottish National Convention, established to draft a bill for Home Rule, 
fared no better for diaspora contributions. The Finance sub-committee records 
of the Convention from 1927 and 1928 show that the most recorded 
contributions for one fund raising effort in early 1927 are from Scotland, 
although there are some from Scots abroad.634 One pound was sent from 
                                                          
627 Acc. 3721/94/75 
628 Acc. 3721/5/76, letters between Donaldson and Muirhead; 23rd July, 28th September and 13th 
November 1931 
629 Ibid., November letter 
630 Acc. 3721/7/127 
631 Acc.3721/7/116, letter dated 3rd January 1930 
632 Ibid., letter, 13th February 1930 
633 Acc. 3721/42/37 
634 Acc. 3721/84/4 
103 
 
Assam and one dollar from Rochester New York.635 Five shillings was donated 
by an SHRA council member,636 Edwin Scrymgeour, Scottish Prohibition Party 
MP for Dundee 1922-1931. A contribution of ten shillings came from two sisters 
in England, M. and J. Calder; Agnes Paterson in Manchester sent two shillings 
and six pence; Mr and Mrs Paul from Putney gave five shillings each; Norman 
Sheave from Bootle paid ten shillings and ten shillings came from Jeremiah 
Shields in Ireland, making only nine out of 127 contributions in the ledger 
coming from outside Scotland. Postage records show that this may not be 
surprising. Ledgers of expenditure on postage from 1924 and 1927 show that of 
500 letters sent to ask for contributions, only 15 went to destinations outside of 
Scotland, in this case to London.637 The committee of the Convention reported 
in 1928 that it was £130 in the red.638 These contributions were insignificant 
compared to needs, and also to the contributions the Irish made to their 
nationalist effort. 
The Support of the Irish Diaspora for Home Rule and 
Independence 
The purpose of having a diaspora with which to compare this remitting 
behaviour is to provide evidence that diaspora support and funding for political 
causes is a proven phenomenon. It is difficult to strike a direct historical 
comparison with the contribution of the Scots abroad to their nationalist 
movement and that of the Irish, as the Irish Free State was established in 1921. 
This partial resolution of the cause of Irish separatism, together with increased 
assimilation, had been accompanied by a sapping of political motivation by 
most of the overseas Irish.639 Recall the earlier commentary on the reduction of 
remittances after this date, curtailed also no doubt by the depression. The new 
state made little effort to tap the financial power of the Irish abroad until after 
World War Two.640 Even so, the Second Irish National Loan issue of the 1920s 
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raised $15 million of its $25 million in the US, although this was the last such 
issue in the US.641 
It is however reasonable to compare the Irish and Scottish situations, if not 
historically, then in terms of process. The Scots’ movement, it can be argued, 
was in a similar situation in the inter-war period as the Irish had been at the end 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, in that both groups 
were pursuing constitutional means of resolving their issues. There was a major 
difference too, that the Irish movement had an unequivocally separatist and 
violent strand that suppressed the home rule groups.642 The Scots did not. 
Nevertheless, the evidence produced in further chapters will demonstrate that 
the financial and organisational contribution of the Irish abroad significantly 
exceeded that of the Scots, even in Scotland itself. 
Support from the Diaspora for the Norwegian Liberation from 
Sweden 
The Norwegian national liberation took place in 1905, leaving a period of twenty 
years at the beginning of the research timeframe when its diaspora might have 
engaged with the movement to free the country from its union with Sweden. 
The ending of the Union was precipitated by the Norwegian Parliament passing 
an act to set up separate Norwegian Consular Offices, long a subject of 
discontent. This was vetoed by the King of Sweden and Norway, leading to the 
cabinet resigning, and talk of war. This process was repeated two months later, 
and in June the Parliament asked Michelson to continue as Prime Minister as 
the King had ceased to function as monarch in Norway. This was confirmed by 
plebiscite.643 
Swedish and Norwegian Americans found it impossible to shed their national 
interest in the problems of their homelands.644 There was plenty of interest in 
the separation long before 1905 and the Union issue became a public affair in 
New York, Chicago, Minneapolis, Seattle and the rural mid-west.645 In the 
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1880s Norwegian-American papers like Norden hailed the movement toward 
parliamentary government in Norway.646 Nevertheless prior to 1905, 
Norwegians in the US exerted no significant pressure on the US government, in 
fact Knute Nelson, a leading Norwegian-American senator, opposed the effort 
to dissolve the Union.647 However, his speech in favour of the Union caused 
uproar in the Odin Club of Minneapolis, and most Norwegians in America 
generally favoured dissolution of the Union.648 
The constant stream of emigrants to the US kept the diaspora informed of 
political battles at home between Liberals and Conservatives over the 
constitution. Norwegian-American Liberal Groups were formed, notably in 
Minneapolis. In 1883 there was a suggestion that there should be collections to 
assist the rifle clubs in Norway should the conflict turn violent. In 1884 the 
Minneapolis Norwegian-American Liberal Society sent 4,000 Kroner to the 
Liberal Party in Norway.649 However, these actions had little impact in Norway 
and those at home were ignorant of the Norwegian-American connection 
except through personal ties. The Liberal Societies were soon dissolved.650 
This apparently weak support will be discussed further. 
The bygdelag movement, raised during a period of ethnic mobilisation of 
Norwegian immigrants, absorbed the new wave of Norwegian-American 
nationalism but did not support political undertones of separatism.651 This 
appeared to be because the bygdelags were regionally connected to Norway, 
not nationally. This was also the case for some Scottish associations. Although 
Norway’s opposition to the Union with Sweden had many sympathisers in 
America, the new nationalism was linked to an interest in folk culture.652 There 
is no evidence that the Norwegian-Americans provided direct support to the 
Liberal groups ending the Union.  
Once the Union was dissolved following the plebiscite of August 1905, there 
was considerable activity to get the US government to recognise the new state. 
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Mass meetings were held in cities with Norwegian concentrations and 4,000 
signatures came from North Dakota alone. Despite separatist difficulties which 
the US was having in its Philippines dependency, pressure from the Norwegian 
press and perceived flaws in the original Union led to Secretary of State Root to 
extend recognition.653 Therefore although there was little evidence that any 
tangible support was received from the diaspora, there was successful pressure 
for recognition afterwards. Had the issue been resolved in other ways, by a long 
drawn out political campaign other than that by the Liberals, or by war or civil 
unrest, it may be that the diaspora would have behaved differently. As it was, 
although the Norwegian diaspora was not indifferent in the way the Scots were 
at the time, positive action was not in abundance until the Union was dissolved. 
Summary 
This chapter was the first of two whose purpose is to study the engagement of 
the Scottish diaspora with the home rule and nationalist projects at home. Four 
home rule and nationalist organisations were selected for the work; the first 
SHRA, the League, the second SHRA with its successor nationalist 
organisations, and the Scottish Convention. The value of remittances to the 
organisations was given particular attention. This engagement was then 
compared with that of two contemporary nationalist projects, that of the Irish 
and of the Norwegians. The time frame for the study was 1885-1951. 
It has been demonstrated that both SHRA organisations courted the Scots 
abroad in order to raise money and build influence, as did the SNP later in the 
period. They appear however to have been poorly organised, and fundraising 
from these sources was poor in relation not only to the volume of money sent to 
Scotland for other reasons, but in comparison to the support of the Irish abroad 
for their nationalist cause. If the limited audiences for Thompson and 
MacCormick in the USA in the 1920s are compared with the thousands 
attending those of Redmond in Scotland and Australasia earlier in the period, 
the difference in response is clear. This is dealt with in greater detail in chapter 
six. However, some individuals in the diaspora were motivated to support the 
nationalist projects in meaningful ways. Compton Mackenzie, born in West 
                                                          
653 Andersen, 1990, pp.109-110 
107 
 
Hartlepool, was a founder activist with the SNP654 and Arthur Donaldson, whilst 
sojourning in the US, became its local organiser, and eventually its chairman. 
It has been established that the Scots abroad did send money home for many 
reasons and that they would have been unusual emigrants had they not. 
However, records show they did not appear to send money sufficient for the 
nationalist cause to build a professional organisation with full time staff. This 
compares very unfavourably with the financial support enjoyed by Irish 
nationalists.  It is clear that despite the potential provided by hundreds of 
thousands of migrants leaving every decade, and many thousands of Scots 
abroad associating with the ‘clan’ element of their homeland culture, the 
numbers of overseas branches of any of the groups were always less than fifty, 
and overseas members themselves probably never exceeded two hundred. 
This compares very unfavourably with the membership of Irish nationalist 
groups in the US, England and Scotland, where membership was in the many 
thousands.  
Having earlier demonstrated that diasporas do get involved in homeland 
politics, the Scots abroad, at least in this period, did not do so to any great 
effect. Some possible reasons for this are emerging. First is the nature of the 
associations targeted by the home rule and nationalist groups. Donaldson’s 
comment that the Scottish societies were an obstacle who were wrapped up in 
mutual worship was telling. These organisations will be studied more closely in 
chapter six. Secondly,  the nature of the diaspora and conditions in its host 
lands may not be conducive to old country politics, as Donaldson found when 
he came up against local by-laws. The Scots in the US were a less visible 
diaspora than the Irish; they were Protestant not Catholic, spoke English not 
Gaelic and tended to be more prosperous. The Irish did not fit in and 
resentment of this fed their nationalism. These themes will be explored more 
fully later. Before that the next chapter examines the involvement of the Scots 
abroad in Scottish Nationalism during the period 1951-1979. 
  
                                                          
654 Mackenzie, 1967,  pp.157-159 
108 
 
Chapter Four: Post-War Nationalism 
 
This chapter will deal with the post-World War Two nationalist movement in 
Scotland and its engagement with the diaspora. Contemporaneous emigration 
will be presented, as will comparisons with the Irish diaspora and its 
engagement with nationalist movements in the homeland. The Norwegian 
liberation from its union with Sweden had been complete in 1905 and there was 
no continuing political dispute similar to the Irish case in Northern Ireland. 
Therefore the Norwegians are not considered. 
During World War Two, power in Britain became more centralised as powers 
were transferred to London by the Secretary of Labour.655 This trend continued 
after the war with the nationalisation of mines, railways, gas, electricity, air 
transport and others, taking local control away from Scotland. The comment 
that ‘Scottish enterprise in Aviation has been contemptuously suppressed’656 
reflects some of the feeling created by this. In December 1947, the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, Mr. A Woodburn, wrote a cabinet paper summarising the 
causes of the greater agitation in Scotland for a greater measure of Scottish 
control over Scottish affairs. It was his view that ‘it is the exploitation of Scottish 
sentiment about the organisation of socialised industries on a Great Britain 
basis that has been largely responsible for bringing matters to a head.’657  
There was evidence that elements of the UK government took the issue of 
Scottish nationalism seriously. In 1950, the medieval Scottish Stone of Destiny 
was removed from Westminster. It was subsequently returned and the Home 
Office took the nationalist theme seriously by recommending no prosecution 
should take place to avoid making martyrs out of the perpetrators.658 In 1951, 
the incoming Conservative administration established a Minister of State post at 
the Scottish office with an additional parliamentary under-secretary. The new 
Government met little pressure from the SNP, tiny as it was, but the 
commitment to a Royal Commission and to enhance the Scottish Office had 
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been made by the party in 1949. This had originally been intended to use home 
rule agitation to embarrass Labour.659 It appointed a Royal Commission on 
Scottish Affairs in 1952, which reported in 1954. Certain responsibilities, 
previously run at a British level, were to be administered in Scotland by the 
Scottish Office.660  
During the war, the SNP had had some electoral success, partly aided by 
Scottish resentment of aspects of wartime policy.661 After significant gains in the 
polls in Argyll and Kirkcaldy,662 the SNP briefly won its first seat in Westminster 
in 1945. The SNP had the official aim of establishing independence as an equal 
within the Commonwealth of Nations. Between 1942, the time of the 
Covenanters’ split, and 1967, the party had few successes. However it grew 
more self-assured and to an extent laid down the foundations for its success in 
later years.663 
In the 1960s the SNP increased its percentage of the vote in Scotland, doubling 
its vote in each national election between 1959 and 1970.664 Although in 1966 
this was still only 5% of the vote, its membership and organisation continued to 
grow from 23 branches in 1960 to 484 branches in 1968.665 The rise of the SNP 
took place in the context of the European phenomenon of distrust towards 
established parties and the political system itself, symptomatic of a decline in 
class alignment and the rise in interest in Scottish affairs from the 1920s 
onwards.666 This discontent grew with the idea that Scotland’s problems were a 
result of England’s neglect, and more Scots control would solve the economic 
problems of Scotland. 
Emigration from Scotland, 1951-79 
Net emigration continued for thirty years after 1951. Though economic factors 
lay at the heart of the post-war Scottish diaspora, it has also been claimed that 
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social mobility played a part.667 Scotland’s economic adjustments of the 
inter-war period continued and there were claims that the economic policies of 
political parties in Scotland failed to counter the propensity to emigrate.668 
There was assistance available for Britons who wished to emigrate to 
Australasia, allowing them to travel for £10.669 Australians now call this cohort 
of immigrants the ‘ten pound poms.’ Ironically, between Scotland and England, 
the emigration flow was both ways.670  
Nevertheless, the total of 759,000671 net emigration for the period 1951-81 was 
a significant net outflow for a population of slightly over five million.672 This 
period saw the second highest decade (1961-71) of net emigration in the 
twentieth century, after 1921-31.This high net emigration took place during the 
period of the SNP’s electoral breakthrough. There were therefore thousands of 
first generation Scots newly arrived overseas. Table VIII below shows the size 
of first generation Scots populations in some host countries.  Although not 
entirely consistent, the dates are close enough to make comparisons.  
Table VIII. Scots-born in Diaspora Host Countries 
Host country Census date Scots in the host country 
USA 1950 244,200 
Canada 1951 226,343 
Australia 1951 123,634 
New Zealand 1951 44,000 
Source: McCarthy, 2007, pp.228-229 
Some of those emigrating in the late 1960s and early 1970s could have known 
about the activities of the SNP before they left Scotland and some were already 
members when they emigrated.673 
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The SNP Engagement with the Diaspora 
The SNP was not a pressure group but a political party with its objectives not to 
influence legislators but to get legislators elected. Its overwhelming need from 
its supporters were votes, activists to campaign in elections and funding to pay 
for propaganda, election deposits, wages of full time officials, travel and 
advertising. The 1949 constitution of the SNP was not encouraging to Scots 
abroad. It allowed only ‘persons permanently resident in Scotland not members 
of any other political party’ to be members. However, persons outside of 
Scotland might become honorary ‘HQ’ members.674  
Despite this apparent institutional indifference, Muirhead corresponded with 
overseas Scots. There are many examples of this. There were letters to 
Rendall P. Roop of New Jersey,675  and E. W. Sansom of Montreal,676 none of 
which hint of a movement in those countries although one did result in a 
donation.677 The correspondence with R. F. Kies in South Africa also included 
Muirhead’s thoughts on non-violent direct action, using Ghandi as an 
example.678 There is an expression of gratitude to Muirhead for his service to 
home rule from the secretary of the Johannesburg branch of the SNP.679 This 
secretary was Ian Hosack, who will be encountered later in this chapter as a 
returnee from the diaspora and head of the SNP Association. 
Muirhead contacted the UN, asking to whom the Scots should address their 
petition of demands for liberty. This was front page news on the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, though the by-line was Glasgow.680 The reply from the UN, that it was 
not empowered to deal with such matters, was reported in the paper on the 27th 
February 1947.681 This is dealt with in greater detail in chapter seven. 
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It has been noted that there was a small group of senior SNP officials who had 
been part of the diaspora; Cunninghame Graham, Compton Mackenzie and, 
dealt with in some detail below, Arthur Donaldson.  
Arthur Donaldson, SNP Chairman, 1960-69682 
Arthur Donaldson was the NPS, then SNP, organiser in the US. Rather than 
split the analysis of his involvement in the diaspora and Scotland, this is dealt 
with in one section here. His activities are dealt with in detail in this chapter due 
to his seniority in the party at this time. Donaldson had emigrated to the US in 
1923 and became heavily involved in the NPS and then the SNP. He returned 
to Scotland in 1936 and continued his support for the organisation, rising to 
Chairman in 1962, a post he occupied until 1969. He was a ‘sojourner’683 rather 
than a permanent member of the diaspora. Donaldson, a journalist, became a 
member of the NPS in 1929. After he returned to Scotland in 1936 he took an 
active part in the SNP,684 rising to Chairman. His period of office was 
characterised by a rise in membership from 2,000 to 60,000685 and an increase 
in the share of the vote in General Elections. 
Muirhead corresponded with Donaldson in Detroit, in September of 1929, 
wanting to discuss things with interested parties during his intended visit ‘so 
that a live centre of Scottish Nationalism may quickly develop.’686 Donaldson’s 
reply gives his early view of the difficulties of raising support amongst the 
diaspora. He had not had too much success in getting people for Muirhead to 
talk to in Detroit, but expected a better turnout in Rochester. He said ‘So far in 
this country Nationalism has not been able to make much impression.’687 His 
reasons were given as follows. Firstly, there was ‘little or nothing in the Scottish 
newspapers sent here,’ secondly, there was ‘no international interest so 
Nationalism does not get into the US newspapers’; presumably reflecting the 
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weakness, and therefore un-newsworthy nature, of nationalism in Scotland. 
Thirdly, ‘Scottish Societies are an obstacle…wrapped in a mutual worship’ 
‘hugging old fictions of the greatness of Scotsmen in Scotland’688 He went on to 
claim that opposing this ‘Burns Club sentiment is a trying and thankless task’ 
and most who had been attracted to nationalism had given it up as hopeless. 
Fourthly, he confirmed in a later letter that the word Party ‘is most objectionable 
(in the US) as it is associated with Old Country politics’ and he used the name 
Nationalist Committee.689 There were only a few friends in Detroit, he claimed 
at that time and was able to give only three names for supporters in New York, 
despite having periodically mailed 1,000 Scots in the US.690 Donaldson wrote to 
eighty people inviting them to hear Muirhead and booked a small hall.691 This 
direct mailing may have been Donaldson’s way of circumventing the lack of 
interest of the Societies and Associations. Recall the reference to a supporter 
who claimed that success abroad would be dependent on success at home in 
Scotland. This has the appeal of common sense; the Scot abroad may well not 
pay heed to a movement in Scotland that had only 8,000 members in 1932.692 
By 1935, Donaldson was very disillusioned with the approach of the movement 
to reaching its goals. In a long letter to D. H. NcNeill, then on the Overseas 
Committee of the SNP, Donaldson complained that the movement had become 
less radical, more respectable and inept in by-elections. He complained that the 
SI had become too literary since the merger with the Scottish Party. He 
resigned in protest over the merger.693 He went on; ‘I’m in no frame of mind to 
attempt to do anything for the SNP and I think I am fairly representative.’ He 
was looking for a change in leadership and management.694  
Donaldson’s experience of running Nationalist branches overseas could be 
expected to influence his decisions about how the SNP gained its support whilst 
he ran it during the 1960s. However, apart from sending a list of 500 clan chiefs 
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in the US to Muirhead,695 there is no evidence of him using contacts he may 
have made in the US, or his experience of conditions for nationalists there to 
gain support in the diaspora. Equally there was no evidence of him opposing 
contact. In 1946 he was treasurer of the SNP, wrote of the parlous state of the 
finances but made no suggestion that they try to collect funds in the US.696  
From 1964 there was no constitutional bar to overseas Scots becoming SNP 
members697 and a report on the organisational structure of the SNP in 1963 did 
contain an overseas secretary, W. S. Orr, who appears to have held the role 
since 1960, when he was also convenor of the Finance Committee.698 It was 
not uncommon for SNP senior officials to have more than one role; Donaldson 
was both chair of the Executive and convenor of the Publicity Committee.699 
Overseas secretary was not a post where the workload was considered great, 
although the report claimed that efforts were being made to boost it. The job 
was best carried out by someone who had an interest in it, but its lack of 
importance was emphasised by its relegation from the National Executive 
Council (NEC).700 Orr made few reports to the NEC, as evidenced by the 
minutes of meetings from that time. Apart from a comment that ‘the general 
expansion of the party has been reflected to some extent in increased overseas 
support,’701 archived minutes of a number of NEC meetings for 1963, 1964 and 
1965 show no references of support from the diaspora or attempts to procure 
it.702  
In 1967, a member of the NEC, Drysdale, asked the committee to make a pack 
available to be sent to overseas members.703 This prompted the Organisation 
Committee being asked to review the functions and work of the overseas 
secretary. Orr’s report to the 33rd National Conference held in June 1967 
recorded that ‘individual support has been forthcoming from overseas Scots,’704 
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and he anticipated increasing sympathy, saying ‘it is practically certain that 
when the time comes to ask for the spontaneous support of the Scot overseas, 
there will be a massive moral…’705 For the Conference, Orr shows optimism 
that there is an untapped resource. However, when Orr resigned in April 1968 
due to ill health, although his role as assistant national secretary was 
immediately filled, his overseas secretary role was not.706  
During 1968, the Central Belt Publicity Committee had taken over the job of 
communicating with overseas members. Minutes of the January meeting 
indicated that there had been a rise in enquiries since the SNP’s Winnie Ewing 
won the Hamilton by-election.707 The committee wrote to them all advising them 
to stay in touch with the organisation through their local branch, that is the 
branch nearest to their old Scottish home. The minutes of the meeting of the 
committee on the 4th February 1968 stated that 150 of these letters had been 
written.708 Similarly the North East Area Publicity Committee was encouraged 
by its chair, Provost Braid, that overseas members were becoming ‘more and 
more important.’709 That being said, there was no mention of overseas 
members in the meetings of the National Executive in either February or March, 
with only a note in April to say that the overseas secretary had died.710   
The earlier comment that the Hamilton by-election had had some impact on 
awareness abroad is borne out by the few letters received by Donaldson from 
Scots abroad. There was an enquiry for some policy details from the Editor of 
the Northern Advocate in New Zealand. Donaldson’s reply was focussed on 
answering the policy questions and he made no attempt to get the Advocate to 
sell the SNP to Scots there, even though the editor mentioned that he had been 
forwarded the SI by ‘adherents’ in the country.711 A letter from R. L. Webster in 
the Republic of South Africa, complained ‘on behalf of the Scottish Community’ 
about the Commons voting record of the SNP MP for Hamilton, stating that the 
‘immature leftist posturing of the perennial undergraduate still remains,’ perhaps 
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because she had voted for the arms embargo to South Africa.712 A letter from J. 
T. H. King in Natal stated he had read about the SNP in the Natal Mercury of 
Durban.713 Donaldson also received a letter from W. T. Martin, an SNP activist, 
recommending that a Mr Young, a businessman in Toronto be contacted as ‘he 
would be of great use in building up support for the SNP in North America.’714  
The increasing professionalism of the SNP during the 1960s brought 
organisational changes suitable for a mass membership political party.715 One 
of these changes was a Foreign Affairs Department, announced in the report of 
executive vice chairman for policy, J. H. D. Gair to the National Council, 2nd 
December 1967.716 No mention was made of the Scottish diaspora in this 
announcement, despite there being potential advantage in liaising with 
prominent Scots abroad. None of the minutes of the meetings of this body 
examined from 1967 and 1968 made reference to the potential of such 
contacts.717 In drafting a manifesto in April 1968, there is no mention of Scots 
abroad.718 In draft notes for the ‘SNP and You’, a document designed to bring 
SNP positions to members and potential members, the chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Department, J. Picken, lists Scotland’s international friends as being in 
Scandinavia and the Baltic, as well as the Auld Alliance with France.719 A 
distinctly local European and historic view rather than one inspired by the 
diaspora. 
Whilst no meaningful support appears to be forthcoming, the question of the 
Scots abroad never completely goes away for the SNP. A correspondent of 
Donaldson’s, a W. McDougall in Iceland claims the Scots in Canada alone 
‘could get us our way’720 and he is invited to join the party and set up an 
overseas branch in Iceland by G. Wilson.721 He writes later to say he has 
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joined, but of a branch there is no indication.722All in all, this summary shows 
Donaldson saw no reason to waver from the transactional business of 
constituency, elections and organisation.723 
With Donaldson as chairman no evidence of a meaningful engagement with the 
diaspora has emerged. The report of office bearers to the 34th SNP Conference 
in June 1968, towards the end of Donaldson’s term as chairman, contains a 
report from the Publicity Committee that there are approximately 200 overseas 
members and that there are 20 information tapes in circulation amongst 
them.724 Add these numbers to the approximately 250 in the London 
branches,725 and the likely number of 450 looks very small against the 
approximate membership in Scotland of 100,000 given at the 1968 
conference.726 
London 
There was an active branch in London in the early 1960s, and a lively debate 
about how to use it between convenor MacDonald and Donaldson.727 A letter 
was composed by MacDonald to members of the SNP before the 1964 general 
election saying that the London members were ‘strategically placed to harry 
and prod’ Scottish MPs who didn’t represent Scottish interests.728 In 1967 the 
London branch had set up an Overseas Press Committee.729 In November 
1967, Wilson ordered an appeal amongst the London Scots to set up an office 
for Mrs Ewing after her election.730 A second branch was set up, the Bexley and 
North West Kent, for London activists who did not want to travel into London. 
These branches were visited in May 1968 by J. Lees, who wrote a report for the 
benefit of the NEC.731 The Bexley branch had 32 members and £20 in the bank. 
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The London branch was more substantial with 220 members but only had £10 
in funds.  
The members saw their function as the SNP’s representatives in London and 
overseas and that they were at the centre of things. They were disappointed 
that the SNP had no London office to support Mrs Ewing. They complained they 
did not have enough to do. Lees’s recommendation to the Executive was to 
encourage SNP organisations outside of Scotland, and that an Executive 
member should be given the job of liaising with them. However, he was clear 
that their role should be limited and the Party should have a separate central 
function in London. Muriel Gibson, an NEC member, was given the role.732 In 
1969, an NEC meeting733 discussed twelve English branches and groups. 
However, only four replied to a suggestion by Gibson that they adopt a Scottish 
constituency through which to work; London, Bexley Heath, Liverpool and 
Weymouth.  
The Scottish National Party Association (SNPA)  
Eventually the SNP addressed the issue of non-Scottish branches by setting up 
an organisation to liaise with these members. It is to this organisation that the 
research now turns. Whilst there was little success in utilising the Scots abroad 
during Donaldson’s time as chairman, there was plenty of evidence of some 
engagement, with an interest in the work of the SNP by some Scots abroad. 
The convenor of the Policy Committee on Finance and Tax, W. T.  Martin, 
wrote of a conversation with R. A. Young in Toronto.734 Young had emigrated in 
1951 and owned businesses in Canada, England and Scotland. He thought 
there would be many in Canada that would support independence if they 
thought the SNP had sensible and responsible people in it. He asked to meet 
senior officials during a business trip.  
The overseas secretary, W. S. Orr, told the Central Belt Publicity Committee in 
1967; ‘It is hoped to cover the world by members’ contacts’ to help build the 
‘foundations for a future Scottish government’ and to ‘also help party finance,’ 
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‘this aspect of party membership will be treated with priority and urgency.’735 
The success of Mrs. Ewing in the Hamilton by-election had resulted in many 
enquiries. Both the Central Belt and North East Publicity committees made 
positive statements about overseas membership.736 There was support for 
campaigning abroad from a constituency in a resolution to the National 
Council.737 In February of 1969 the SNP national organiser, John McAteer 
wrote a letter to members headed ‘Recruitment - Overseas Members.’738 He 
began, ‘The Party has members in New Zealand, Australia, USA, Canada, 
Holland, Hong Kong and elsewhere and an increasing number of applications 
to join flows into HQ every day.’ He went on to assert that ‘overseas members 
can be of great value to the party’ and asked members to recruit overseas. This 
was aimed at getting the Caledonian societies’ members on board, rather than 
them being beholden to the hereditary leaders of Scotland who have ‘nothing in 
common with the ordinary Scot.’ The letter finished with a greeting from the 
125,000 members of the SNP to the countless thousands of overseas 
supporters of Scottish freedom. This was presumably sent out as there was a 
reply in July from Los Angeles.739  
The letter was from I. W. Mitchell. Its story reflected the reasons for earlier 
failure. Mitchell, a member himself from Aberdeenshire, had tried to interest the 
members of the Clan Gordon Association. Their reply was that they ‘don’t do 
politics’ and added ‘we’re British.’ The local St. Andrews Society thought the 
idea of Scottish independence amusing. His letters to the Los Angeles Times 
were rarely printed and so he tried to keep the subject alive through the 
classified columns. McAteer’s note on the subject to Donaldson reflected that 
‘this will not surprise you since you must have had contact with Scottish 
Societies in the States yourself.’740 
                                                          
735 Acc. 11987/29, minutes of the meeting of the Central Belt Publicity Committee,1st October 
1967 
736 Acc.11987/30, minutes of the Central Belt Publicity Committee 3rd March 1968; North East 
Publicity Committee, 16th March 1968 
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Also in February 1969 there was a letter to HQ members. It gives the address 
of an Auckland, New Zealand branch and three English branches are 
mentioned. It claimed ‘the overseas department of the Party has been 
strengthened.’741 A memo from McAteer to Wilson later in 1969 indicates some 
ambition to exploit the diaspora; the overseas membership secretary should 
establish contact with Scottish societies in all countries where they exist, the 
grip of the establishment on the US organisation should be challenged. There 
should be special status for active overseas members. There was concern that 
membership of a foreign political party could threaten citizenship, so this would 
be clarified with the relevant overseas governments.742 Shortly after, Dr David 
Stephenson was appointed the overseas membership secretary but he was 
given no secretarial assistance.743 In a reflection of the success of the ‘1,000 
Club’ in domestic fundraising, he suggested they established an overseas 
version,’744 but there is no evidence that this proceeded.  
It is clear that this activity did not produce many new members overseas. There 
is a list of SNP members in the EEC. There were thirty members listed in 1976, 
nearly half of whom were in the Netherlands, Belgium or Germany.745 In 1976, 
the SNP had only 14 members listed in the US.746 However, a branch was 
founded in Toronto in August 1974.747  
According to two reports written in March and April 1976,748 just prior to the 
SNPA being formed, only in Canada and Australia were there sufficient 
branches to form a country association. The case of Canada is well described 
in these reports by Norman Allen, a supporter from Ottawa. His report on the 
‘Patterns and Prospects for the SNP in Canada’ offered a ‘Canadian Model’ for 
the National Council’s deliberations on the establishment of an SNP 
Association to bring together all overseas branches. Allan looked ahead to 
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approval for the founding of the SNPA. He provided a list of branches in 
Canada with ‘round figures’ numbers of members, reproduced in table IX 
below. 
Table IX: Canadian Membership 1976 
Branch Members 
Toronto 70 
Montreal 15 
Vancouver 15 
Ottawa 30 
Rest of Canada 70 
Total 200 
Source: Acc. 10754/24, Report by Norman Allan dated 9th March 1976 
Of the 70 non-branch members, around 20 were individuals who had been 
notified to Toronto by Edinburgh, so were prospects. In New Zealand, Mr. Lee 
in Otago wrote to Muriel Gibson, SNP national secretary in Edinburgh, to 
suggest forming a New Zealand branch, so there was a little interest.749 In 
October 1976 the SNP founded the SNPA to bring together all overseas 
branches.750 Minutes of an earlier meeting on 25th July 1976751 had noted that 
individuals needed to be subject to party discipline and so had to be within the 
SNPA.752 The SNP recognised it had support outside of Scotland, but had to 
control any response such supporters might give to the local press. The SNPA 
was formally affiliated to the SNP at the National Council meeting in December 
1976.753 
The constitution of the SNPA stated it was to ‘provide an organisation for 
persons out with the United Kingdom who wish to support the aims of the SNP 
primarily, but also wish to further Scottish interests and promote goodwill.’754 
Muriel Gibson, SNP membership secretary, thought it an inadequate response 
to the need to accommodate overseas members without having the difficulty of 
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their joining a foreign political party.755 There was confusion over a recent 
change in the SNP constitution which had appeared to try to exclude all those 
not on the Scottish electoral register, even though there was a long standing 
London branch.756 The impression left by the correspondence is one of benign 
neglect of members or aspirants outside of Scotland. However, there were 
genuine fears about the impact of distant members on publicity. 
A discussion paper by David Ross dated 17th September 1977 is helpful in 
understanding the SNP’s approach to the diaspora in America. The paper 
recognised the importance of the US to Scotland, second only to England in 
foreign relations terms and recognised that party policy should reflect that. 
Caution was added with regard to the support the Irish-Americans were seen to 
be giving to the Republicans in their violent struggle in Northern Ireland. It was 
acknowledged that ‘a vital element in any strategy must be to avoid at all costs 
situations where unfavourable comparisons can be made with any other group 
or nation.’757 There was concern that the Americans could be very enthusiastic 
and therefore difficult to contain. Additionally it was recognised that federal laws 
made contributions to foreign political parties difficult, something that had been 
made clear to Muirhead by his US correspondents many years earlier.758  
The paper laid out the SNP objectives in the US at that time; influence and 
motivate in the widest sense those, particularly the elite, who can assist 
Scotland in achieving independence. To build up a body of committed and 
informed support in this, maintain the interest and support of those who wish to 
make a contribution to the Party through a branch of the SNP. The paper also 
recommended the ‘paramount interests of control’ in that the exercising of 
executive authority in the US should be tightly supervised from Scotland. Any 
countrywide membership that existed in the US would have a membership fee 
and be ‘entirely passive.’759  Two months later, a letter to Johnstone in the US 
from SNP Chairman Wolfe set out his expectations of a US association. The 
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main aim, he said, was to ‘seek influence which is sympathetic to us’ by 
‘establishing a non-public network of SNP sympathetic contacts-no PR-no 
public organisation-you (Johnstone) as SNP rep as the channel between such 
people and me’ (Wolfe).’760 
Canada, particularly the Toronto branch, was regarded by the SNPA as quite 
well organised.761 There was a Canadian Association which organised the 
branch activity. Wolfe visited Canada and the US towards the end of 1976 and 
endorsed the view that other countries should organise along the lines of 
Canada.762 The role suggested for the Canadian Association was to display 
solidarity with the aims of the SNP; to act as a PR agent in the country, creating 
publicity and propaganda for the SNP cause, to cement good relations between 
Canada and Scotland and to raise such funds as were required to support its 
own general purposes.763 The inconsistency of ‘acting as a PR agent’ with 
Wolfe’s advice to Johnstone is noteworthy. Recruitment was best achieved 
through local Scottish associations or by newspaper advertisements.764 These 
elements of the role of the SNPA overseas were incorporated into the 
constitutions of the Associations set up for Canada, US, Australia, and New 
Zealand.765 The membership policy of the SNPA of Australia was very inclusive, 
open as it was to all those over 16 who endorsed the aims of the Association.766 
The fact that there had been some interest from potential supporters outside 
the UK was reflected in the constitution of the SNP on 26th May 1977, when it 
was amended to cater for this. By this time New York and Virginia branches 
had already been set up.767 This amendment was forwarded to the convenor of 
the International Council of the SNPA, Michael Spens, on 1st September that 
year.768 Spens was born in Windsor but had Scottish ancestry. He was a 
diaspora returnee.769 Spens did not devote his time solely to this role; he was 
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the prospective parliamentary candidate for Orkney and Shetland and the 
convenor for the Fund Raising Committee. Running the SNPA was not 
regarded as a full time job. Spens himself allotted one day a week to it.770  
The SNPA minutes dated 27th February 1977 included a London 
representative, but an amendment to include the non-Scottish parts of the UK 
was refused by the NEC. The role of non-Scottish branches was to influence 
others, not speak for the SNP,771 a recognition of overseas interest. A note from 
Spens to a prospective member in Atlanta, G. L. McKelvey, stated that the 
Association was established to serve the growing number of overseas 
supporters.772 However some felt the SNPA was not going well, due to the 
commitments of its secretary, failure to attend meetings and confusion about its 
aims and functions.773 
The Association used proxy members to represent those overseas who could 
not regularly attend the International Council of SNPA. By November 1977, this 
had 12 of its 15 positions filled. There were five residents overseas and the 
remainder were SNP nominees or proxies. The minutes of the meeting that first 
discussed Dr. MacIntyre’s visit to the Canadian SNPA Conference included 
attendees such as a US proxy, W. F. Macdonald, and the proxy member for 
South Africa, Ian Hosack.774 SNPA delegates were to be invited to the 1978 
National Conference.775 
A mixed picture about the activities of these overseas branches emerges from 
the correspondence. A letter by Macdonald to Spens on 6th February 1978 
claimed Johnstone in New York felt neglected, whereas Toronto ‘seems pretty 
well organised.’776 Later, MacDonald asked for some SNP literature and 
merchandise so he could forward it on.777 The Canadian Association held its 
first conference in May 1977.778 Overseas members would attend meetings of 
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the International Council when they were in the UK and Norman Allan wrote to 
the SNPA on 12th June 1978 to suggest that they arrange a meeting to coincide 
with his visit later that year.779 
Letters from Sydney and Adelaide in March and April of 1978 claimed they had 
15 and 16 members apiece. Tomala, of the Sydney branch, asked to be 
appointed a spokesman for the SNPA of Australia to State Governments and 
the press. However, in a later letter Tomala complained to the International 
Council that both he and McGill of the Adelaide group felt neglected. They had 
not received copies of the newsletter, Saltire, and there was a good chance the 
branches would close if the situation was not fixed.780  
There were similar issues in New Zealand. The New Zealand Association had 
sent its draft constitution to the National Secretary of the SNP in August 1976, 
so was probably founded around that time.781 In June 1978 a letter from Donald 
Lee of the University of Otago in New Zealand complained he had had no 
Saltires. In his reply Spens admitted the Saltire was dogged with problems and 
offered to send Contact, the SNP’s parliamentary newsletter, instead. Lee had 
made some efforts with the Otago press and Spens complimented him on his 
efforts. The issues with the Saltire continued. The editor, Stuart West, wrote to 
Spens in 1978 and admitted its ‘days were numbered’ when Canada said they 
did not want it. He estimated only 60 people worldwide read it.782 
Ian Hosack wrote to Spens in 1978 giving the SNPA contact in South Africa as 
Iain Ramsay and asked Spens to send Ramsay copies of the Saltire so that he 
could photostat copies for his members.783 A potential member, J. M. Weir, 
wrote in July 1978 to say he was going to South Africa for three years, and 
asked to be put in touch with the party there.784 There was discussion of a 
European SNP Association, but this did not progress.785 
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A picture emerges of branches with limited membership in the USA, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, with mixed support from the SNP through the 
International council of the SNPA. No summary of members for each year has 
been located, so the overall number of members outside Scotland is unclear. 
However numbers may be deduced from the minutes of meetings of the SNPA 
International Council. These are summarised in Table X. 
Table X: Approximate SNP Membership outside Scotland, 1977 
Country Members Totals 
Canada 200  
Australia 50  
New Zealand 15  
Total  265 
HQ members   
Outside UK 200  
England & Wales 250  
Total  450 
Grand Total  715 
Sources: Acc. 10754/24, minutes of meeting 4th December 1977, Acc. 10754/22, letter from Mr. 
West dated 14th November 1977.  
At the end of 1974 the SNP had a total of 460 branches, and member numbers 
of 125,000 claimed in 1968.786 Added to their limited numbers, the passive role 
of those abroad lessened their impact. Although prior to the General Election in 
May 1979, the International Council noted that it was planning to circulate 
relevant material to leading SNPA activists in other countries,787 there was no 
intention on the part of the SNP to allow these overseas branches any official 
status as spokesmen.  
Michael Spens visited Canada between 24th November and 1st December 1978. 
In a summary of his visit he observed that a very fine network of activists, 
committed and influential, existed across Canada, and ‘we must USE it 
properly.’788 Spens was appointed secretary of the SNPA by the NEC in 
October 1979, so the organisation was still in existence then. A letter from the 
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national secretary, Ian Murray, asked for a report on the current situation.789 
However, Spens resigned in September 1980, blaming pressure of work.790The 
need to have control over Party commentary meant the overseas branches 
were constrained to be politically passive and could not act as official 
spokesmen, the only other way the overseas supporters could help a peaceful 
party in a foreign country was through financial support. Early post-war records 
of contributions are sparse.  
Amongst the archived correspondence for 1965-89 there is only one file 
covering the fundraising committee of the SNP791 and this only covers a small 
part of the period under review, from 1976 to 1979. In meetings of the Fund 
Raising Committee, for example the meetings of 1st December 1976 and 13th 
January 1977, there was no mention of fund raising from overseas branches.792 
However, in 1977, Spens was also appointed convenor of the Fund Raising 
Committee. Consideration of overseas sources of funding was thereafter on the 
agenda of the committee.793 In a note dated 15th May 1978 Spens says ‘the 
International Council, (of the) SNPA, has in view other sources of funds within 
its own remit and will be making its own efforts to raise additional support.’794 
As with the pre-war SHRA and SNP, fundraising was vital but appeared to 
perform badly. The annual report of the Fund Raising Committee written by 
Kenneth Fee for 1979 said performance since 1975 was the best ‘because 
there was little to beat’.795 Fund raising from abroad featured in the minutes of 
the meetings of January, March and April of 1979, with no specific news of how 
this would be done and where the funds would come from.796 Spens referred to 
the failure in fund raising in his resignation letter.797 
Part of the problem lay in the constitutions of the overseas groups which did not 
task them with raising funds other than to fulfil their own needs. In the case of 
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the Canadian document, the original wording to raise funds ‘for the assistance 
of the SNP in Scotland’ was amended by the Scottish organisation to read ‘to 
support its own general purposes and organisation.’798 The overseas branches 
were expected to fund visits of SNP delegates to their countries, as Toronto did 
for the visit of Wolfe and Ewing to Canada in 1976.799 However, Allan’s note of 
7th April 1976 makes no mention of fundraising.800  
The draft constitutions of the SNPA (28th October 1976), the New Zealand 
SNPA (6th August 1976) and the Australian SNPA (28th October 1976) all make 
reference to raising funds for local needs rather than for the SNP in Scotland. 
Amendments to these drafts are all procedural and do not change the 
objectives around fundraising.801 Minutes of an SNPA meeting on 25th July 
1976 do not refer to fundraising, nor is there any reference in the January, 
February or December editions of the 1977 Saltire. David Ross, in his 
discussion paper on the US, anticipates no direct funding for the SNP, just local 
subscriptions.802 Various minutes of the meetings of the International Council of 
the SNPA contain no reference to fundraising.803 
In March 1977, West wrote to Wolfe with his assessment of the first few months 
of operation of the SNPA. His conclusion was that it was moving too slowly. He 
attributed this to the Party’s uncertainty as to the role and status of the SNPA, 
the workload of the International Secretary, and insufficient meetings of the 
International Council (four in number in ten months, one of which was not 
quorate.) He felt that if the organisation was more business-like in its approach, 
this might encourage overseas donations although he did ‘realise that 
fundraising is not a primary aim of the association.’804 There can be no surprise 
then that the SNPA was unable to raise funds overseas, as it was not 
constitutionally bound to do so and was poorly organised.  
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Towards the end of the 1970s the SNP showed many signs of an organisation 
short of cash. There were plans to cut costs at Head Office,805 and predictions 
that its deficit would be £25,000 in 1980.806 The need was therefore great, but 
the fundraising efforts did not exploit the diaspora for funds. In 1980 a trip to 
study the US presidential election, whilst considered worthwhile, could not be 
funded. There was no reference in the correspondence to asking the US SNPA 
for help.807  
Confidential income estimates for 1980-81 have no specific reference to income 
from SNPAs other than £1,000 from HQ subscriptions out of a total of 
£76,400.808 The last reference to the SNPA in the General Business Committee 
(GBC) correspondence archive is a suggestion from the Bothwell constituency 
association that they be allowed to ‘twin’ with overseas branches for fundraising 
purposes. The national secretary in his reply intimated that the GBC had given 
some thought to overseas fundraising.809 Later a branch suggested a 
delegation go to Georgia, US, to raise money at a big clan gathering. The idea 
was rejected, as the SNP were not keen to involve themselves with such 
gatherings as they had a British orientation and had not responded in the past. 
Later in 1982 there was an assertion that there was every intention of the GBC 
writing to ‘Americans with Scottish names’ to raise funds, and the intention is 
again repeated in a note a year later.810 No mention of the SNPA is made.   
In conclusion, although some overseas branches were established in the 
1970s, the SNPA remained a very small part of the SNP in terms of both 
numbers of members and impact. Indeed its impact was so low that only six 
years after its founding it was not considered by the GBC in its fundraising 
efforts. It is appropriate that Spens has the last word in this assessment of the 
SNPA; ‘this is an excellent organisation in principle, but I believe it will require 
more resources and more two-way communication from the overseas 
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Associations to succeed continuously.’811 There had been no meetings for 
some time and members had resigned as they could see no point in meeting.812 
The reply to this letter gives no intimation of how the organisation would 
continue,813 although the Canadian organisation held conferences in 1980, and 
there was some further correspondence that year.814 
The Irish Diaspora Engagement during the Ulster Conflict 
The previous chapter referred to the support for Irish nationalism from the Irish 
diaspora in the US and Canada. Although the Irish had had their independence 
for some years by the time of the electoral rise of the SNP, the outstanding 
issue for Republicans was that the island of Ireland was not united. The six 
counties of Ulster were still in the UK. In 1967 the demands of civil rights 
activists proved critical in triggering the outbreak of a bloody conflict in the 
province.815 Although in the immediate post-war period there had been some 
vocal support in the US for the Protestant Unionist position in Northern Ireland, 
Irish Catholic Nationalism was more readily marketable to conservative and 
richer Irish-Americans.816  
Founded in 1970 by an IRA veteran, the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) 
was the most prominent organisation within the republican support network in 
America.817 The group’s fund raising was claimed to benefit the families of 
imprisoned Provisional IRA (PIRA) volunteers. Noraid sent an average of 
$200,000 per annum to the PIRA between 1971 and 1994.818 Other sources 
claim between $3 and $5 million were raised.819 Noraid became increasingly 
involved in publicity campaigns and at one stage organised a tour by American 
relatives of dying hunger strikers, greatly increasing the flow of dollars to Noraid 
collections.820 Irish Republicanism relied heavily on funding from the US and 
although Irish Canadians lacked the financial muscle of their US counterparts, 
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there was support for the movement.821 This remittance and support 
performance made a complete contrast to that of the Scottish diaspora.  
There was never any Scottish equivalent of Noraid, and the Scottish nationalist 
movement had a very low profile in the US.822 The SNP was of course very 
aware of this fundraising effort, and the issues it caused with both British and 
US governments.823 The claim that the funds were for the relatives of 
imprisoned republicans no doubt served to circumvent restrictions on 
contributions to non-US political parties. The non-violent nature of the SNP’s 
struggle left that door closed. The support of Irish-Americans for the separatist 
republican movement was not only financial. There was also the apparent 
application of soft power.  
Both the Irish and Scots appear culturally attractive to the Americans. Only the 
Irish state could have demonstrated policies, although both groups could 
demonstrate values. Neither could directly influence the US through hard 
power, although the PIRA were not afraid to use it to influence the British. 
There was an attempt by the Scottish Nationalists to set the agenda not only of 
the United Nations, but of the US Congress, to be examined later. Before that, 
the success of the Irish in influencing US policy makers is analysed. 
Irish America and Northern Ireland 
The political relationship between the United States and Ireland is one which 
has been mediated by generations of emigration from Ireland, creating an 
organic link.824 For two centuries Irish-Americans have sought to influence the 
politics of Ireland by providing assistance to political or underground 
organisations or by persuading the American Government to intervene.825 Yet 
the US also has an important diplomatic relationship with the United Kingdom, 
of which Northern Ireland is a part, sometimes referred to as a special 
relationship.826 Because the US had friendly relations with both the UK and 
Ireland, its diplomatic approach was to stay out of the conflict in Northern 
                                                          
821 Peatling, 2005, p.55 
822 Sim, 2011b, p.177 
823 Acc. 10754/22, 2nd November 1977, Wolfe to Johnstone 
824 Cochrane, 2007, p.217 
825 O’Clery, 1996, p.1 
826 Calvocoressi, 1987, p.175 
132 
 
Ireland.827 However, some prominent Irish-American politicians did get involved. 
Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a resolution to the US Senate calling for 
the withdrawal of British Troops.828 Further, US administrations have 
periodically taken an interest in the Northern Ireland situation and not treated it 
wholly as a domestic issue for the UK.829 Two examples of this follow. 
The activities of Noraid have been described earlier in the context of supporting 
the republican fight in Northern Ireland. The Irish National Caucus was 
vociferous in its criticism of UK policy in Northern Ireland. This body subjected 
Congress to effective lobbying, one outcome of which was the establishment of 
an ad hoc committee on Irish Affairs in the House of Representatives.830 
Further, throughout the 1980s the Caucus promoted the MacBride principles of 
fair employment in Northern Ireland.831 This was opposed by the UK 
government and Ulster Unionist politicians, but several US states adopted the 
principles and forced US companies to apply them. This resulted in a change of 
strategy by the UK Government, who in 1989 was forced to bring in its own Fair 
Employment Act. The relative success of this action by the Caucus illustrates 
the impact of Irish-American civil society on Northern Ireland. The Caucus did 
not have the power to compel the UK government to accept these principles, 
but they appeared to use soft power to engage in successful persuasion.832 
While the British Government recognised that a small number of 
Irish-Americans made considerable financial contributions to the PIRA, the 
activities of Irish-American groups were a very minor factor in its decisions on 
Northern Ireland policy.833 However this was not the case in 1979, when there 
was considerable evidence that there were policy responses to American 
pressure.834 In the mid-1970s the nature of the PIRA changed from being 
supported by acquiescence from the Catholic population to a cell based terrorist 
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organisation dependent on external sources of support and income. Recall that 
one of these sources of funds was the US.  
Support in the US came from the poorer city areas and these communities 
wielded some influence through the House of Representatives. A group of 
politicians including Kennedy, the ‘Four Horsemen,’835 took an interest in 
Northern Ireland. Their influence had lain behind President Carter apparently 
treating the situation in Northern Ireland as a legitimate concern for US foreign 
policy.836 In 1979, as a result of pressure from the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish 
Affairs, the US government suspended the sale of handguns and ammunition to 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) on the grounds of violation of human 
rights.837 The UK government hoped that the Northern Ireland secretary calling 
a conference of Northern Ireland’s four political parties was seen as something 
that would meet US Congressional approval.838 
The UK government was concerned that the issue would become a factor in the 
1980 presidential contest, particularly as Kennedy was seen as a potential 
contender for the Democratic nomination. There was concern that a hunger 
strike in ‘H’ block, part of a prison, would lead to more sanctions like the RUC 
arms embargo. Part of the Democratic platform spoke of ending the division of 
the Irish people, but the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iran 
embassy siege ensured the limelight was elsewhere and the candidates did not 
take the issue up.839 President Reagan’s approach was one of non-intervention 
and the influence of the Irish lobby declined whilst he was in power.840 
Two examples have been presented of the soft power of Irish-Americans 
leading to changes in UK government policy. Within the same time frame, an 
organisation called Scotland-UN (S-UN) was failing to get any support from the 
same House of Representatives. At this time, it is clear, there were no Scots 
American politicians forming a cabal like the Four Horsemen, there was no 
Scottish National Caucus, no interest groups in the US willing or able to use 
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soft power close to the hub of government. The phenomenon of Tartan Day 
was some years in the future.  
Scotland-UN, March 1979-Autumn 1980 
Before the 1979 Devolution referendum the S-UN group was formed to urge 
support for Scottish self-determination, this time focussed upon appealing to 
international bodies; the United Nations and the Council of Europe. It is the 
appeal to the United Nations that is of interest in this analysis, as it included an 
appeal to the US Congress that invoked the contribution of the Scots abroad to 
the establishment and success of the US. The body was active intermittently 
until the early twenty-first century, claiming amongst other things that its 
submissions to the Council of Europe were responsible for putting Scottish 
self-determination on to the New Labour Manifesto.841 
Whereas some of its members were SNP, for example John McGill, this was 
not a party but a pressure group. Its constitution made it clear that it would 
‘concentrate its activities on the international scene.’ However, there is no 
mention of leveraging the support of the Scots abroad.842 A claim of rights to 
Scottish self-determination was sent to the Director of the Human Rights 
division at the United Nations in New York. This had a limited demand. The 
Director was asked to search for a precedent where the UN had become 
involved in the internal affairs of a member nation. Failing that, he was asked to 
let Scotland be the precedent and ‘consider our case.’843  
A letter was sent to all members of the US Congress. This included comments 
on the 20 million or so people of Scottish descent in the US and the 
contributions of Scots to the Declaration of Independence. It reminded 
Congressmen of the ‘considerable debt that the US owes to Scotland’ in 
respect of the formation of the US.844 It asked for their support to end the 
‘remote colonial rule of Scotland’, and claimed they had the ‘right to expect the 
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support of the Congress.’845 A letter was sent to Ronald Reagan in December 
1980.846  
The substance of the Claim of Right was a petition signed by thousands of 
Scots which was submitted with the letter to the UN. No number of signatures 
was given in the submission, nor is there any given in the archive of the S-UN 
movement. There is however, a file of 1390 signatories which the archive 
asserts were received too late to be submitted.847 The Claim of Right was also 
sent to 233 UN ambassadors, many Scottish newspapers, a Society of Arts and 
Culture in Massachusetts and a lady in Toronto. There was no attempt to 
engage the help of influential Scots in the US directly as sponsors, either in 
Congress or the UN.848 In May 1980 the submission to the UN was 
acknowledged, with a note that it would be copied to the British Government, in 
accordance with UN protocol. The case was presented by Brenda Carson of 
S-UN to UNHCR in Geneva in Autumn 1980. There were hints at confidential 
diplomatic manoeuvres, but what this refers to is unclear.849 
The appeal to Congress invoking the Scottish diaspora in the US is of interest 
to this enquiry. There appears to have been little other contact with US Scots. 
Two letters of support from Florida and British Columbia mark the sum of 
indirect support, and of the surviving signatories to the Claim of Right, only 55 
of 1390 were not from Scotland.850 This unsuccessful attempt to influence the 
UN and Congress to intervene in the case for Scottish self-determination 
contrasts remarkably with the actions of the Irish diaspora during the Northern 
Irish conflict. 
Summary 
The chapter covered the second of the two time periods to be analysed and in 
doing so has examined the engagement of the SNP with the Scottish diaspora. 
The diaspora was refreshed by considerable net emigration. During the period 
there was a prominent returnee involved at the highest level of the organisation, 
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Arthur Donaldson. However, no doubt partly because of his own experience in 
the US, Donaldson correctly gauged the lack of interest abroad and did not 
encourage the diaspora to support the nationalists in a meaningful way, despite 
there being a constant awareness of the possibility of support by having an 
overseas secretary in the Party. There was an active London branch whose 
existence was treated with detachment. At the end of Donaldson’s tenure there 
were approximately 450 overseas and English members. The Party’s priorities 
were to win votes in Scotland and seats in Westminster.851 Even so, during the 
1970s, at a time when the SNP had 11 MPs at Westminster, an association 
was set up by the party to co-ordinate the overseas branches and members. 
Despite several branches being established, they were deliberately constrained 
in their involvement without even a role in fundraising.  
Once again the Irish diaspora proved successful not only in fundraising, but 
apparently also in the apparent application of soft power. Just why the Scottish 
diaspora was indifferent to the nationalist project in its homeland will be the 
subject of chapter six. Before that the analysis turns to the performance of the 
diaspora in the UK parliament during the debates of the Bills to promote 
devolution in Scotland.   
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Chapter Five: Home Rule and Devolution at Westminster 
 
This chapter examines a part of the diaspora in England and Wales, Scottish 
MPs in the Westminster Parliament. During the period researched, many 
attempts were made in Parliament to legislate for self-government for Scotland. 
Their chronology falls roughly into two parts, 1889 to 1927 and 1975 to 1978. 
During the first period, these were private members bills or motions. During the 
later period a Government introduced the legislation. It must be recalled, 
however, that for the greater part of the twentieth century the two main British 
parties, Labour and Conservative, have attempted to suppress the territorial 
dimension in national politics.852 
As a general observation to this research, it should be noted that there are 
ways other than speeches in parliament for MPs to make their positions known 
to ministers. It is not surprising that backbenchers should raise matters privately 
with ministers, or their PPS,853 when to do so in the House or in committee 
might expose opposition to their party’s policies. Factors such as how well the 
member knows the minister, the member’s seniority and the seriousness of the 
topic are significant.854 Private meetings can take place, with varying degrees of 
formality, the outcomes of which are difficult to judge.855 An MP’s loyalty to his 
party’s position on a bill will be enforced by compliance through the Whips. 
However identification with the party and its norms are a stronger influence. 
Constituency concerns are also a powerful influencer of an MP’s position.856  
The debates on UK membership of the EEC, roughly contemporary to the 
period of the 1970s Devolution debates, highlighted the degree to which public 
issues may cut across party lines.857 Considerable cross-party cooperation 
exists at the backbench level on a formalised and regular basis in a wide range 
of all-party committees and groups.858 Whilst only a small proportion of these 
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are extensively active, they demonstrate the ability of backbenchers to 
cooperate across party boundaries.859 This is relevant to the question of this 
chapter, which tries to demonstrate that the Scots abroad in Parliament in 
England appeared to shrink from this in the passage of the Scotland and Wales 
and Scotland Bills in the House. 
Significance of the Debates 
The importance of parliamentary activity was recognised and results of votes in 
the Commons were often published by the SHRA.860 The SNP advanced its 
own candidates for election. Without active support in Parliament and of 
political parties, home rule or independence could not be achieved by 
constitutional means. Relevant to the earlier debates in the chronology, the first 
meeting of the 1924 Scottish National Convention affirmed its determination to 
‘use every constitutional means’ to bring control of Scotland’s affairs to 
Scotland.861 The actions of the legislators in Parliament were therefore very 
important to the supporters of home rule and independence. Likewise the 
support of political parties was crucial to the success of legislation. Up to 1914, 
the Liberal party was the only hope for home rule, and it was from the Liberals 
that the first SHRA largely drew its membership. The Liberal Young Scots 
group ran meetings and garnered support for home rule in Scotland after the 
demise of the SHRA.862  Whilst this group set up the Scottish Home Rule 
Council of Scottish Liberal MPs and was successful in getting the 1913 Scottish 
Home Rule Bill to a second reading, its existence showed the issue was 
marginal to the main party.863  
In 1919, Cowan’s Government of Scotland Bill was counted out (the House was 
inquorate.) Muirhead saw this as sufficiently significant to write to each Scottish 
Member asking them to explain their absence from the House at such a time.864 
Candidates for by-elections were sent questionnaires by registered mail to 
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ascertain their position on home rule matters.865 In the inter-war Labour 
government, home rule fared no better under Ramsay MacDonald with the 
failure of Buchanan’s 1924 Bill. The SHRA saw the Bill as very important and 
arranged a demonstration in Glasgow to draw attention to it.866 Roland 
Muirhead noted to one MP that the ‘Scots members were not able to get 
together’ in that parliament.867 The significance of these debates is that their 
failure, particularly that of Buchanan’s Bill which had the support of the majority 
of Scottish members, made many who favoured home rule begin to think of 
independence.868 Notwithstanding, a Scottish National Convention to draft 
another bill met in the November of that year. This provided the draft for Barr’s 
1927 Bill. The failure of this attempt was closely followed by the Convention 
proposing a meeting to form a National Party.869 A note written in January 1928 
with some papers on the formation of a National Party claimed that ‘the policy 
of depending upon the existing political parties for obtaining self-government 
has been tried for many years and found wanting.’870  
For the later debates upon the Scotland and Wales and the Scotland Bills, the 
issue at hand was the provision of a devolved form of government in Scotland. 
The SNP share of the vote in Scotland, as the debates took place from 1975 to 
1978, gave the SNP 11 MPs in Westminster, its highest number for the period 
of this enquiry. After the failure of the Scotland and Wales Bill in the guillotine 
defeat of February 1977, the SNP withdrew its support from the minority Labour 
Government, resulting in it having to rely on the ‘Lib-Lab pact’ to survive a vote 
of no confidence. With this, and a slump in the polls by Labour in Scotland,871 a 
new bill appeared, the Scotland Bill.872 Thus devolution was important to the 
SNP, its National Council voting to support a ‘Yes’ vote in any referendum,873 
despite internal divisions.874  
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The proceedings of the Westminster Parliament were important therefore to 
both home rulers and SNP. Any enquiry into the actions of the diaspora in 
support or otherwise of self-government for Scotland should therefore, include 
the actions of Scots in the diaspora in England who were members of 
Parliament in either House during the discussion of bills and motions supporting 
home rule.  
The purpose of the analysis is to identify the actions of the diaspora in 
parliament to determine whether or not they supported home rule. In the 
previous chapter the issue of the ‘Britishness’ of the Scottish associations was 
briefly covered. This will be dealt with in some detail in chapters six and seven, 
accordingly this forthcoming analysis will highlight any similar tendencies 
amongst the Scots abroad in a British institution, the Westminster Parliament. 
In chapter two, the issue of nationalism and interests was discussed, to 
highlight that genes were not enough, and people had to have aligned interests 
as well as common geography or birthright to support a nationalist concept. 
This is also important, as the interests of politicians may well not be aligned to a 
territory but a party or group within a party.  
Before each analysis of the MP’s actions, a brief background is provided as well 
as a summary of the attitude of UK political parties to Scottish self-government. 
The SNP’s approach to devolution legislation in the 1974 Parliament will be 
included in that section. For the earlier attempts, there was little contemporary 
electoral evidence that home rule motions or bills reflected the wishes of people 
in Scotland. However, the case for more self-government was accepted by 
some. Westminster was seen as too busy running the Empire to deal with both 
Scotland’s problems and national regeneration, a radical social project 
conjoined with home rule in the eyes of the Liberal left.875 There was a House of 
Commons Speaker’s conference in 1919 on the subject. In 1923 one estimate 
put the number of Unionists amongst Scottish MPs as 15 out of 74.876 In the 
later debates, on the Scotland and Wales and Scotland Bills, the electoral 
success of the SNP had arguably demonstrated an appetite for devolution 
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amongst the Scottish people, and it will be seen that this was recognised by 
some speakers.  
Many of the politicians discussed below were either economic or career 
emigrants; Willie Whitelaw, anxious to get into politics after two failed attempts 
at winning Dunbartonshire East, was offered an English seat, Penrith and the 
Borders. Several Scots Tories sat for English constituencies; John MacGregor, 
Robert McCrindle and David Knox being examples.877 They demonstrated 
homeland orientation by referring to themselves as a Scot or part Scot. They 
would evince boundary maintenance if they used associational groups, regular 
visits and family ties to link themselves to Scottish people and culture. They 
might have formed a group for Scottish interests in the Commons, inclusive of 
other Scots regardless of Party. Political actions more aligned to Scotland’s 
interests, as they perceived them, rather than that of their English constituents 
or the UK, would also indicate boundary maintenance. The analysis of the MPs 
will use this and homeland orientation to identify behaviour linked to Scotland 
during the debates.  
There is an interesting facet to this element of the research, which is to say that 
the Scottish back-bench MPs (those representing Scottish constituencies, not 
those in the diaspora) did not find a distinctive voice on issues affecting 
Scotland until the devolution debates forced them to take a wider view.878 There 
was, for example, no evidence that Scottish MPs developed any distinctive 
point of view on the formation of the British National Oil Corporation, beyond a 
left wing polemical view about wider state participation.879 
The Debates in the House of Commons on Scottish 
Self-Government  
1889-1927 Debates 
Gladstone’s 1879 Mid-Lothian campaign brought Scotland a higher profile in 
Parliament.880 Later, during the early and mid-1880s it was being argued that 
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the Scots needed someone in Parliament to oversee Scottish legislation and to 
guard the interests of Scotland.881 The Irish were getting unwarranted attention, 
it was felt, as a reward for the threat of terrorism.882 In 1871 Gladstone had 
promised Scotland that, ‘if the doctrine of home rule is to be established 
between Britain and Ireland, I protest on your behalf that you will be entitled to it 
in Scotland.’883 The Irish question was central to the issue of devolution or 
independence being on the political agenda.884 Home rule for Scotland became 
linked to progressive politics in this period, whereas Irish nationalism was seen 
as backward looking and conservative.885 The support for reforms in Scotland 
was seen to require the support of a dedicated Scottish secretary, but not 
necessarily a local parliament.  
At this time, radical Liberals, a growing power in Scotland, believed in the virtue 
of minimal government, and therefore few were in favour of an increase of the 
state in Scotland.886 Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule for Ireland in 1886 
split the Scottish Liberal Party, but Gladstone was reminded of Home Rule All 
Round by supporters and seemed to give it succour in 1886.887 Gladstone 
nevertheless held the line against any further home rule measures for the rest 
of the UK.888 The progressive nature claimed by Scottish home rulers attracted 
the Liberals and they supported home rule before World War One.889   
The SHRA was ridiculed by the Conservative Party.890 After 1912, the 
Conservative cause in Scotland was led by the Scottish Unionist Party and 
Unionists acknowledged that recognition of diversity was central to a robust 
Union.891 For traditional Conservatives, parliamentary sovereignty is identified 
with a commitment to Crown, Church and Parliament. This is compatible with 
progressive modification. The Labour Party would not challenge this, believing 
the massive concentration of power at Westminster would give the party the 
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means to transform society.892 The inter-war period saw a fundamental 
re-alignment of politics in Scotland as the Labour Party displaced the 
Liberals.893 On the face of it, the radical nature of Scottish home rule meant that 
Labour, particularly the Independent Labour Party (ILP),894 supported it.895 
However in the 1930s, mainstream Labour became more centralist and the 
economic disruption of the period left little room for constitutional debate.896 
In 1918 a new SHRA was formed and sought to influence the election by writing 
to all candidates for Scottish seats. After the election it did so again to those 
elected, only nine out of 74 responded favourably. They were split amongst the 
parties; three non-coalition Liberals, two coalition Liberals, two Labour, one ILP 
and one Unionist. Ten further replied but did not commit themselves.897 No 
party brought a bill to Parliament.898 In 1929 Muirhead was able to write to 
Joseph Westwood MP; ‘I am saddened by the way in which Scottish affairs 
have been treated at Westminster.’899 
Scottish self-government was debated in the Commons on 24 occasions before 
the 1978 Scotland Act.900 This section will deal with the 21 instances up to 
1927. It is worth recalling that this earlier period saw the establishment of a 
Standing Scottish Grand Committee, made up of all Scottish MPs, which 
oversaw the later stages of Scottish-only law-making.901 
The Contributions of the MPs   
The full list of speakers in Scottish home rule debates from 1889 to 1927 can 
be found in Appendix II. The list of those considered to be Scots abroad is 
found in Appendix III. They are Scots representing Scottish constituencies but 
spending most or all of their working lives in England. It is worth noting that 
Ramsay MacDonald was the secretary of the London branch of the first 
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SHRA,902 Prime Minister when Buchanan’s 1924 Bill was debated, he was in 
correspondence with Muirhead. Whilst claiming to be a ‘home ruler,’903 he told 
Muirhead in January 1924 he was too busy to consider Scottish home rule.904 
Muirhead wrote to him on 16 occasions between then and March 1926, 
receiving little or no encouragement.905 This Scot abroad in a position of power 
did not see home rule as his priority. 
This list will not be the whole story, but with 20 MPs it gives a qualitative answer 
to what the Scots abroad in Parliament did to promote Scottish 
self-government. It is proposed to analyse the contribution of each, summarised 
into the following headings; Supporter – put or seconded motions, broadly 
supportive or supportive with reservations, Opponent – Unequivocal opposition. 
Supporters 
Dr G. Clark was a founder member of the SHRA in 1886 and was chairman of 
the London branch.906 Clark spoke in favour of home rule and moved 
supporting resolutions on five out of a possible seven occasions in the 
Commons. He laid home rule motions before the House in April 1889,907 in 
February 1890908 and on 6th March 1891.909 He moved amendments to later 
devolution bills in 1892 and 1893.910 Clark was a supporter of Scottish home 
rule in words and deeds in Parliament, and outside of it.   
R. B. Cunninghame Graham supported Clark’s motion in 1889.911 He 
associated himself with Scotland, using the first person plural,912 demonstrating 
boundary maintenance. He was a founding member of the first SHRA and a 
Council member of the second.913 
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Sir James Dalzeil, moved in 1894 ‘that it is desirable, whilst retaining the power 
and supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, to establish a legislature in Scotland 
for dealing with purely Scottish affairs.’914 Home rule would, he argued, allow 
Westminster to discuss Imperial affairs more than they did.915 The resolution 
was successful, but there was no bill. In 1894 he spoke in favour of local 
legislative assemblies as a stage of the home rule movement.916   
In 1911, Dalzeil asked for ‘leave to introduce a bill to make better provision for 
the government of Scotland.’917 He claimed that 60 of the 70 Scottish MPs918 
supported home rule, ‘a great national question.’919 Although Dalzeil won the 
vote, no bill resulted.  
Sir W. H. Cowan moved the 1913 Government of Scotland bill, making nine 
speeches in favour.920 He stated that a ‘federation of the United Kingdom’ 
would lead to a truly Imperial Parliament.921 In 1914, he spoke in support of 
home rule.922 In 1919 he moved a further Government of Scotland Bill.  
William Pringle made a brief intervention in the debate for the 1912 Federal 
Home Rule Bill, and voted in favour. In 1913 he made five interventions in a 
debate,923 and voted in favour.  
Donald Maclean supported the 1919 Federal Devolution Bill. In 1920 he 
seconded Johnston’s Government of Scotland Bill, acknowledging that it was 
not perfect.924 In 1922 he made seven speeches in the bill moved by Shaw,925 
all in support. 
George Buchanan moved the 1924 Government of Scotland Bill, saying it was 
supported by 56 out of 74 Scottish members and addressed a ‘problem to 
which every man and woman who has the commonwealth of Scotland at heart 
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must give attention and serious thought.’926 He did not speak to the Reverend 
Barr’s 1927 Bill. 
Sir James Macpherson moved the Government of Scotland Bill in 1914 and 
made 15 speeches. He said the bill would ‘give a large measure of 
self-government to my native country,’927 supporting home rule and identifying 
himself with Scotland. He talked of the ‘sane and practical desire of Scotsmen 
for local self-government.’928 He also claimed that ‘no Scot seeks separation 
from the Imperial Parliament’ but claims the right to share in the government of 
Empire.929 He ends by saying that he wishes Scotland to be allowed to direct 
her own individuality in her own way.930 
Dr William Hunter seconded Clark’s 1889 motion, calling home rule beneficial to 
Scotland, his constituency and the UK.931 He later stated that the wants of 
Scotland could never be satisfied by the House of Commons.932 However, he 
only spoke on two out of seven possible occasions in the House. 
Sir F. C. Thompson identified himself as a Scot in the Devolution debate in 
June 1919, and despite being a Unionist, supported it.933 He replied positively 
to the SHRA’s 1919 letter to Scottish MPs.934 However, he saw the later Home 
Rule Bill of George Buchanan as a ‘shearing off from this house of all Scottish 
legislation’, not a ‘system of devolution all round.’935 He made ten interventions 
in this debate, wanting a solution for the whole UK. He made no contribution to 
the Reverend Barr’s Bill in 1927.  
John Leng Sturrock identified himself in 1920 as a ‘convinced Scottish home 
ruler’936 stating that Scotland ‘must have a measure of devolution’937 He voted 
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for the Bill. These home rule credentials are contradicted by him talking out the 
1924 Bill, preventing a division.  
Sir Robert Reid intervened in Clark’s 1889 motion. He claimed he did not 
believe Scots would tolerate a reduction of Scots influence at Westminster.938 
However, he agreed that Scottish business was neglected in the House, voting 
for the motion.939 In 1892, he stated that he was unclear what type of 
self-government the Bill wanted.940 In 1893 he seconded Clark’s resolution on 
devolution for Scotland.941 He supported home rule in a later debate942 but did 
not speak on Dalzeil’s home rule motion, or in the debate on Local Legislative 
Assemblies. He appeared to identify with Scots and their issues, but within the 
United Kingdom.  
Sir Charles Barrie,943John Seymour Keay,944 Alexander Shaw,945 William 
Young,946 Edmund Robertson947 and John Murray Macdonald948 all spoke on 
only one occasion, despite having the opportunity to join in further debates on 
the subject.  
Opponents 
There were only three Scottish MPs in the diaspora who posed outright 
opposition to home rule. W. E. Gladstone was asked, during the debate on 
home rule for Ireland in June 1886, if he was going to include Scotland and 
Wales. He responded that it would be too difficult and he was not convinced it 
was their wish.949 He did not support the 1889 motion as he felt it would be to 
Scotland’s advantage to see the question thoroughly examined in the Irish 
context. The time was not right, and he would vote against.950 Again in 1890, he 
voted against Dr Clark’s amendment, ‘whatever sympathy one may entertain on 
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the point.’951 He does not speak again on any of the Scottish home rule 
debates. Gladstone did not support home rule for Scotland in Westminster, 
even though he upheld it for Ireland. 
Sir Henry Craik opposed Dalzeil’s request to put a bill before the House in 
1911. His response to Cowan’s Bill was that the Bill ‘as always, shall have my 
strongest opposition.’952 He also spoke in opposition in May 1919953 and later 
that year referred to federal devolution as a dangerous project.954 He made 
eight speeches against Johnson’s 1920 bill.955 He summed it up as amateur 
constitution mongering.956 He acted as teller for the noes. In May 1924 he 
spoke of his deep seated opposition to the Government of Scotland Bill.957 He 
believed there was no demand for the proposal in Scotland.  
Frederick Macquisten spoke only once in a debate on Home Rule, opposing it 
as divisive. 
Summary 
During this period the various organisations supporting home rule for Scotland 
were acting as pressure groups. Their method of achieving their aim was to 
influence their fellow Scots at home and abroad to support them and persuade 
legislators to give them what they wanted. Recall that they failed to mobilise the 
diaspora. However, there was no shortage of opportunity in the Westminster 
Parliament for the parliamentary diaspora to express their feelings even if the 
outcome was always defeat for home rule. It should not be forgotten that the 
Irish presence in parliament, though more massive, also failed to produce home 
rule without a violent rising.958 
Apart from during Dr Clark’s 1889 motion, a majority of the MPs for Scottish 
constituencies voted in favour of the question, with the majority growing as time 
went by. However, there were never more than 59 out of 72 Scottish members 
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in the house for the votes, sometimes much lower. For the Government of 
Scotland Bill of Henry Cowan, only 18 were present and the Bill was counted 
out. According to W. Graham, MP for Edinburgh Central, in a letter to Muirhead, 
on this occasion the Government Whips told their MPs to stay away; the turnout 
of Scottish MPs was disappointing.959 Muirhead wrote to those absent MPs to 
castigate them for their absence. Twelve of these replied with good reasons to 
be absent. The Scottish MPs could not deliver home rule on their own. 
Of those identified, although a majority, twelve, supported home rule, six said 
very little and three were outright opponents. Although most identified with 
Scotland, most supported the Union and saw pressure on the Imperial 
Parliament a telling factor in the pressure for devolution as well as the failure of 
that Parliament to give Scotland’s business sufficient time. Set against this, the 
failure of the SHRA to engage the Scottish people in nationalism made it easy 
for opponents to ask for evidence that they wanted it.  
In Parliament, this part of the diaspora was in a prime position to make a 
considerable contribution to the debate on more self-government for the Scots. 
In that respect they failed to exploit their insider position in Parliament. A brief 
discussion of the possible causes of this is provided at the end of the chapter. 
The Devolution Debates, 1974-78 
The SNP saw a rise in its electoral fortunes from 1960. A consequence of this 
was that all three political parties had some form of self-government for 
Scotland in their policies by the 1974 general elections.960 In the October 1974 
general election, the SNP won eleven seats in Westminster and 30.4% of the 
Scottish vote, effectively capturing the third party vote in Scotland from the 
Liberals.961 There was little doubt that Scotland’s people supported some form 
of self-government, with 65% of Scots saying that they would vote in favour of 
devolution.962  
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It had been Labour that had set up the Crowther, later Kilbrandon, Commission 
on the Constitution in 1969. In the Queen’s speech of March 1974, there was a 
commitment from Harold Wilson, head of the new minority Labour government, 
to publish a White Paper and Bill on devolution for Scotland and Wales.963 From 
April to May 1974, consultations took place with the SNP, Plaid Cymru, the 
Liberals, Tories and the Confederation of British Industry on the options put 
forward by Kilbrandon. By 1975 the need for a form of devolution that enshrined 
the integrity of the UK and differentiated between a Scottish Assembly with 
primary legislative powers and a Welsh assembly with secondary powers was 
accepted in a speech to the House of Commons by The President of the 
Council, Edward Short. There had been much discussion about the nature of 
the devolved assemblies.964 The Scottish movement towards devolution, 
though sponsored by UK political parties, was now driven by the political 
success of the SNP. This is distinctly different from the home rule debates in 
Parliament in the late 19th century, which had behind them the force of 
argument of Irish home rule and the notion that home rule for Scotland and 
Wales would simplify the Imperial Government. 
A green paper outlining some alternatives for discussion was published in June 
1975. A Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced to the House in 1976,965 but 
this joint Bill was defeated and two separate Bills replaced it. So it was the 
Scotland Act that finally got the Royal Assent in the summer of 1978. In March 
1979 the Labour Government was defeated in the referendums on its plans for 
devolution. The Welsh voted four to one against devolution and although the 
Scots voted 51.6% in favour, this only made 32.9% of the electorate and so 
failed to get over a hurdle that stipulated that a minimum of 40% should vote in 
favour of the proposals. In the general election that followed the referendum, 
the SNP lost nine of its 11 parliamentary seats.966 
The remainder of this chapter will deal with the response to these Bills by 
Scottish MPs representing English Constituencies, and selected Scots in the 
House of Lords in the October 1974 Parliament. Analysis of their participation in 
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debates and votes can reveal how involved these Scots in the diaspora were in 
the issue, and whether they were acting as Scots reflecting Scots interests, or 
as representatives of English electors.  
Arrangements for handling Scottish business in Parliament, stemming from the 
separate Scottish legal system, have led to the establishment of Scottish 
institutions in Parliament.967 The Scottish Grand Committee has been 
mentioned above. There had also been a Council of State for Scotland during 
the Second World War, established on the initiative of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Tom Johnson, but it was largely ignored.968 From 1957 the procedural 
framework changed, with the Grand Committee being supplemented by two 
Scottish Standing Committees.969 Select Committees on Scottish affairs were 
established from 1968-72 and 1979-87.970 It can be argued then, that Scots did 
work together across party lines prior to and after the devolution debates. By 
way of context, it will be useful to understand the party positions at the outset. 
The electoral success of the SNP in 1974 ensured that home rule or devolution, 
would remain on the UK political agenda for some years.971 Nevertheless, 
devolution, despite finally bringing the constitution to the fore of Scottish 
politics, would prove difficult and divisive for the SNP.972 It was a key issue and 
one on which they failed to develop a coherent strategy.973 However, the 1975 
Party Conference debated devolution and produced a vaguely worded 
resolution to participate in a democratically elected assembly.974 The debates 
were seen by William Wolfe, chairman, as a good time to win support for 
self-government and seek a mandate for independence.975 Although Margo 
Macdonald, convenor of the Strategy Committee wanted to push hard for 
independence, the party had recognised that it would possibly be easier to 
achieve it through an assembly.976 
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The SNP electoral success saw a turning point at the Garscadden by-election, 
in April 1978 when Labour held the SNP target seat.977 Some reflections on the 
defeat written to Gordon Wilson, SNP MP, recognised that as the Labour party 
now had an assembly option, the Devolution Bill, the electorate would chose to 
go with it. The same paper recognised that if the SNP opposed the assembly, it 
would incur years of unpopularity with the voters. Therefore it must support the 
assembly and try to strengthen it.978 Even so there was a presumption of 
‘non-interference’ from the Party on behalf of the MPs.979 
The Tories were the party of the Union, with a large proportion of vociferous 
opponents to devolution. However, they were the first of the two major parties 
to support devolution.980 In 1968 Edward Heath accepted the argument for an 
assembly and set up a committee under Sir Alec Home.981 The 1970 manifesto 
had offered a chance for the Scottish people to have a greater say in their own 
affairs.982 The Tory manifesto for the October 1974 election - ‘Putting Britain 
First’- said of the people of Scotland and Wales; ‘people want more freedom 
and control of their own lives’ and said that this would shape policy. The policy 
for Scotland was to set up a Scottish Assembly and give it and the Secretary of 
State for Scotland the power to decide how to spend the budget.  
However, by the end of 1975 there was a majority amongst back benchers 
against devolution and it was clear that Margaret Thatcher had changed 
policy.983 Willie Whitelaw, the Tory devolution spokesman acted as though 
devolution was an unsatisfactory compromise.984 This view was shared by 
others.985 By 1978 the Tories opposed devolution and their 1979 manifesto 
contained only a promise of discussions.986   
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Labour had abandoned any formal commitment to home rule by 1958. That was 
to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the establishment of 
Kilbrandon was a response to increased interest amongst Labour radicals in 
Scotland and the loss of Hamilton.987 In 1968, Scottish Labour MPs 
unanimously voted against separate parliaments.988 Kilbrandon had reported in 
1973 and was at first ignored by the government as the SNP had suffered a 
decline.989 In the General Election of February 1974 the SNP won seven seats 
and 22% of the Scottish vote. The minority Labour Government announced that 
the next Labour government, elected in October 1974, would create elected 
assemblies in Scotland and Wales. However, even as late as 1976, as many as 
forty Labour MPs indicated that they would have difficulty supporting the 
Government on the matter.990 
The Liberals had become less interested in home rule in the 1960s and failed to 
reach an electoral accommodation with the SNP 1964-66.991 For the 1974 
elections, the party was committed to ‘a substantial devolvement of power from 
Westminster.’992 
A summary of the passage through the House of Commons of the Scotland and 
Wales Bill and the Scotland Bill will provide context for the analysis of MPs’ 
positions. The Scotland and Wales Bill was published on 28th November 1976, 
receiving a second reading on 16th December. At this stage the Government 
conceded that referendums would be held should the Bill be enacted. The 
committee stage ran from 13th January to 15th February 1977, but the motion to 
impose a guillotine to ensure the Bill’s passage was defeated and the Bill was 
dead.993 
The Scotland Bill’s994 second reading was in November 1977. The guillotine 
motion, allocating 17 days for Committee, report and third reading, was passed. 
The guillotine resulted in 61 of the 83 clauses and 11 of the 17 schedules being 
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carried without debate. About 500 of the 638 amendments were not reached. 
Amongst those was the 40% threshold amendment relating to the referendums 
which the Government hoped to reverse in the report stage. 
In the third reading, the Secretary of State for Scotland announced that the 
Government had reluctantly accepted the House’s verdict on the 40% rule and 
had decided to make no further attempt to overthrow it. This, with other 
concessions ensured the third reading was carried by a comfortable margin of 
forty. 
The Contributions of the MPs  
James Lamond stated in 1978 that ‘in the House of Commons there are 
approximately 20 men and women who were born in Scotland and now 
represent English constituencies.’995 This research has identified fifteen of 
them. Studying this group of politicians and their behaviour during the debates 
on devolution will provide insight into whether they acted as part of a group with 
a common bond of nationality and interest as Scots, or as partisan politicians. 
As parliamentarians they had a platform to air those views and expectations. 
However the constraints of party allegiance, pressure from the whips and their 
own personal view might pull against these bonds or support them.   
The Scots identified by the method outlined in chapter one are listed in 
Appendix IV. This sample is sufficient to produce some qualitative measure of 
the contribution of these migrants to the debates. The analysis of the 
contributions of these MPs to the Scotland and Wales Bill and the Scotland Bill 
is presented in three sections; first those who made no or minimal contribution, 
next the supporters of devolution and lastly those who opposed it. 
Of the MPs whose voting record and speeches were examined in detail, three 
gave no speeches on the Bills whatsoever, and a further three said little. Sir 
George Sinclair (Con), Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Con) and Mr David Young 
(Lab), fell into the first category, Mr David James (Con), Patrick McNair-Wilson 
(Con) and Albert (Jock) Stallard (Lab) into the latter. All voted on party lines. 
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Supporters 
David Knox (Con) was unusual in not always voting along party lines during the 
debates, being one of the rebels against the Tory three line whip in December 
1976. In his first contribution he identifies himself as Scottish born, educated 
and a frequent visitor. Homeland orientation was clear. He saw the Bill as the 
most important that Parliament would discuss because of its profound effect on 
both Scotland and the UK.996 He referred to the long term nature of nationalism 
in Scotland. He saw this as affecting all Scots, based on his own experiences. 
Although he recognised that the bill was not very good, he saw it as 
Parliament’s last chance to stop separation, which would be ‘an unmitigated 
disaster for England as well as Scotland.’997 Here is a clear alignment with what 
he saw as the wishes of the Scottish people, an active participant in the 
diaspora, whilst still asserting the interests of his English constituents. Though 
the Bill was flawed, he saw the rejection of it as being a rejection of devolution.  
Knox voted with the government to reject the amendment of the ‘40%’ 
condition. He did this as he felt it would make devolution less likely.998 Apart 
from these two occasions when he made substantial contributions, Knox makes 
seven further speeches. In the 17 votes analysed, Knox was absent for five, 
voted with his party six times and with the government six times. Both in his 
words and deeds he demonstrated that he was acting in what he saw as the 
interests of the increase in nationalism in his own people, as well as working in 
the interests of the English.  
Norman Lamont (Con) made only five contributions to the debates on 
devolution, all focussed around his interest in the position of the Shetland Isles. 
He asked what representations had been received from the Zetland County 
Council.999 In 1977 he came with a specific proposal from the Shetlands, that 
the Zetland (now Shetland) County Council Act, which gave extra powers to 
Shetland to help them manage the oil exploitation in the region, be maintained 
in the Bill. Although his voting record follows the opposition position, he did not 
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speak against it. It is hard to interpret his contributions other than to ensure 
Shetland was provided for in the devolved arrangements. 
Opponents 
John MacGregor’s (Lab) homeland orientation was apparent in his first speech 
on devolution in January 1976; ‘I speak as a Scot born and brought up in a 
Scottish mining village, educated up to and beyond University level and with a 
family still very much based in Scotland.’1000 He felt devolution would lead to 
separation; a ‘private nightmare,’1001 and would not solve Scotland’s economic 
problems. He summarised four conditions for his support; first that they did not 
include the devolution of economic powers, second that they reduced 
bureaucracy, third that they brought government closer to the people and last 
that they be fair to all parts of the UK. He criticised the bill for its lack of fairness 
to the English, who would have to pay for it and gain no better system of 
representation themselves. Worse, he said, there will be Scots and Welsh MPs 
in the house voting on English matters when the English cannot vote on Scots 
issues.1002 The only boundary maintenance in his later speeches is with the 
English, the UK, and his constituents. MacGregor’s voting supports the 
opposition. He voted in the Scotland Bill debates but did not speak. In 
conclusion, whilst MacGregor clearly has a strong homeland orientation, his 
affiliations were English, UK and lastly Scots. 
Willie Whitelaw (Con) was the spokesman for devolution during both the Heath 
and Thatcher leaderships.1003 He supported Thatcher in her opposition to 
devolution. This was ‘slightly mysterious, since he was particularly sensitive to 
opinion north of the border.’1004 He contributed to the debates on devolution 
between February 1975 and November 1976. He made no contribution to the 
debates on the Scotland Bill.  He had however, by September 1976, been given 
a new job as shadow Home Secretary.1005 
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In his first speech, he described the legislation as the ‘most far reaching reform 
of the United Kingdom constitution since the Act of Union in 1707.’1006 Thus he 
set a familiar tone, that this was an important matter for the whole country and 
required much debate.1007 He spoke for the Conservative Party and its support 
for the UK, and of the tragedy that would accompany any end to the United 
Kingdom.1008 He also referred to the difficulties of Scots in England, and the 
English in Scotland, if Scotland were to become once more a separate nation, 
highlighting nationality and identity issues.1009 He questioned whether Scotland 
could afford the same social and health benefits.1010 However, Whitelaw argued 
against the SNP position, not specifically against devolution, stating ‘we are all 
committed to giving the people of Scotland and Wales a genuine opportunity to 
have more control over their affairs.’1011 Whitelaw raised a constitutional 
question; ‘how does one reconcile the need for real legislative assembly in any 
Scottish body with the overall requirement of keeping sovereignty in this 
house?’1012  
Whitelaw set out his (and the Tory) position; this is a major constitutional issue, 
the sovereignty of Westminster must be maintained, the continuation of the UK  
a given, no fudging on overall authority and yet a commitment to give the 
people of Scotland more control over their affairs. Later that year he asked the 
House to recognise that ‘those of us who support sensible proposals for 
devolution are nevertheless determined to ensure the basic unity of the UK.’1013 
He acted as a senior opposition spokesman, and revealed little support for the 
notion of Scottish devolution beyond those statements. He also protested at the 
idea of one bill for Scotland and Wales as their situations are so different.1014 
The house debated the White Paper on January 19th 1976, and Whitelaw 
responded as the opposition spokesman. His contribution differed little from his 
earlier positions.1015 However in his concluding remarks, he felt ‘great 
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unhappiness about the Government’s proposals for Scotland, even though I 
believe that the needs of the Scottish people require change.’1016  
Throughout his contribution, he spoke as a member of the Opposition, never 
using the first person plural when referring to the Scots, but always the third 
person. Whitelaw supported Britain and the idea of the British as one nation.1017 
He claimed to understand the Scots, divining their support for change as one 
for devolution not independence. He acted as a senior Tory politician, not as a 
member of the diaspora urging Scotland forward. 
At the Scottish Conservative Conference in Perth in May 1976, Whitelaw had 
committed the party to a directly elected assembly.1018 However, Margaret 
Thatcher enforced a three line whip on opposing the Bill and in December, 
Whitelaw voted accordingly. In fact, Whitelaw and most of his fellow Tory Scots 
in the diaspora voted with the opposition. David Knox was the exception.  
In conclusion, the Tory spokesman on devolution was active in early debates 
supporting the idea of more democratic oversight of the Government’s 
decisions in Scotland, but fell short of proselytising a satisfactory solution, 
merely opposing the Government’s position. When it was no longer his job to 
contribute, he ceased to do so. 
Roderick MacFarquhar’s (Lab) position was that he had no sympathy with the 
SNP, foisting a ‘mean and jealous nationalism on a generous people.’1019 He 
supported the white paper insofar as it was an attempt to satisfy the demands 
for greater participation in Government, though with some reservations.1020 It 
made no mention of England as a region in need of greater participation. He 
agreed that devolution would most likely lead to separatism but that not 
satisfying the demand for it would also lead to a break-up.  He argued that the 
answer to this inevitable and unfortunate break-up of the UK is to collaborate 
with EEC partners to eventually create a political union of Europe based on 
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regions not nation states. This first speech established him as a Scot, but 
showed affiliation with the UK and Europe not Scotland alone.  
He was critical of the Scotland and Wales Bill but said that not to support it 
would be to represent a ‘cowardly unwillingness of the house’ to move onto the 
next historical phase of the Union.1021 His criticism was that he saw it being 
‘representation without taxation’1022 with no solution for England. He voted for 
the Bill on the 16th December. He supported the Government because ‘A no 
vote tonight would be seen as a... defeat for the bill itself.’1023 This was because 
he ‘can think of no vote more likely to ensure the dissolution of the Union than a 
vote to ensure that the Bill runs into the sands.’ His voting record for the 
Scotland Bill was a clear adherence to the Government line, including voting 
against the 40% amendment. In conclusion, although he used his Scottishness 
to lend authority to his speeches, he was as concerned about the English as he 
was the Scots and about the UK as much as devolution for Scotland. 
Hugh Fraser’s (Con) first three speeches claimed that the devolved Parliament 
would move the average Scots citizen that much further from Government. He 
was concerned that ‘this type of bill will lead to the dissipation and undoing of 
the Act of Union.’1024 He envisaged conflict between Westminster and 
Edinburgh, ‘a disastrous situation.’1025 He accused the Nationalists of promising 
things they could not deliver. 
He claimed the Bill was unworkable and beyond improvement. He suggested 
the front bench stop trying to improve the Bill and instead cut ‘its filthy 
throat.’1026 He was speaking as a Scot and as a member of the Opposition. He 
considered the Bill unclear, and called for its defeat.1027 His opposition is clear 
throughout. However his homeland orientation is not evident from his speeches 
in the Commons, although he speaks of concern for getting the right 
governance for Scottish people.1028 His voting record for the Scotland Bill 
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follows party lines. There were no contributions from Fraser to the debate on 
the Scotland Act and he voted against rejecting the 40% clause. The conclusion 
is that he was voting as a Tory rather than as a Scot on devolution.  
James Lamond (Lab) warned the house that his fellow Aberdonians were ‘the 
least enthusiastic in all Scotland about even the Government’s modest 
devolution proposals.’1029 In this speech he both asserted his homeland affinity 
and a degree of linkage with Scotland. The same speech also saw him express 
doubts from his Oldham East constituents. He had earlier warned that the SNP 
could ‘drive the people of Scotland along a desperate and unacceptable road to 
complete independence.’1030 
During the debates, his interventions were not in support of devolution and his 
voting record shows a variety of positions, perhaps based on the bills as he saw 
them. There is no evidence that he supported devolution. 
Robert McCrindle (Con) made only two contributions on the subject of Scottish 
Devolution, and neither of those in a debate on either of the Bills. He declared 
‘the idea of devolving some meaningful powers to Scotland is a must’ but he 
was not convinced that the ‘people of Scotland’ would be better off.1031 He 
expressed the wish to be able to vote for some kind of assembly and hoped 
that his own party would not wish to impose a three line whip. He gave notice 
that ‘this will put me in some considerable difficulty.’1032 Finally, he saw 
devolution as a means of retaining the Union, which in his view would be in 
danger without it. He did not think the Scots wanted independence.1033  
McCrindle voted with his fellow Tories. Despite his Scottish roots,1034 and his 
support for an assembly within the Union, he has no contribution to the debates 
and voted against it. 
George Cunningham (Lab) was described in the Times as ‘the resolute 
anti-devolutionist.’1035 He nuanced this position a few days later; ‘our duty is not 
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only to give Scotland an assembly if she wants it, but not to impose an 
assembly if she does not want it.’1036 Cunningham identified himself in a ‘hybrid 
role’ as a Scotsman.1037  In the same speech he outlined his opposition to the 
Scotland and Wales Bill. He saw it as a one way ratchet to independence, 
forced in stages by the SNP. If the Scots face up to the question of 
independence, he continued, then they will realise they are better off 
maintaining the connection with the Union.1038 
Cunningham spoke 64 times in the debates on Scottish devolution and the 
referendum, a considerable contribution. He had a strong interest in the bills. 
He was derisory about the Scots’ suggested ambitions for a separate state.1039 
Cunningham introduced the 40% amendment. He summarised the debates for 
devolution as being not based on merit but on the ‘irresistible demand for 
devolution that substitutes for the case on merit.’1040 Therefore the referendum 
should reflect that irresistible demand. Over half of Cunningham’s contributions 
to the debates are about the electoral arrangements for the new assembly and 
the referendum. He was anti-devolution and ensured with the 40% amendment 
that there would be a high hurdle for it to be introduced. 
Summary 
The analysis of the participation of Scots MPs representing English 
constituencies has revealed how these Scots sitting for English constituencies 
responded to the issue. In the main, with three exceptions, this group did not 
make a large contribution to the debates. Appendix IV reveals that six of them 
said nothing and a further six made less than ten interventions. Three, Lamond 
with 14, Whitelaw with 27 and Cunningham with 64 made significant 
contributions, Cunningham having the greatest impact, albeit a negative one.  
It is easy to see them all as Scots, claiming Scots descent or close association. 
The case for their homeland orientation is therefore proved. It is not possible 
however to see any significant boundary maintenance activity. None have 
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sympathy with the SNP or their case for separation. Although they consider the 
interests of Scots, they also consider the Union and the Westminster 
Parliament. There is no evidence of them forming an interest group in the 
House based upon their nationality. Whereas the members of the group speak 
of being Scots, they act in the main as party politicians. The exceptions to this 
were Knox and Cunningham. 
At this time the major UK political parties had more Scots self-government in 
their manifestoes, and the SNP had reached a high water mark of MPs in 
Westminster and share of the popular vote. Yet most of the Scots working as 
MPs in England showed little desire for Scottish devolution. MPs that supported 
the principle of devolving power found issue with the details of the Bills put 
forward to enact it. Some, like George Cunningham, exhibited a plain dislike of 
the notion, some in positions of influence, like Willie Whitelaw, though 
recognising the rise in demand for more self-government by his fellow Scots, 
chose not to influence his party leadership but to acquiesce to its opposition.  
However, the Commons is not the whole of the Houses of Parliament. The 
Lords also debated the Scotland Bill, and their Lordships did not have to 
concern themselves with re-election or selection by party officials. It is to this 
group that the discussion now turns. 
The Debates in the House of Lords 
The background to the selection process has been laid out in chapter one. The 
research sampled those who spoke on the Scotland Bill in its second reading 
on the 14th and 15th March 1978, the committee and report stages in April and 
May and the third reading in June. Out of the many speakers to this bill, 25 
selected peers seem to qualify as being in the diaspora. They are listed in 
appendix V. There may be others, as with the Commons analysis. The Hansard 
archive does not record party affiliations so these are not included. 
The Hansard online archive holds the details of the stages of the Bill in the 
House of Lords. There are few divisions, and the record does not always list 
‘contents’, that is those in favour, and ‘non-contents’, in full. As a result an 
analysis such as that provided for the Commons research is not as accessible. 
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As with the House of Commons analysis, the research aims to see if the 
individuals clearly identified themselves as Scots, and showed evidence of 
boundary maintenance by associating themselves with Scots in Scotland and 
the apparent rise in demand for devolved government. 
A summary of the Bill’s passage through the Lords assists in navigation through 
the analysis.1041 The Bill received an unopposed second reading. The chief 
Opposition spokesman on devolution, Earl Ferrers, gave an assurance that 
they would not frustrate the Government’s timetable, but that the bill would be 
scrutinised closely.1042 Lord Home of the Hirshel spoke in support of 
proportional representation. This issue caused the Government’s defeat, with 
an amendment proposing the additional member system for Assembly 
elections. Later, the Earl of Perth moved a significant amendment, to enable the 
assembly to draw up its own tax raising powers, which the Secretary of State 
would lay before Parliament. This was carried.  
The Report stage began with the defeat of a Conservative back bench 
amendment reducing the number of Scottish MPs after Devolution from 71 to 
between 57 and 63. A number of important changes were made to the bill in the 
report stage and there were 12 more government defeats. An amendment by 
Earl Ferrers gave the Commons an opportunity to vote on the ‘West Lothian 
question.’1043 Altogether 239 amendments were passed through the Lords 
stages, of which 170 were accepted in the Commons and included in the final 
Act. The Government made 29 substantial concessions during the passage 
through the Lords and a further eight on its return to the Commons.1044  
Supporters 
Lord Drumalbyn insisted the Bill should be looked at in the context of whether 
the need for some Scottish self-governance was likely to lead to separation. His 
position was to improve the Bill. During the committee stages, 13 days in all, 
Drumalbyn tabled many amendments and spoke to many others. In all he made 
                                                          
1041 Lindley, 1978, pp.8-16 provides the basis for this summary 
1042 Hansard, 14th March 1978, col. 1203 
1043 Lindley, 1978, p.12 
1044 Ibid., p.14 
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over 246 speeches on the Bill.1045 Drumalbyn was trying to make the Bill 
work.1046 He had a strong sense of making sure the Scots benefited, a sign of 
boundary maintenance. However, he was unhappy with the end result. In the 
third reading he summed up that the ‘Bill will not work in its present form.’1047 
Viscount Thurso was clear that ‘over purely domestic matters, it is easier to 
make one’s problem understood in Edinburgh than it is in London.’1048 He was 
not a separatist, but wanted to do all he could to help the bill.1049 He 
appreciated the Bill had its drawbacks, but nevertheless he wanted the Bill to 
‘release the wisdom of the Scottish people into the service of their own 
country.’1050   
The Earl of Perth, who made his opening speech in the second reading, stated 
that ‘the Bill gives the inhabitants of Scotland what they want – an Assembly. 
That is in the Bill and that is what we want.’1051 However he did not support the 
SNP.1052 His summary at the end of the Committee stage was that he felt a 
better Bill had gone back to the Commons than arrived at the Lords.1053 
He supported the UK and was clear that there was more risk to the Union 
without the Assembly. At a moment of great change, he stated, you have ‘to 
make a start, and that is what this bill is about.’ Perth became an active 
campaigner in the ‘Scotland Says Yes’ campaign.  
Viscount Masserene and Ferrard disliked the Bill.1054 His longest speech 
described the Union as the most perfect alliance of all time. His dislike of the 
SNP was very clear. He first called for the Bill to be scrapped but concluded 
that the answer was to improve the Bill in committee.1055 He voted for 
amendments1056 demonstrating a reluctant support for devolution.  
                                                          
1045 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people/mr-miall-macpherson/1978  
1046 Hansard, 24th April 1978, col. 1576 
1047 Hansard, 29th June 1978, col. 509 
1048 Hansard, 15th March 1978, cols. 1373-5 
1049 Ibid., col. 1375 
1050 Ibid., col. 1377 
1051 Hansard, 14th March 1978, col. 1220 
1052 Hansard, 24th April 1978, col. 1494 
1053 Ibid., col. 479 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Hansard, 14th March 1978, cols. 1285-1289 
1056 See for example, Hansard, 29th June 1978, cols. 385 and 403 
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Fraser of Kilmarnock made only one speech on the Bill.1057 He was clear that if 
enough Scots living in Scotland wanted devolution, they should have a right to 
obtain it.1058 Fraser saw many problems for the Bill but did not condemn it 
outright.  
Lord Home of the Hirshel laid out his support for more self-government for 
Scots. He wanted the Bill to be clear on the scope of the Assembly’s powers, 
with some power to raise revenue. He intended to ‘get the bill right.’1059 He 
believed that ‘the average Scotsman and woman’ wanted more control over 
Scottish affairs, so felt able to speak for them, but he spent no time defending 
the sanctity of the UK and the Union. To conclude with Home, it is difficult to 
see the association that say, Thurso, made with Scotland. There is an 
assumption of a right to know Scottish minds. However, Home joined the ‘No’ 
side in the following referendum campaigns, his motive being that the Tories 
would produce a better solution.1060 
Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal made 33 speeches in the debates. He 
moved five amendments during the committee stages of the Bill. There was in 
all of Strathcona’s interventions a degree of aiming to improve the clarity of the 
Bill. 
Opponents 
The Earl of Glasgow made one speech in the second reading. He was opposed 
to anything that would damage the Union. He did not think Scots were aware of 
the benefits of their current arrangements. He considered the Bill a very 
dangerous one; the thin end of the wedge, the ‘first foundation of the road to 
independence.’1061 He was first and foremost a Unionist. 
The Earl of Selkirk was scathing about the Bill; ‘It is totally unintelligible and 
utterly unfair to press on the Scottish people.’1062 His amendment 210 went to 
the heart of the ‘West Lothian question’. He moved the amendment to force the 
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1060 Bochel, et. al., 1981, p.19 
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Commons to discuss the issue, and to put some balance into the Bill.1063 In his 
final speech, Selkirk claimed that the real things in Scotland, employment and 
opportunity, would be untouched by this.1064 He agreed that if the Bill fell ‘not a 
dog will bark.’1065  
Lord Burton spoke 32 times on the Bill.1066 He described it as horrific and 
claimed that it would be the pre-cursor to another Northern Ireland situation.1067  
Lord Glendevon declared a belief in the Union, claiming that strength lay in the 
Union, not the Bill, and he urged the House to think again.1068  
The Earl of Lauderdale aligned himself with the Scots.1069 As a Unionist he 
deplored the Bill,1070 despite his Scottishness.1071 
Lord Spens was brief but vocal in his condemnation of the Bill. He described 
himself as an expatriate Scot, but he did not deal with any points on the Bill as 
he ‘dislike(d) it so intensely.’1072 
Viscount Colville of Culross made detailed speeches on the definition of the 
assembly’s powers. Culross made 24 amendments seeking for clarity or detail. 
What was clear was his concern for the outcome for the citizen in cases of 
unclear legislation.1073 His opinion of the Bill was low even after his 
amendments.  
The Countess of Loudoun’s only concern was for consistency in the 
management of waterways throughout the United Kingdom.1074  
The Duke of Atholl, Lord Ballantrae, Douglass of Barloch, Hamilton of Dalzell 
and Alexander of Potterhill had only marginal contributions in the committee 
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stages. None refer to their Scottish links, or passed comment on devolution or 
nationalism.  
The SNP Engagement with the Diaspora 
Before concluding the chapter, it is instructive to ask whether the SNP showed 
any inclination to engage with the diaspora in Parliament in order to strengthen 
its position as a voting bloc. The minutes of their meetings held between 
October 1976 and July 1978 make no reference to this, or indeed to any of the 
actions of other Scots MPs in the house.1075 Similarly there are no references in 
Gordon Wilson’s archived correspondence from January 1976 to December 
1978.1076 Whether unrecorded conversations upon this took place it is 
impossible to say. The silence of archived correspondence on the issue stands 
as evidence of only that.  
Summary 
It was established in the introduction to this chapter that these attempts to 
secure home rule and devolution were of considerable importance to the 
movements which had been established to promote and achieve such a 
settlement. Even when the aims of the groups had been changed and 
coalesced into the independence ambition of the SNP, the party did vote 
support for the devolved settlement of the 1976-78 debates, and was at least 
partially responsible for the provision of a Scotland Bill after the earlier joint Bill 
failed, as it withdrew its support for the Labour government.  
The early home rule debates were examined through the speeches of Scots 
identified as being in the diaspora in England, in Parliament. Whilst a majority of 
those identified supported home rule, around half of those; Dalzeil, Cowan, 
Hunter, Thompson and Reid, felt that devolution would strengthen the UK and 
the UK parliament’s ability to govern. Of those who opposed, Gladstone and 
Craik appeared unconvinced the Scots wanted home rule. The emergence of 
the ‘British’ theme provides an interesting reflection of the response of the 
Scottish societies, and is repeated in the later debates.   
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The devolution episode of the late 1970s was an embarrassment to both 
Labour and Conservative parties. Labour’s commitment to devolution was 
initially undertaken primarily with their electoral fortunes in mind.1077 The 
argument assumed that as the SNP was enjoying considerable support in 
Scotland, the interests of the Scottish people could be advanced by 
self-government. It follows that support for devolution by a Scot in the 
Commons would be advancing the interests of the Scots. Yet in the speeches 
of the parliamentary Scots abroad there was in both Lords and Commons a mix 
of indifference, support and dislike of the Bill.  
Of those identified who spoke in the debates, only Knox rebelled against his 
party whip to support devolution. He did so out of fear that without it the UK 
would cease as a constitutional entity. He was also aligned with what he saw as 
the wishes of the Scottish people. Lamond appears supportive but is parochially 
concerned with Shetland’s settlement. Six of those identified made little or no 
contribution to the debates, the remainder in the Commons were opposed. This 
opposition was generated in the main by an adhesion to the UK expressed 
through a fear that devolution was the first step in a one way ratchet to 
separation. Whitelaw refers specifically to the idea of Britain and the British as 
one nation, as well as adherence to the UK. Ultimately only Knox, in supporting 
devolution, and Cunningham in making it less attainable, voted other than on 
party lines. 
In the Lords, the same arguments that devolution was good but the Bill was bad 
are put forward, although some of the Peers appeared to attempt to make it a 
better Bill. However, it is the role of the Lords to act as a reviewing chamber, so 
there was a sense of duty there as well. In the Commons, the Bill was amended 
to alter the threshold for success for the referendum, requiring that 40% of the 
electorate voted yes. Thus an abstention was effectively a no vote. The 
Commons members were in most cases party men first, Scots second.  
The evidence seems to refute any assumption that, free of political control, their 
Lordships would have a significantly different approach to their colleagues in 
the Commons. Only two of the protagonists in the diaspora appear in either the 
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Yes or No Referendum Campaigns.1078 As with the Commons, there was 
recognition that there was a groundswell of support in Scotland for more 
self-governance and there was consistent support for the Union, as well as fear 
that devolution would destroy it.  
It has been said that the Scots in Westminster representing Scottish 
constituencies are usually anxious to be statesmen of Britain as well as 
Scotland.1079 There is evidence here that this applied equally to the Scots 
diaspora in Parliament. The theme of Britishness that will be presented in future 
chapters as a barrier to Scots abroad supporting more self-government for 
Scotland is reflected here in the support by MPs and Peers for the status quo 
constitutional arrangement. Recalling the short section in chapter one on 
gatekeepers, the MPs and Peers were also gatekeepers between the Scots 
and the legislation to provide some form of self-government. Although there 
was some unstructured support for the idea of more Scots self-government 
from these Scots at the heart of UK government, they did not provide a unified 
group to successfully promote a Bill and referendum acceptable to the people 
of Scotland. Over many occasions over nearly ninety years, although many of 
the Scots abroad in England and in Parliament supported home rule and 
devolution motions, they failed to exploit their privileged position. 
The analysis presented over the last three chapters has attempted to describe 
the response of the Scottish diaspora to the nationalist project in Scotland. 
They have presented the response to home rule pressure groups and an 
organised political party seeking votes in Scotland, as well as examining the 
response of those privileged few Scots in the diaspora who were part of the 
legislature of their times and had occasion to influence legislation to embrace 
home rule or devolution. The next chapter will draw together the conclusions 
from the analysis of the contributions of the Scots abroad in both the Empire 
and England and lay out a series of explanations for their apparent indifference. 
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Chapter 6 Scots Abroad: Understanding indifference. 
 
The work presented so far has described the Scottish experience of mass 
migration and the formation of what is described as a Scottish diaspora. This 
was followed by evidence that many diasporas are involved in nationalist 
projects in their homelands. The case for using the Irish and Norwegians as 
comparison diasporas has been made. Evidence has been presented from both 
original and secondary sources of the lack of support for Scottish home rule or 
independence during the period under scrutiny. Files from the archives of the 
SNP and some of its senior figures have been referenced to support this case. 
Research into the home rule and devolution parliamentary debates, from 1889 
to 1978 has provided evidence of the lack of support from most Scottish MPs 
and the Lords in the diaspora in England other than that which was partisan.  
Yet national identity has long been a component of Scottish people.1080 
Therefore this chapter begins to analyse why there was little interest. Two 
hypotheses will be examined. Firstly, that the process of the engagement by 
the groups supporting self-government in Scotland with the diaspora was for 
the main part amateurish and spasmodic, perhaps as a result of it having a low 
priority. Whilst it cannot be denied that all the major organisations1081 examined 
tried to gain support from the diaspora, all these efforts, even when set up to 
prioritise such contact, were characterised by failure. 
The second hypothesis will claim that the target groups in the diaspora chosen 
for involvement by the nationalist groups were primarily non-political in their 
objectives and their membership was probably small in relation to the diaspora 
as a whole. With a different, ‘British,’ horizon for their nationalism, it will be 
argued that these groups acted as gatekeepers between the nationalist 
organisations and the diaspora. The comparison of the activities of the Irish 
nationalist movement and the Irish diaspora is briefly dealt with at the end of the 
chapter. 
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It is appropriate to spend a little time explaining some of the terminology used 
thus far. The word indifference has been used on several occasions to describe 
the reaction of the diaspora to Scottish nationalist projects at home. The word 
here is used as a noun meaning a lack of concern, nonchalance about, lacking 
sympathy rather than its other meaning of mediocracy or ordinariness. 
Moreover, it has been chosen specifically because of its late Middle English use 
of being neither good nor bad, neither for nor against. This is because whilst 
there was a little interest in the diaspora for Scottish nationalist projects at 
home, it was insufficient to make a difference one way or another to the 
outcome of the projects. Whilst the diaspora did not support the nationalist 
causes, neither did it expressly oppose them. The effect was neither to provide 
the means of success or destruction. Despite the reaction of the diaspora, 
Scottish nationalism has grown to a successful maturity in UK politics. 
The word ambivalence has been used to describe Scottish nationalism in the 
context that many organisations were established to support it over time, often 
existing side by side. The meaning striven for here is to convey equivocation, 
unsureness, vacillation or inconclusiveness. Recall that ‘home rule’ 
organisations supported the British Empire and saw themselves as much a part 
of this as Canada and New Zealand. Their wish was to amend the Union, not to 
abrogate it. In the case of the earlier movement, Dr Clarke was trying to enforce 
the Union which he saw as having been weakened. The post-1918 movement 
comprised four organisations; Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist 
Association, the Scots National League, the SHRA and the Scottish National 
Movement. These formed the NPS in 1928 and with the Scottish Party formed 
the SNP in 1934. In 1942 this suffered a splinter group, the Scottish 
Convention, which continued in different forms for 10 years. Thus organisations 
with different strategies for self-government or independence but which broadly 
supported self-government of differing kinds for Scotland coexisted, cooperated 
and competed.1082 No doubt the individuals in these organisations were certain 
of the solution they proposed, although some individuals were common to a 
number of organisations, but their co-occurrence indicates that the movement 
had no single focus until the eventual pre-eminence of the SNP during the 
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1960s. This certainly affected the way the movement looked from the diaspora, 
as organisations could be broadly supportive but unsure of which organisation 
to patronise.1083  
The activities undertaken by the various protagonists in the home rule and 
nationalist projects in Scotland have been described using the adjective 
amateurish. The word is used in its most basic definition, that of an activity 
being unprofessional. Suitable synonyms in the context used here would be 
inexpert, inept and unskilled. Some examples from the text will be sufficient to 
justify the use of the word. Roland Muirhead’s correspondence with supporters 
abroad was initially structured, thus the letter to 80 Australian newspaper 
editors. However, he lost the replies for a year, and was unable to respond in a 
structured way, merely asking for support and money. There was no sustained 
effort to build an organisation and the correspondence turned more towards a 
personal correspondence rather than a business one. The one exception to this 
might have been the formation of the SNPA in the 1970s, when an organisation 
of sorts was put in place to coordinate overseas branches. However its 
governance was poor, there was little money and it was seen by a senior SNP 
official, Muriel Gibson, as a poor response to interest in the diaspora.1084 
If the use of the word amateurish as described above notes a failure of method, 
the word spasmodic has also been used in the enquiry to indicate a failure of 
continual effort. It is used to describe the efforts of the home rule and nationalist 
organisation in their attempts to recruit the diaspora to their cause. Defined as 
erratic, the appropriate synonyms relating to the use of this adjective would be 
irregular, desultory, fitful, or perhaps intermittent or fragmentary. The efforts to 
engage the diaspora through visits by officials serve as one example of this. 
Muirhead and his colleagues in the NPS did make some visits to America and 
Canada, but they were essentially personal business visits with nationalist 
meetings fitted in where possible. These visits were not regular. Muirhead went 
once, MacCormick once for the NPS and once for the Covenant, Thompson 
twice for the NPS. This between 1921 when Muirhead wrote to the Australian 
                                                          
1083 Acc. 3721/4/77, letter from the London Renfrewshire Association 11th August 1934 
1084 Acc.10754/23, 22nd October 1976. Gibson felt it had caused disappointment and could have 
achieved its aim in a cleverer way 
173 
 
papers and MacCormick’s visit in 1950. The word as used therefore is designed 
to re-enforce the message that there was no sustained, continual effort to woo 
the diaspora to the nationalist cause.  
To proceed now to the analysis of the nature of diasporas. This should be 
preceded by the caveat that, in common with all social groups, they are not 
homogenous. Nor will their homeland always carry connotations of loyalty, 
belonging or obligation.1085 They are defined as people with a common origin 
who reside, more or less permanently, outside the borders of their domestic 
homeland.1086 It has been shown earlier that from time to time diaspora are 
called upon to take part in homeland affairs, or they become entangled on their 
own initiative. Members of such a diaspora can usefully be categorised to 
determine their degree or likelihood of mobilisation. The categories used here 
are core, passive and silent.1087 
Core members are the organising active elites, capable of mobilising the 
diaspora, usually mobilising passive members first. Silent members are the 
larger pool of people generally uninvolved in diaspora affairs but able to be 
called upon at times of crisis.1088 This simple categorisation will be returned to 
after a closer look at the Scottish diaspora. The role of Scottish associations as 
gatekeepers also supports the notion of them as core actors in the diaspora. 
The Engagement with the Diaspora 
It is useful to analyse the movements’ activities chronologically. This 
demonstrates how little was learned by subsequent organisations from the 
actions of their predecessors. The first SHRA was founded in 1886 with £200 
each from Lord Bute and a ‘colonial premier,’1089 there would be an expectation 
that such provenance would encourage engagement with the diaspora. Indeed, 
the second annual conference of the SHRA, in 1889, made an appeal to 
‘Scotsmen all over the world’ for funds to enable the association to organise in 
Scotland.1090 A pamphlet outlining the SHRA cause was dedicated to the Scot 
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Abroad.1091 The constitution provided for branches to be set up ‘in Scotland and 
elsewhere.’1092 A Colonial Secretary, Thomas McNaught was appointed, toured 
the US and Canada in 1888 and published an aim to raise a fund of 
£100,000.1093 McNaught wrote to newspapers around the world in connection 
with the Association’s ‘Statement of Scotland’s claim for Home Rule’.1094 There 
is however no evidence that funds of anything like McNaught’s target were 
collected, although there was evidence that some overseas branches were 
established. For example, the New York Scottish Home Rule Association was 
founded. 1095  
It was not unreasonable of him to anticipate funds being raised, given the 
success of the Irish referred to earlier, and given the common occurrence of 
remittances. It was not unusual at that time for Scots societies in New Zealand 
to raise funds for relief projects in a particular Scottish locale. The Caithness 
and Sutherland Association initiated a Shetland relief fund in about 1881, and a 
year later, highland members of the Oamaru Caledonian Society were also 
supporting the fund.1096 Highlanders from Invercargill raised £148 pounds for 
relief of crofters on Skye in 1883.1097 Such relief projects have been claimed to 
reflect an active connection between the benevolence of the diaspora and 
domestic politics.1098 A previous chapter has recorded the collection of funds 
from the diaspora to found a Chair of Gaelic at Edinburgh University during the 
1870s. A later example would be the gift of £1,000 from Dunedin to the 
Edinburgh Lord Provost for the furnishing of a room in the City Chambers. An 
expectation of some contribution had not been unreasonable, especially in the 
light of the massive contributions the Irish were making. 
In 1891, there was some success for the SHRA in Australia when the Scottish 
Home Rule Association of Victoria was founded. This organisation existed to 
‘support the great patriotic movement in Scotland to obtain local national 
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self-government.’1099 It may be recalled from chapter three that it changed its 
name a year later to the Scottish National Association of Victoria to encourage 
membership numbers. The Association actually featured fund raising in its 
objectives; ‘All Scotsmen and others in the Colonies who sympathise with the 
objectives of the association are requested to forward their donations to the 
Hon. Treasurer in order that they be transmitted to the parent Association in 
Scotland.’1100 
Theodore Napier was the founder and funder of the Association. Napier was a 
‘sturdy Jacobite who was regarded by many as a public benefactor and by a 
few others as a public nuisance.’1101 In 1885 he had moved a motion at the 
annual meeting of the Caledonian Society of Melbourne concerning the misuse 
of the word ‘English’ in place of British. The motion was withdrawn and some 
regarded it as an extreme expression of Scottish nationalism.1102 It is notable 
that the Melbourne Association appears to have been a feature of the 
successful Caledonian culture that thrived from time to time in Victoria from the 
1850s.1103 Whilst at first sight this may seem to support the tactic of 
approaching the diaspora through its associational groups, this is contradicted 
by the need to change the name to remove the words ‘home rule’ to encourage 
membership. This Melbourne nationalist association did persist although no 
records of systematic support through fund raising have been discovered. In 
1915 it was reported as passing a resolution of protest at the threatened 
closure of Rosyth dockyard.1104  
Whilst the first SHRA, unlike the League and the NPS/SNP did not have a 
regular publication to sell to supporters, it did contribute a paper that attempted 
to reach out to the Scots in London. The first edition of The London Scotsman 
received expressions of support from Cunninghame Graham and Professor 
Blackie, both SHRA members.1105 There are no articles on the SHRA; nor are 
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any to be found in a later, more modest, publication of the same name that was 
being published between 1897 and 1899.1106 
By 1892 the organisation no longer appointed a Colonial Secretary.1107 The 
accounts of the organisation showed funds of £33 only three years later,1108 an 
indication that the support expected from abroad or home was not 
forthcoming.1109 Recall from chapter three that by 1906 the organisation had 
foundered. The engagement with the Scots abroad had featured some 
elements which were to be common with most future attempts; a visit to North 
America, the use of newspapers and the use of Scottish associations to access 
the diaspora. With the exception of Melbourne, and perhaps New York, this 
attempt failed.   
Established in 1913, the International Scots Home Rule League aimed to bring 
the Scot abroad into the fight for home rule. It reached out to the Scottish 
Diaspora through the many Scots associations in the US and Canada. Making 
a specific point of ensuring the demand for a national parliament came from the 
Scottish race, it contacted many overseas organisations1110 and, superficially at 
least, had around 30 branches in some way affiliated throughout the 
diaspora.1111 An earlier chapter has described the visit to North America by 
head of the organisation, Robertson, with this specific aim in mind. These were 
in part the same associational Scottish societies that had listened to McNaught 
nearly twenty years previously, the honourable presidents of the League were 
the prominent Scots in their areas. However, the branches showed little 
appetite for fundraising and meetings were essentially cultural in aspect.1112 
The League did at least add one additional feature to its armoury for attracting 
the diaspora’s support; that of a newspaper, the Scottish Nation. Published 
from 1913 to 1917, the Nation was a bi-monthly paper designed for 
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consumption both home and abroad with the dual purpose of raising money 
and spreading propaganda. 
The visit of Robertson to North America was superficially welcomed by the 
Scots associations visited and branches were established,1113 however there 
was no long lasting organisation created and crucially little generated in the way 
of financial contribution to the cause. The organisations targeted were barren 
ground for attracting support for the nationalist project in Scotland. Yet this 
approach was to persist.  Chapter three dealt with the ending of League activity 
with the advent of the First World War.  
The new, post-war SHRA’s initial engagement was through letters sent in June 
1921 by its founder Roland Muirhead to the editors of 80 newspapers in 
Australia. There are just 13 responses filed in the correspondence archive.1114 
Many of the responses to these letters were ignored by Muirhead for around a 
year, reflecting poor organisation. The responses begin encouragingly, with 
promises to set up branches,1115 requests for literature1116 and occasionally 
donations.1117 Muirhead sent literature, advised of membership fees and of 
membership in Scotland and overseas.1118 As chapter three recalls, over the 
years these correspondents reveal no great progress in the branches if set up, 
and eventually the subject matter becomes more social than political.  
The only visit to Australasia by a prominent home rule supporter was in 1927, 
that of The Reverend James Barr who proposed the Home Rule Bill of May 
1927. Barr was the guest of academics and churchmen1119 and although he 
preached or lectured in many towns in New Zealand, his audience chiefly 
comprised of churchmen, Labour party members and the temperance 
movement.1120 There is no mention of nationalism in his accounts of this trip, or 
the following visit to Australia, where he preached and gave Burns lectures.1121 
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All he could give Muirhead on his return was the names of six supporters to 
contact. Engagement with the diaspora in Australasia was therefore sporadic 
after the first attempt at recruitment through newspapers, and not maintained in 
any structured way such as was found in the US with Donaldson’s organisation. 
After the formation of the NPS, there were several visits to engage with the 
diaspora in North America and Canada. However, due to shortage of funds, 
these visits were primarily for other purposes with the promotion of home rule 
tagged on to them. MacCormick was in the US and Canada in 1930 on the 
business of Glasgow University,1122 and the visits of Muirhead and Thompson 
were primarily business visits. Whilst it can be seen from the description of 
these visits in chapter three that there were some meetings with small 
audiences addressed, these visits were not successful from a fundraising 
perspective and were not repeated often enough to sustain a permanent, 
growing base of support. They were also coordinated through the local Scottish 
associations. 
There was an organisation in the US and Canada, with an organiser for the US 
in Arthur Donaldson, described in chapter three. An undated list of non-Scottish 
SNP branch secretaries lists eight in Canada and five in the US.1123 However, 
the audience was not necessarily receptive, as Andrew Little in Quebec 
reported; the Scots got abuse from other Canadians about nationalism, insofar 
as if they don’t like what’s happening back home they should go back and sort it 
out.1124 Later he remarked that ‘the attempts to awaken in others the 
sentimentalism for things Scottish is a thankless and sometimes an unpleasant 
experience for me but I intend to carry on.’1125 This seems a curious anomaly, 
making it sound difficult to encourage the Scot abroad to think about Scotland. 
However later in this chapter evidence is presented to demonstrate that the 
associational Scot of Caledonian Societies was by no means the larger part of 
the diaspora. 
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The SNP published a newsletter, in this case the Scots Independent. The SI 
was originally the organ of the Scots National League (recall this merged with 
the National Party of Scotland in June 1928) and continued to be published by 
the movement when it became the SNP. Early on, the sort of help asked for 
was the linking ‘of all Scots societies’ establishing branches of the Scots 
National League in all centres where Scots congregate. League Branches were 
asked to disseminate information about Scotland not only to other Scots 
societies but also the politicians and press of their own state.1126 Sales of the SI 
were a source of income and propaganda and there are many references to 
subscriptions to the paper in Muirhead’s correspondence with overseas 
sympathisers.1127 
However, Muirhead would many times affirm his belief that the Scots abroad 
would contribute, ‘if only they knew of us.’1128 Post 1945, the SNP made 
another attempt at organising the diaspora. The failed engagement methods 
were repeated. Branches existed briefly in Sydney and Johannesburg in the 
1950s and branches in Auckland, Wellington and Vancouver in the 1960s were 
equally short lived.1129 In the case of Vancouver, this was because the driving 
force, Ian Hannah, left.1130 This may have been the reason the SNP tried to 
improve its approach as its popularity in Scotland grew in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The SNP set up an organisation to manage and engage with the diaspora, the 
SNPA. Like its predecessor, the Scottish Independence Society, it was partly 
founded to overcome the difficulty of overseas branches being representatives 
of a foreign political organisation.1131 Described in detail in chapter four, minutes 
of an early meeting of the SNPA on 25th July 19761132 noted that individual 
members needed to be subject to party discipline and so had to be within the 
SNPA.1133 It can be suggested therefore that this body was as much about 
control as it was about promotion of the cause overseas. For example, there 
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was concern that the Americans could be very enthusiastic and therefore 
difficult to contain.1134 Muriel Gibson, SNP membership secretary, thought it an 
inadequate response to the need to accommodate overseas members who had 
difficulty in joining a foreign political party.1135 An SNPA supporter in Canada, 
Norman Allan, described its role as a PR organisation, one which was able to 
host visits by senior SNP officials and facilitate contact with business and 
politicians.1136 A newspaper, the Saltire, was distributed to members. 
Nevertheless some progress was made in the mid-1970s. Jim Johnstone, 
newly emigrated from Edinburgh, set up the SNPA in the US, founding 
branches in New York, Washington and Virginia. Johnstone hosted a visit by 
Douglas Crawford, SNP MP, on the 6th-14th of June 1977.1137 The visit 
encompassed the UN, lunch with journalists, meeting with Congressmen as 
well as discussions at the World Bank and the IMF. This was not a ‘flag waving’ 
visit, but focussed on business and finance. Good though Johnstone was, he 
was the only SNP member in the US SNPA. The rest were US citizens 
interested in culture, kilts and clans1138 and William Wolfe did not think 
Johnstone got on well with his members.1139 When he returned to Scotland two 
years later, the organisation foundered.1140  
The management of the SNPA betrayed the same lack of consistent organised 
support for those Scots abroad interested in the nationalist cause. Overseas 
membership may never have exceeded 7001141 at a time when SNP Scottish 
members numbered approximately 125,000.1142 Organisation was lax,1143 
leadership part time1144 and the branches abroad were neither expected to raise 
funds beyond their own subscriptions,1145 nor act as spokesmen for the SNP in 
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their country.1146 The editor of the Saltire wrote in 1978 the paper’s ‘days were 
numbered’ He estimated only 60 people worldwide read it.1147 The SNPA had to 
achieve a modus operandi that fell somewhere between a branch of a foreign 
political party and a Caledonian Society. Norman Allan admitted that ‘the 
meetings tend to the social’1148 to attract members. 
For the most case these organisations tried to engage the diaspora using the 
same methods and the same Scots associational bodies, and failed repeatedly 
to learn from the experiences of their predecessors. The only attempt by a 
nationalist body to organise its overseas branches by country into one affiliated 
organisation was blighted by the same poor and part time organisation. The 
common thread, the approach through the associational Scot abroad was also 
a mistake of target, not just of organisation. It is proposed that these bodies 
acted as gatekeepers between the nationalists and the diaspora, so it is to this 
concept as well as the nature and size of the associations that the chapter now 
turns. 
Gatekeepers: Brief Examples and a Definition 
Some examples of gatekeepers in social and political environments were given 
earlier to demonstrate the kind of actors and activities that characterise this 
behaviour. Further examples demonstrate how gatekeepers influence politics. 
Although the French presidency was designed as a supra-partisan office, the 
need for Presidents to have a majority in the National Assembly to pass 
legislation, works against this. The parties effectively act as gatekeepers and 
enablers for candidates, and the presidential election is the high point of party 
activity. The parties determine who goes forward to lead.1149  
In the field of academic research, an important factor affecting the choice of 
topic is the availability of funds to pay for it. The people and organisations who 
provide these funds act as gatekeepers. Governments may be hostile to 
research that attacks their policies or which advocates an agenda different to 
their own. Industrial providers of funds tend to want research to yield practical 
                                                          
1146 Acc. 7295/35, 30th March 1979 
1147 Acc. 10754/22, letter dated 12th February 1978 
1148 SI, July 1979, p.5 
1149 Hanley, 2007, pp.423 and 437 
182 
 
benefits.1150 Media professionals act as gatekeepers by systematically including 
or excluding certain types of content.1151 Governments can also act as 
gatekeepers by determining who, if anybody, gets access to certain data.  
These examples, drawn as they are from political and social arenas, 
demonstrate common features; gatekeepers can be organisations or 
individuals, their role as gatekeeper in any specific context may not be explicit 
in the description of their functions or the role they carry out as commonly 
understood by employers, sponsors or supporters. Either individually or 
corporately they act in such a manner which will support their objectives, or 
those of the organisation they represent, rather than any other. This principle 
applied to the Scottish Associations. 
Contact through the Associations 
The Scottish Diaspora is distinguished by the associational structure the Scots 
set up wherever they settled.1152 Scottish associations such as St. Andrew’s 
and Caledonian Societies proliferated throughout the British Empire as a 
vehicle for the expression of ethnic identity.1153 This identity tended to be 
Highland in texture, rather than representative of all Scots, but there was no 
single narrative of Scottish associational culture at home or abroad.1154 
Although these clubs of Scots, or descendants of Scots, appeared from the 
seventeenth century onwards, It is unclear when precisely the Scots started 
forming these associations.1155 They fell broadly into two types; those which 
were generically Scottish in character and those with a Scottish regional 
orientation.1156 They provided relief and support for Scots in difficulty, and 
preserved the culture and relevant cultural artefacts. This kind of association 
was not unique to the Scots; the Irish were very active in this regard as were 
fellow Britons the English and Welsh.1157 In the Irish case, this association was 
accompanied by the politics of active homeland nationalist activity, sometimes 
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violent. Although the Scottish associations were by no means the only 
component of the diaspora, the argument now turns to the nature of these 
associations and whether or not they supported homeland self-government.  
It is preferable to examine the associational Scot through the lens of the host 
country. This is because conditions in these countries were different and the 
situation of the diaspora and its associations were also different. Just how 
different will be seen in the arguments to follow. Note first, that there would be 
general agreement that all of these countries could be labelled liberal states 
where diasporas may operate as ethnic lobbies for their kin.1158 However it has 
been noted earlier that the progress of liberal democracy in these states did not 
proceed in concert. Nevertheless it is helpful to structure the analysis 
geographically.  
Canada 
Some Canadian associations have left evidence of their objectives. The 
constitution of the Caledonian Society of Toronto, dated 1871 in this edition and 
therefore proximal to the time frame of this thesis, makes clear its aims in 
Article I, The Objects of the Society. 
‘The encouragement of the National Costume and games, the cultivation 
of a taste for Scottish Music, History and Poetry and the uniting more 
closely together of Scotchmen.’1159 
There is no intent here to support any return to Scotland, none to support any 
independence movement, nor to support any remittances to such organisations. 
Article IV of the constitution says nothing of what can, or cannot be brought to a 
meeting. The St. Andrew’s Society of Montreal, established in 1835, stated its 
objects to be ‘strictly limited to charity and acts of philanthropy’.1160 Its 
membership was restricted to leading, influential and respectable Scots.1161 Its 
management were charged by the constitution with dispensing the Society’s 
bounty to ‘Resident Members’ (of the society) ‘who may become indigent, and 
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poor natives of Scotland.’1162 Through the organisation and its charitable 
actions, the Scots of the high bourgeoisie, those who founded it, conveyed 
values and ideas to the rest of the Scottish population.1163 There is no specific 
ban on political activity, except at the outset, when the revival of national feeling 
is attributed to the racial nature of politics in Montreal as Anglo-Saxons vied 
with French Canadians and British values needed to be maintained.1164   
If the Society did not have an overtly political agenda, then some of its 
members certainly did; many of them were active in support of the Constitution 
Act of 1791 which established a British style social and political structure 
disliked by the French Canadian majority.1165 Although its actions were 
exclusively charitable, it is clear from its offer of help to worthy Scots that the 
elitist regulation of charity was at its heart.  
It would be with organisations like these that the representatives of both the 
SHRA and League would engage to put their case to Scotsmen. The focus on 
national costume and culture would have been expensive, which would 
encourage membership from the well-off. The qualification to vote in Canada 
varied by province until 1920 and was qualified by property ownership until that 
time. The Canadian provinces had gained some form of self-government 
progressively from 1848. The concept of home rule by whatever name would 
have been familiar to the members of the Toronto and Montreal Societies. 
United States 
Many British immigrants to the United States did not really consider it a foreign 
country.1166 However, they still formed societies and celebrated their national 
days. For the Scots, the first recorded was the Scots Charitable Society of 
Boston, formed in 1657.1167 St. Andrew’s clubs followed; from 1729 to 1756 
clubs opened, starting in Charleston South Carolina,1168 with Philadelphia, 
Savannah and New York following.1169 In 1845 a group of Scots met to 
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celebrate St. Andrew’s Day, and formed the Illinois St. Andrew’s Society. Its 
aims were to preserve Scottish traditions and culture and serve Chicago’s 
community of Scots.1170 The first constitution of the Society was published in its 
annual report of 1889 and refers to ‘A sacred obligation to aid the unfortunate 
among our countrymen.’1171 The aims of the Detroit St. Andrew’s Society were 
to ‘provide relief and assistance for the unfortunate of their countrymen and to 
preserve and promote the traditions of Old Scotia in the land of their 
adoption.’1172 Whereas the St. Andrew’s societies were run by small 
philanthropic cliques (the New York St. Andrew’s Society took in none but the 
‘Scottish elite,’1173) the Caledonian Clubs founded from the mid-1800s fostered 
a type of Scottish culture in the form of games, balls and concerts; activities, 
games excluded, probably enjoyed by the elite few rather than the many. 
By 1918 there were games being held in over 125 towns and cities in the 
US.1174 Benefit Orders akin to the English Odd Fellows lodges began to be 
formed in the late 1800s with St. Louis founding the first lodge of the national 
fraternity. This ‘Order of Scottish Clans’ had 160 active lodges in 1914 and 
16,000 active members. These clans were not traditional highland clans, just 
local lodge names.1175 In 1926 it was reported that the Order of Scottish 
Clansmen of America represented societies with a membership of 30,000.1176 In 
contrast, the main purpose of the Highland or Gaelic variety of association was 
the protection and preservation of Highland culture and language.1177 
As in other countries, these associations were either philanthropic or cultural, 
as is evidenced by their aims and activities. They were not founded for, or used 
for such a purpose as the promotion of a foreign country nationalism. As Tables 
VI and VII have shown, the US had been free of foreign rule since 1783 and 
although participation was low, men who were not slaves had been able to vote 
since the 1820s, although a universal franchise was not achieved until 1965. 
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Old country politics were not encouraged, demonstrated earlier in chapter 
three. 
New Zealand 
 New Zealand is recognised as the first state to allow universal suffrage, in 
1893. Some form of self-government was in place from 1857, with Dominium 
status within the British Empire following in 1907. It is reasonable for the 
members of the Societies to be aware of the difference in governance 
circumstances between New Zealand and their place of birth or historical 
homeland, Scotland. 
When a St. Andrew’s Society was established in Auckland in 1855, its aims 
were listed as the promotion of education, the granting of pecuniary aid to 
worthy potential immigrants, communication about affairs in the province to 
Scotland to encourage other emigrants, the revival of old associations and 
providing relief to natives of Scotland and their descendants resident in 
Auckland.1178  
Themes in the objects of these societies emerge. Benevolence, the support for 
procuring and disseminating information on the literature, culture and history of 
Scotland, as well as encouraging excellence in the performance of national 
feats, games and exercises.1179 The New Zealand societies were dominated by 
the Caledonian Games, which were exploited as a brand by athletics clubs. ‘It is 
conceivable that many of the new Caledonian clubs set up in the early part of 
the twentieth century were athletics clubs with no particular rooting in the 
Scottish Community.’1180 This, with the absence of St Andrew’s Societies, made 
New Zealand different from North America; The Scottish associational 
landscape in Otago was dominated by Caledonian Societies.1181 Here 
benevolence was not the main driver as it had been in North America. Although 
usually ranked first in lists of objectives, in New Zealand the clubs outsourced 
the giving by donating to charities, rather than distributing it as was the case 
                                                          
1178 Bueltmann, 2011, p.82 
1179 Ibid., pp.70-71 
1180 Bueltmann, 2011, p.69 
1181 Leith and Sim, 2014, p.50 
187 
 
seen above in Montreal. It can be suggested therefore that it was less likely to 
be ethnically focussed.1182  
Scottish clubs with specialised associations, such as Burns, were established in 
the late nineteenth century, and Scottish societies in the early twentieth century 
celebrated Scottish patriotism, were located in the cultural realm and were 
defined to invoke Scotland.1183 Highland societies like the Gaelic Society in 
Dunedin existed to preserve language and culture.1184 A New Zealand 
Federation of Caledonian and Scottish Societies was established in 1927. Its 
objectives were to unite the various societies, unify all Scots throughout New 
Zealand, and stimulate a general interest in all affairs of social and national 
concern to Scots people. It encouraged the study of literature, music and art as 
well as Scottish games, sports and pastimes. It encouraged members to take a 
brotherly interest in Scots arriving from the mother country and overseas.1185 
There was no ambition here to support any political cause in the home country, 
only to celebrate and preserve Scottish culture and other activities, provide 
vehicles for integration and ethnic identity and be a site of potent memory.1186  
Some view of the place that nationalism held in the diaspora here can be 
deduced from the official organ of the New Zealand Federation of Caledonian 
and Scottish Societies, the New Zealand Scotsman. This paper provided some 
reporting on nationalist activities. It reported the 624th Wallace anniversary, 
noting a gradual awakening of the spirit of Scottish nationalism. The author, Mrs 
Dorothy McClelland, reported that ‘the only obstacle to self-government for 
Scotland was the apathy of the Scots themselves.’1187 There was nothing in that 
issue’s editorial, though, and no letters on the subject in following issues until 
1930, when the editorial reported on an article describing Scottish nationalism 
from the Spectator which had been used in an unnamed New Zealand 
newspaper.1188 A year later a correspondent reported on a visit to the Inverness 
branch of the NPS. They reported ‘no crankiness, but good sound Scots 
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sense.’1189 Later that year the sorry state of the Scottish economy was the 
subject of a full page in support of Scottish nationalism, ending ‘can we 
wonder…that men from all political parties are banding together and making a 
demand for home rule for Scotland?’1190 However in 1933 a short piece on 
Scottish nationalism ended ‘Scots Nationalism is a subject at the current 
moment to be approached with bated breath.’1191 Nowhere in the occasional 
discourse over these four years in this official organ is there pressure to 
support, join or send money, demonstrating that the societies were maintaining 
their non-political stance. It may be that the paper did not have the full support 
of the many societies it represented, as after four years of operation it was still 
losing money through low subscription, due it claimed to the economic 
recession.1192  
Australia 
The Scottish immigrant arriving in Australia did so with dual nationality, Scottish 
and British.1193 The Sydney based Highland Society formed from two earlier 
groups in 1877, had as its aims the following; promoting Gaelic and Scots 
literature, music and Games, the social and intellectual improvement of its 
members, care for needy Scots and new arrivals and the commemoration of 
Scottish Days in the calendar.1194  
Membership was for the more distinguished. The first President of the Society 
was Sir John Hay, Conservative MP and President of the Legislative Council. 
Five of its first seven vice presidents were MPs, including Alexander Stuart who 
became Premier in 1883.1195 The objectives of these and the other 130 or so 
Australian societies that were established were similar to those listed above for 
the Sydney society. In the Victoria region, there was a great expansion of 
Scottish clubs in the early 1900s, with 53 recorded in the greater Melbourne 
and surrounding districts by the outbreak of the First World War. This 
proliferation of groups was co-ordinated by the Victorian Scottish Union, which 
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facilitated the avoidance of events clashing and represented the groups in the 
pre-war dispute with the Australian Government over the disbanding of 
Highland regiments.1196 
By the 1960s, there was more diversity, with clan groups as well as regional 
groups such as the Western Perthshire society. The Scottish Heritage Council, 
formed as an umbrella group in 1981 affiliated hundreds of Caledonian, music, 
clan and county groups.1197 However, as with groups elsewhere in the Scottish 
diaspora, struggles to retain the kilt in uniform apart, they were a part of a 
preservation movement, of Scottish symbolism, of the constitutional status quo. 
An MLA of Western Australia stated; ‘The Scottish societies in Australia had no 
politics. Their only policy was the maintenance of the British Empire.’1198 Of 
course, the maintenance of the British Empire was politics, just not Scottish 
nationalist politics. Recall the notion earlier that some place nationalism at the 
periphery, something that belongs to others. The evidence as presented leads 
to the conclusion that the Scots combined in their Clubs and Societies overseas 
had objectives and activities which were not aligned to political or financial 
support for Scottish Nationalism. This situation also obtained where long 
distance nationalism was not possible, the rest of the UK, specifically England. 
England 
The Scots in England also established their associations wherever their 
migration resulted in large co-located groups. As part of the UK, England, like 
Scotland and the other constituents, did not have universal manhood suffrage 
until 1918, and universal suffrage for over 21 year olds was not introduced until 
1929. Of the selected states examined in Tables VI and VII, only the US and 
South Africa were more tardy. England, whilst conquered by the Normans in 
1066 and subdued over subsequent decades, had been independent for 
centuries before the time of the first SHRA. This section on Scottish societies in 
England will concentrate on groups in London. The London Caledonian Society 
was probably the first of its kind conceived by Lowlanders as an all Scottish 
alternative to the many Highland-orientated groups in the capital. It served as 
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the model for at least one overseas association, the Melbourne Caledonian 
Society.1199 
London, as the centre of the government of the UK and the Empire, was a 
natural nexus for those having, seeking or wishing to influence power. At the 
turn of the 19th century Scottish associations in London had, by a contemporary 
estimate, around 5,000 members.1200 Accordingly, it is not surprising that there 
was formed in 1919 a Scottish Home Rule Association of London,1201 although 
its membership was limited to members of the National Liberal Club.1202 Over a 
year later it was described as being ‘an active body’ and there is a note that a 
branch of the Scottish National League (SNL) had also been formed in 
London.1203 The body saw itself as ‘a kind of watchdog over parliamentary 
developments and claimed the support of the majority of Scottish MPs.’1204 
The Scottish National Convention was established in 1924 for the purpose of 
framing a scheme for Scottish self-government.1205 It recognised the importance 
of London and established a parliamentary sub-committee to lobby MPs, 
convened by Alex McLaren, also a member of both the SHRA and the SNL in 
London.1206 The Convention wrote to 58 actual and prospective Scottish MPs in 
November of that year.1207 Between 1936 and 1939 there was a London 
Scottish Self-Government Committee, an elite organisation whose members 
were Scottish MPs and other dignitaries resident in London.1208 The importance 
of London as the seat of power was appreciated by the SHRA and this was 
highlighted in a letter from Muirhead to John McCormick.1209 London, then, was 
an essential location for those intending to influence law-makers. 
The records of the London associations therefore make a useful source to 
determine the political inclinations of the Scots in these societies. The Ilford 
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Scottish Association was one such organisation. It had around 800 members 
and did ‘much useful social and charitable work among Scots in the south.’1210  
The Caledonian Society of London recorded its activities in a set of Chronicles 
between the years of 1837 and 1967.1211 When the Society was established 
there were only two Scottish societies in London. Its objects were to ‘promote 
good fellowship and brotherhood and to combine efforts for benevolent and 
national objects connected with Scotland’, also to ’preserve the picturesque 
garb of Old Gaul.’ This included charitable donations to the Highland Schools 
(in London), the Royal Caledonian Asylum, the Scottish Hospital and other 
Scottish charitable organisations.1212 
The Scotsman newspaper reported the annual dinner of the Society in 1889 
and the same edition of the Chronicles noted that ‘the Scottish feeling grows 
apace in the Metropolis’. A Scottish Festival was held in the Albert Hall that 
year.1213 It was said that at this time ‘Scottish clubs and Societies abound, for all 
ranks and conditions of Scotsmen, Highland and Lowland.1214 The first 
Chronicles were distributed to other Scottish Societies in London, like the 
London Caithness Association.  
The Chronicles are helpful in learning what the Society actually did, and how it 
saw itself and this in turn helps to establish why it was not likely to support 
Scottish home rule. The toast list for the Annual Festival for 1891 was as 
follows: Her Majesty the Queen, The Duke of Rothsay, other members of the 
Royal Family, the Army, Navy and Reserve forces, the immortal memory of 
Burns, the prosperity of the Caledonian Society of London, their visitors, its 
president and finally Ladies present.1215  In this way the Society characterised 
itself as Royalist, British, cultural and self-interested. Scotland itself does not 
get a mention. 
The nature of the Society is clearly stated in the summary to the 1905-1921 
Chronicles. It emphasises ‘social and literary intercourse’ and that the Society 
                                                          
1210 Acc.3721/125/25, cutting dated 25th February 1929 
1211 Chronicles of the Caledonian Society of London (Chronicles) 
1212 Chronicles first volume, pp.2-3 
1213 Ibid., p.83 
1214 Ibid. 
1215 Chronicles, first volume, p.100 for 1891 list and pp.176-7 for the 1905 list 
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‘endeavoured to keep the lion rampant in the Capital of the Empire, maintain a 
strong Scottish sentiment along with a keen sense of duty to Great Britain.’ ‘Our 
local patriotism is not an enemy but a complement to our great commonwealth 
of nations.’1216 These sentiments would be familiar to associational members 
amongst the Scot abroad, recall the ‘British’ values of the Montreal St. Andrews 
Society. The Melbourne Association asked the Society for affiliate status in 
1938.1217 
These sentiments were supported by the president, Loudon McQueen, who in 
1913 considered the bitter recriminations arising from the 1707 Union to be 
happily healed.1218 These very British views may be in part explained by the 
social status of the club’s members. For the year 1904-5, of 17 ex-officio 
members, there were two colonels, one KC, one JP and one doctor.1219 At this 
time of restricted suffrage, these would most likely have all been voters, unlike 
many ordinary Scots that their charity supported. 
Periodically a president or a guest offered a ‘sentiment’ or speech to the 
gatherings. The interests of the society may be fairly judged from the subjects 
covered. Of a sample of 30 of these given between 1931 and 1938, ten were 
cultural, ten on life in Scotland (mainly legal issues), two on education, one on 
faith, four on industry and three on the armed forces.1220 One on Government 
talked of a fringe of Scottish sentiment about de-centralised government. 
Offering no opinion, the speaker, one W. S. Gilbert, CB, claimed that the ‘man 
in the crowd’ did not care for it.1221 This pattern is repeated in the post-war 
period, for the period 1952-56,1222 1956-61,1223 and 1961-67.1224 No mention 
was made, for example, of the Stone of Scone incident in the toast to 
Scotland’s place and power at the meeting held on 18th January 1951.1225  
                                                          
1216 Chronicles, 1905-1921, p.216 
1217 Chronicles, 1938-45 
1218 Chronicles, 1905-1921, pp.110-111 
1219 Chronicles, 1905-1921 
1220 Chronicles, 1931-38, p.417 
1221 Chronicles, 1938-45, p.32 
1222 Chronicles, 1952-56, p.173 
1223 Chronicles, 1956-61, p.209 
1224 Chronicles, 1961-67, p.33 
1225 Chronicles, 1945-52, p.278 
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The Scottish Unionist MP for Dumfriesshire responded to what he described as 
a contemporary Scottish attitude that postulated a Scottish state that ‘we want 
Scotland not to become less united with England but more closely united with 
her, with the Empire and with Europe’.1226 It is no surprise that a Unionist MP 
would express these sentiments, but he was a guest of the Society, and 
received loud applause.1227 This lends weight to the argument that the 
associational Scot may not have supported the nationalist or home rule cause. 
They were not unaware of this cause; Alan Gomme-Duncan, MP for Perth and 
East Perthshire, despite opposing the SNP,1228 urged that the Covenant signed 
by over a million people in 1950 be recognised as a sign of discontent. 
Members appreciated the difficulties in the Scottish economy. The speech by 
Sir Harold Bolton in 1953 asserted that ‘all is not well in Scotland.’1229  
H. B. Boyne, in 1962, said ‘I am convinced there is no better or quicker way of 
advancing Scotland’s interests than getting the best of her men and women, 
irrespective of party, to represent her in Parliament.’1230 Later in the speech he 
compared this favourably to ‘the choppy waters of chauvinistic nationalism.’1231 
The Caledonian Club, though clearly expressing nationalist tendencies of a 
state-maintaining, British, sort was clearly not a place Scottish state-seeking 
nationalism would find support.  
In brief, the Scots abroad in England formed their ubiquitous associations but 
these were not active in Scottish nationalism. However, some of their members 
did engage in organised political activity through membership of the SHRA and 
the Convention. Equally, the Canadian, New Zealand, US and Australian 
associational Scots appear to have had little or no inclination to join or support 
groups such as the SHRA, NPS or SNP except in Melbourne, and then to little 
effect. Whilst they held a torch for ethnic consciousness, their expression of 
Scottish identity was rooted firmly in the Highlands - romantic imaginations of 
the colonial-era founders.1232 They also tended to be relatively elite 
                                                          
1226 Ibid., p.107 
1227 Ibid. 
1228 The Times, 9th March 1950, p.8 
1229 Chronicles, 1952-56, p.55 
1230 Chronicles, 1961-67, p.33 
1231 Ibid., p.39 
1232 Leith and Sim, 2014, p.63 
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organisations due to the cost of membership, highland dress and social 
occasions. 
However, an explanation for the indifference of the associations to the 
nationalist projects of the homeland is still wanting. Their association with 
British nationality and Empire could not have been significant in the early years 
of nationalism; it was demonstrated in chapter one that the SHRAs and the 
League were also attached to Empire and Britain. The SNP’s clearer line of 
Scottish national identity would have jarred with the elite membership of these 
groups. Clearly a barrier to engagement in the nationalist project at home was 
their lack of political purpose. To outside observers, the members of these 
associations would have seemed like the core of the diaspora as outlined 
earlier. However, this was an elite preserving the status quo. When they 
mobilised the passive members of the diaspora they appeared to do so only for 
cultural, philanthropic or sporting events. This does not mean that the members 
of the diaspora were not individually engaged in politics and this will be 
explored below.  
Membership in Perspective 
First, it needs to be determined whether or not these groups, with all their 
prominence, were a numerically significant part of the diaspora. Although these 
associations were quite visible, they were not the whole of the diaspora. Their 
membership may not have been numerous when compared to the size of the 
diaspora. The preceding description of the Scottish diaspora and the lack of 
support for nationalism might lead to the conclusion of one writer on the 
subject, that the diaspora was essentially cultural rather than political.1233 This 
lies in contrast to the Associations’ members, many of whom were. However, 
this also avoids the issue that the associational Scots were not the whole 
diaspora, just the most visible part of it to contemporary and historian alike. 
Whilst it is difficult to determine membership of these associations at any one 
time, assumptions can be made to assess what participation in these societies 
there was amongst the diaspora.  
                                                          
1233 Bueltmann, 2011, p.197 
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It is possible from the 1901 census to obtain the Scots born population of 
England and Wales, which was 311,680, and in 1911, 322,012.1234 Of these 
around 90,000 were situated in London and the South East.1235 At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, London’s 28 Scottish associations had 
between 4,000 and 5,000 members,1236 or 4.4% to 5.6% of the Scots born 
population. Some were elite bodies. The London Caledonian Society limited its 
membership to 100 plus the committee. Like others referred to earlier, it was an 
elite organisation of core diaspora members. Whilst membership of these clubs 
was sometimes restricted to Scots, some were open to all who enjoyed cultural 
aspects such as music or dance.1237 Individual examples of club constituents 
and membership numbers are scattered throughout texts on this subject without 
a systematic listing. This is probably because the focus of past studies has 
been on culture and historic trends rather than an exercise in estimating 
participation. In order to attempt this estimate, some examples have been used 
to provide a patchy guide to participation.  
The Society of St. Andrews in Hull was initiated to give Scots an exclusive 
Society. It had a relatively affluent membership, whilst also inviting migrant fish 
workers to their Grand Scottish Concert in 1912. Membership in 1950 was 463, 
around the same number as the Wolverhampton and District Caledonian 
Society.1238 The Hull society had 92 members at its inception in 1910, and in 
the 1911 census there were 72,000 Scots-born in Lancashire and Yorkshire.1239 
The numbers are not directly comparable but the broad appearance is that 
membership of the diaspora was much greater outside of these societies than 
within.  
At the 1921 census, there were 333,517 Scots-born in England and Wales.1240 
In chapter two, net migration to England in the following decade was estimated 
to be 330,000.There were therefore hundreds of thousands of first generation 
                                                          
1234 www.neighborhood.statistics.gov.uk/htmldocs/dvc/census1911_2001.html , 
http://en.wickipedia.org/wiki/united_kingdom_census_1901; Harper 2012, p.19 
1235 Harper, 2012, p.19 
1236 Bueltmann, et. al., 2009, p.24 
1237 Harper, 2012, p.44 
1238 Ibid., pp.44-45 
1239 Harper, 2012, p.19 
1240 Acc. 3721/125/25 
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Scots there at this time. Yet In 1929, the Ilford Scottish association was stated 
to have 800 members,1241 the London Ayrshire Society had 300 at its annual 
dinner in 1932.1242 There are unfortunately few totals of association 
membership available, but some indication can be derived from those for Clan 
Associations. The Scottish Clans Association held a dinner in London in 1932 
and 350 attended.1243 Membership in 1929 was given as 1,500.1244 Nor was this 
picture of the associational Scot being of limited number confined to England 
and Wales. Table XI shows the Scots-born populations of four popular Scottish 
destinations. 
Table XI: Census records of Scots-born Population in Selected Countries, 
1950-54 
Country Date Scots born population 
United States 1950 244,200 
Canada 1951 226,343 
Australia 1954 123,634 
New Zealand 1951 44,000 
England and Wales 1951 653,626 
Sources: McCarthy, 2007, pp. 228-229; England and Wales figures from Harper, 2012, p. 19 
The population of course is that of first generation immigrants, not the total of 
Scots in these countries, so the pool from which Scots associations could 
recruit would be much larger. It does however give a base from which to 
approximate the proportion of Scots participating in these societies. 
Membership of the associations at a particular point was hard to obtain for this 
period and there is much scope for further research into these participation 
numbers. However, some broad estimates can be made. In the late 1920s, the 
Scottish associations in the US had between 24,000 and 30,000 members.1245 
This would have been only 10% of the 1951 Scots-born population. In 1929, 
                                                          
1241 Acc. 3721/125/25, Glasgow Herald cutting dated 25th February 1929 
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1244 Ibid., Daily Record, 23rd January 1929 
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Arthur Donaldson, US nationalist organiser, noted there were 15,000 Scots in 
Detroit and the St Andrew’s Association had only 200 members.1246 The fashion 
for Clan associations after 1970 saw a burgeoning of members but of the 150 
or so clan clubs in existence at the millennium, 53 claimed a total of 27,000 
members1247 out of a supposed 20 million people of Scots descent in the US. 
This situation appears to continue to the present day, with recent research 
exposing the reliance of many Scottish clan and cultural organisations on a 
small group of dedicated enthusiasts rather than a mass membership.1248 In 
Canada, the 1921 diaries of George Dott, at that time working as a labourer, 
make only one mention of the St. Andrews Society in Ottawa and it appears he 
declined the invitation to attend.1249 Likewise the more middle class Earnest 
Younger makes no mention of the Toronto Society in either 1926 or 1929.1250  
The picture of low participation is not as clear in New Zealand. The societies in 
New Zealand developed from the 1860s,1251 the Otago society being founded 
with forty members.1252 It has been demonstrated earlier that in the1930s there 
may have been over 600 Scottish societies in New Zealand, though individual 
membership numbers are difficult to ascertain. Many of these were sporting 
clubs or pipe bands, but the overall numbers lead to a suggestion that in New 
Zealand at least the associational scots were perhaps a bigger part of the Scots 
diaspora population. Recall, however, the failure of the New Zealand Scotsman 
to attract enough subscriptions to break even. 
In Australia, individual societies have been shown to have membership in the 
hundreds, although there were many of them. For example, although 5,000 
were mobilised from the passive diaspora for the Games organised by the 
Sydney based Highland Society in 1880, the membership peaked in 1892 at 
                                                          
1246 Acc.3721/74/669, letter to Muirhead, 7th October 1929 
1247 Zumkhawala-Cook, 2005, p.125 
1248 Sim, 2011b, pp.182-183 
1249 Acc. 12987/54, June entry mentioning a Glaswegian called Scott 
1250 Acc. 9407/2 
1251 For example the Caledonian Society of Otago was founded in 1862, according to its 
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404.1253 Similar membership numbers were achieved by the Caledonian Society 
of Melbourne, 567 in 1886, reducing to 246 in the following recession.1254 
It appears to be justifiable to conclude, even with these disjointed figures, that 
the associational Scots were a minority of Scots born or generational 
immigrants in these host societies. Therefore, it follows that if there were many 
outside of these societies, these Scots may have been a source of support for 
the nationalist movement in Scotland, for the Scots abroad were politically very 
active in their host lands.  
Scots in Politics in the Host Lands 
It was the ability of the Scottish elite to integrate themselves with the English 
elite that deprived any nascent nationalist movement of prospective 
leadership.1255 The political activity of Scots in England and the UK has been 
covered in previous parts of this thesis. This presented a considerable 
participation in the political process in the UK. To complete the picture, the 
political success of the diaspora overseas should be addressed.  
The ethnic origins of Canadian members of parliament were significantly 
weighted towards the Scots from 1886 onwards; they constituted 25% of the 
members of the House of Commons in the first 4 decades of the twentieth 
century whilst persons of Scots origin in Canada stood at 12% in 1941.1256 Six 
out of sixteen premierships from 1873 to 1979 were held by three men of 
Scottish birth or descent; Sir John Macdonald, Alexander Mackenzie and W. L. 
Mackenzie King.1257 A news cutting dated 1926 named eight Scots in the 
Canadian Cabinet of 18, the largest national group, followed by French with 
six.1258 
In Australia ‘the Scots and Scottish Australians have been disproportionally 
represented in the government of Australia since 1788.’1259 For more of a third 
of the years since Australia’s Federation, ‘the Prime Minister has been of 
                                                          
1253 Prentis, 2008, p.200 
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1256 Stanford Reid, 1976, p.296 
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Scottish birth or descent, roughly a third more than the Irish.’1260 Before 1900, 
46% of Queensland’s Premiers and 35% of Victoria’s were of Scottish 
background.1261 Federally, in the 1920s, Scots and Scots Australians continued 
to be prominent and nearly 40% of overseas-born Australian Labour Party 
federal parliamentarians 1901-1981 were Scots-born.1262 In New Zealand, the 
vigorous embrace of the political was not so evident.1263 Between 1856 and 
1975, four out of 31 prime ministers were of Scottish descent, accounting for six 
out of 38 premierships.1264 Even so, it cannot be denied that the Scots abroad 
were active in politics.  
In summary, the many visible associations of Scots abroad were cultural and 
social bodies in nature and to an extent British as well as Scottish. In the terms 
of the categorisation of members of a mobilised diaspora, these were the 
outward representation of the core, the active elite. As they made a visible and 
institutional nexus of Scots and Scottishness, they were used as a means of 
engaging with the diaspora. This effort was likely to fail from the outset due to 
the nature of the associations and their adherents. They were not the major part 
of the Scots abroad but were usually relatively elite in composition so acted as 
gatekeepers to the passive and silent members of the majority. However, 
although individual Scots tended to be politically active in their host countries, 
they were not generally interested in the politics of their home land. Lastly, in 
the US, American patriotism, or state maintaining nationalism, and to an extent 
the law, made it difficult to proselytise the politics of old Europe. 
Having spent some time describing the failure of the efforts of the Scots to 
mobilise their diaspora, it is instructive to look at a nationalist project that 
successfully engaged the support of a national diaspora; that of the Irish. 
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Successful Engagement 
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the Irish lent significant support to 
their own Home Rule struggle.1265 The Irish-American was characterised as the 
avenging wolfhound of Irish Nationalism.1266 Supporters of a constitutional 
settlement as opposed to outright independence, such as the Constitutional MP 
John Redmond, toured the globe raising funds for home rule.1267 Eventually 
these organisations were suppressed by the Fenian United Brotherhood of the 
United States. From 1876 onwards this organisation became very strong.1268 A 
note to the UK Cabinet claimed that the society originated in 1869 and seemed 
in 1885 to have pan-US coverage and about 20,000 members. It appeared to 
have sent £40,000 to the nationalists in Ireland to use for explosives and 
weapons.1269  
A Skirmishing Fund was set up, named after the acts of violence that 
represented a change of tactics for the Fenians.1270 Contributions flowed 
through these clubs in the US and Canada.1271 The British thought it a secret 
organisation, its workings known to only 5% of its members.1272 It supported an 
armed struggle against England for the independence of Ireland. From 
1873-78, a Home Rule League was established in Canada, the Montreal 
branch sending $693 to Dublin in March 1874.1273 In excess of 150 pounds was 
sent in 1875. 
Support in Australasia was mixed, to judge from the reaction to John 
Redmond’s tour in 1883. Redmond was warmly welcomed in Adelaide with 
prominent citizens of Irish birth or descent attending his first meeting.1274 
However, his comparison of what the Irish wanted to the ‘measure of 
self-government’...’which you possess here’1275 quickly aroused anxiety across 
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Australia.1276 Opposition was loud in both the press and the New South Wales 
Assembly and Redmond arrived to his first Sydney engagement finding deep 
division within the City’s Irish population.1277  
News of the murder of Cavendish and Burke in Phoenix Park led to the 
Protestant press branding Redmond’s visit as an attempt to ‘white wash that 
blood stained league.’1278 Sir Henry Parkes, Australia’s Prime Minister wanted 
him expelled.1279 However Redmond avoided extremism.1280 The local Irish 
population, in the form of working men and the lower middle class supported 
him.1281 They turned out in big numbers for the St. Patrick’s day celebrations, 
and Redmond was able to announce that £1,000 had been raised and sent to 
Ireland in the preceding week, and that would be repeated later the same 
week.1282 The visit continued to have mixed support though, with the Catholic 
archbishop of Melbourne wanting nothing to do with him.1283 Recalling the elite 
nature of some of the Scottish Associations, this division of support along class 
lines finds echoes in the Scottish experience. However, the objection based on 
violence had no relevance in the Scottish case. 
In New Zealand, Auckland’s more affluent Irish steered clear, but working class 
support was solid.1284 A tour of the west coast alone raised £1,400, more than 
the £1,000 target for the New Zealand trip. In spite of the mixed reaction, nearly 
£15,000 was raised for the National League in twelve months,1285 and much 
had been done to elevate the National League’s cause to a level of 
respectability in the region.1286 The tour continued to America, where 
Redmond’s welcome was led by the Mayor of Chicago and the Governor of 
Illinois.1287 The two year trip was claimed to have raised £20,000.1288 
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The Irish diaspora in the UK provided considerable support. In 1908, the United 
Irish League, a nationalist organisation, had a Glasgow branch with 2,600 
members. Leeds had 1,800 and London 1,500, with many other branches with 
members numbered in the hundreds.1289 In 1911 Redmond addressed crowds 
of 20-30,000 in Glasgow during a Scottish tour.1290 Sinn Fein’s popularity was 
greater in Scotland than in any other part of the Irish Diaspora.1291 Glasgow 
alone had 4,000 IRA volunteers, and there was an arms gathering network for 
trafficking arms out of the Clyde in most of the towns of central Scotland.1292 
High numbers of members would have meant high contributions, in the sense 
of both financial aid and participation. It was clear that the Irish nationalist 
cause had considerable support from its diaspora. 
Summary 
This chapter began to analyse why the Scottish diaspora failed to win 
meaningful support from the millions of Scots overseas. Two hypotheses have 
been presented. Firstly, that the nature of the engagement of nationalism with 
the diaspora was sporadic and amateurish. Secondly that the nature and size of 
the associational groups that dominated the visible Scottish diaspora meant 
they acted as gatekeepers to determine its response to nationalism, and did not 
represent the greater part of those Scots abroad. The case presented is that 
these factors were factors in the failure of the diaspora to support Scottish 
Nationalism. A brief case study of Irish success stands in contrast but without 
analysis of causation.  
Indeed, the success of other causes to mobilise the diaspora engagement 
provided encouragement to the Scots to continue trying. Norman Allen, SNPA 
activist in Canada, wrote what he thought was the reason he should persist: 
‘Perhaps the world would think it strange if there were no organised 
support overseas for the SNP and might deem that this omission cast 
doubt about the validity of the Scottish national identity’1293 
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The next chapter probes into why some diasporas may find it easier to engage 
in the nationalist projects of their homelands than others. It also investigates 
further reasons given for success or failure. The first of these is that it was 
understood by some in the movement that success at home would promote 
success abroad. Thompson said after his visit to North America: 
‘The measure of support you will obtain from him (the Scot in Canada 
and the US) will be directly proportional to the results you achieve 
yourselves in Scotland.’1294 
The truth of this will be explored in the next chapter. Also considered will be the 
use of soft power by non-state actors such as diaspora. These issues will be 
presented alongside further context and discussion of the cause of the Scottish 
self-government movements’ failure to exploit its diaspora in pursuit of its goal. 
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Chapter Seven: Context, Comparison and Discussion 
 
This thesis has provided a longitudinal study of the history of the involvement of 
the Scottish diaspora in the various nationalist projects of its homeland. That 
the diaspora was formed as a result of a significant migration over two centuries 
was described in chapter two. A later part of that chapter was concerned with 
the formation of diasporas and typologies were compiled to illustrate that, 
amongst other factors, the characteristics of a diaspora could be affected by its 
origins and the nature of its migration. This chapter will provide some historical 
context for the emigration. It will then examine a phenomenon of diaspora 
development, assimilation. A theoretical discussion of the nature of assimilation 
and the effects on an emerging diaspora will be followed by case studies from 
the experience of the Scots, Irish and Norwegians, introducing the concept of 
visible and invisible diasporas. The impact of the response of the host lands to 
the incomers on their propensity to support nationalist projects at home will be 
examined. Chapter two demonstrated that the nature of the dispersal of a 
diaspora could affect its characteristics in development. The issue of dispersal 
and how that affected the propensity of both Scots and Irish to support their 
nationalist causes will be examined. 
The nature of Scottish nationalism receives attention in this chapter, to test how 
this may have impacted the response of the diaspora. Recalling the assertion of 
Thompson that success for the Scottish nationalists abroad depended upon 
success at home, some qualitative indicators of both are examined to 
determine the validity of this assertion. Finally the chapter further explores the 
nature of soft power and provides an extended interpretation of the case of the 
Irish and Irish-American interventions in the Northern Ireland dispute. In 
contrast with the Irish endeavours, attempts by the Scots to use soft power, and 
the reasons for their failure, are discussed.  
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Scottish Emigration 
The long history of Scottish emigration has been driven by many factors. 
Movement within the same country and emigration to a different country was 
long a feature of Scottish economic and social life. There are references to 
Scots mercenaries being employed by Gaelic Irish kings as early as the 
thirteenth century.1295 These mercenary soldiers bolstered the military 
capabilities of Irish chieftains. Few remained after their service.1296 By the 
sixteenth century, there are records of Scots fighting in Sweden1297 and the Low 
Countries.1298 As economic emigrants, Scots went to England as both unskilled 
workers and professionals. There were estimated to be 7,000 to 11,000 south 
of the border in the middle of the fifteenth century, when England was a hostile 
neighbour.1299 Very few of these became naturalised Englishmen, however.1300 
Estimates for the size of the emigration of the Scots at this time are just that, 
and the safest statement is that a clear pattern of emigration had been set in 
the fifteenth century, with Scots trading and fighting in England and many parts 
of Europe.1301 Changes in destinations became apparent by the early 
seventeenth century, with the Americas beginning to feature for the first time.  
The Union of 1707 was a significant change in Scotland’s governance, yet 
provides no evidence of a large emigration from Scotland. Neither was 
emigration particularly driven by the economic and political difficulties of the last 
ten years of the seventeenth century. The source material is ambiguous1302 but 
one estimate of total emigration in the last half of the eighteenth century was 
that it was 10% higher than for the first half. Of these emigrants, about 80% 
went to Ireland and only about 7% to America. Of those who left, around 50,000 
were driven by the Cromwellian Union and a similar number by the famines of 
the 1690s.1303 The majority could be inferred to be refugees from a difficult 
regime or hunger. Additionally there would have been Jacobite supporters in 
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political exile. The Jacobite emigrants were a conflict-generated emigration, 
which, it has been argued, is a component of diaspora activism in home land 
politics. Not readily recorded as a total but inevitable due to the earlier union of 
crowns and proximity, many would have left for England or joined the English 
Army.1304  
An emigration does not always lead to a diaspora.1305 However, for those who 
settled in North America in the second half of the seventeenth century there is 
evidence of some cohesion through charitable societies and in religion.1306 In 
1657, a Scots charitable society was founded in Boston.1307 However the 
emigration figures reveal that a relatively small number of Scots were in North 
America at the end of this century. 
Free trade between Scotland and England was the most pressing economic 
issue at the beginning of the eighteenth century.1308 The Empire seemed too 
remote, especially after Darien. During the 1680s and early 1690s the Scots 
had profitably traded in North America, albeit illegally.1309 The 1707 Union 
brought the Scots within the ambit of the British Imperial system and provided 
the context for closer association with the American colonies.1310 Scottish 
merchant houses, as an example, began providing indentured servants to 
colonial customers.1311 The evidence is that a steady stream of single men and 
a smaller proportion of women left Scotland for America at this time.1312 
The 1707 settlement which paid compensation for Darien also dissolved the 
Company of Scotland, which traded with Africa and the Indies.1313 Scotland had 
little interest in the Eastern trade at the time of the Union and this would 
continue for some time to come as the (English) East India company kept its 
monopoly and Scots traded in the East as its employees, not as Britons.1314 
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However, it is likely that the 1707 Union will have encouraged and created 
opportunities for Scots in England.1315 Some of the nobility moved south, and 
even before the Union, one in seven Scottish nobles had English wives.1316 
Those with qualifications or a profession were also amongst those leaving for 
England.1317 The numbers of these professionals, the traders and unskilled 
workers who left for England, are still uncertain. The estimated Scottish 
emigration for the eighteenth century ranges from 85,000 to 115,000 for those 
who left in the first half of the century and 77,000 to 127,000 in the second 
half.1318 It is possible that many travelled abroad as militia.1319 Scale has to be 
judged from knowledge of particular episodes, but the trend was for growth 
from one broad period to the next.1320 
From the later eighteenth century, the common source of these movements 
was an increasingly turbulent rural society.1321 However it would be a mistake to 
represent these migrations as an undirected flood of poverty stricken victims of 
agricultural change.1322 Through the greater part of this century, Highland 
society was changing from a patriarchal to a commercial mould.1323 Some 
reasons for the outflow of people from the Highlands were detailed in a report 
about emigration published in 1802.1324 This report listed them as; ‘the 
dissolution of that feudal state in which the proprietors of land, and the people 
thereon were mutually necessary to each other,’ the advent of sheep farming 
and the ‘delusive picture’ of emigration given by agents. 
The 1802 report demonstrated the concern caused at the time by the 
substantial depopulation of the Highlands, a considerable exodus from what 
was already a sparsely populated area.1325 With the increased 
commercialisation of rural spaces, the middlemen, or tacksmen, who had acted 
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as the owner’s agents became vulnerable. They often led a movement of those 
who had been their sub-tenants to settle on undeveloped land in America.1326 
These early emigrants were able to encourage others by both report and letter. 
For example, one states ‘did thousands in Scotland know it they would desire 
banishment (here) never to return’ adding, ‘here each may sit safe and at 
ease’...’indulging himself in the natural bent of his genius.’1327 The early settlers 
would help to provide a more favourable environment to later arrivals,1328 
facilitating the later upsurge in movement. 
In 1773 Duncan MacDonald of Glengary had a ‘difference with his principal 
gentry’ This ultimately led to about 1,000 people leaving Glengary after Duncan 
had reconnoitred the area around Montreal. Each family was settled with 200 
acres.1329 These settlers, who went to Canada in 1773, were able to afford 
some assistance to their family and friends by laying aside some provisions for 
them should they emigrate.1330 This would have been of great assistance as it 
reduced the cost of the outgoing voyage by eliminating the need for emigrants 
to ship enough provisions to survive the first winter. One result of early Scottish 
emigration was to form communities, with a dominant representation of 
Scots.1331 
There was a Highland tradition of military service overseas and many would not 
have returned home for one reason or another. The younger sons of gentlemen 
obtained commissions in the Dutch regiments which at that time were raised in 
Scotland.1332 During the late eighteenth century, many highland regiments were 
raised, the majority of which served in Europe, North America and India. The 
Seven Years’ War provided opportunities for Scots. The Highlander was 
particularly regarded as suitable for service in North America and by spring 
1757 families in the Scottish Highlands who had contributed soldiers to the war 
in America were declaring their intention to emigrate as soon as the fighting 
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ended.1333 Two battalions of ‘emigrant loyalists’ were raised in Nova Scotia by a 
Colonel McLean and a Colonel Nairn for service in the War of 
Independence.1334 It was even possible to be pressed into the Royal Navy 
straight from an emigrant ship without reaching Canada, although in this case 
the men were released after a petition to the Admiral on behalf of the Governor 
of Halifax.1335 Further evidence for this service abroad can be found in a 1796 
petition to the King for pensions for the officers of the late Scots Brigade in the 
service of the Dutch in the Dutch Wars in 1780.1336 The following year, plans 
were submitted for ‘regimenting the Highland Clans’ and raising 16,000 officers 
and men.1337 Scotland was a sufficiently important source of fighting men for 
Britain to reverse the suppression of the clans after the ‘45 rebellion. 
The early Scottish emigration was therefore driven by forces of economic and 
social change that would not have been unique to Scotland. By the end of the 
eighteenth century there would have been many small settlements of Scots in 
North America as the first shoots of the associational culture, alongside the 
letters of settlers, attest.  
The size and nature of the later emigration has been described in detail in 
chapter two and needs no further analysis here. The Scottish movement was a 
small part of a significant European migration phenomenon in this century, with 
over 50 million Europeans going overseas,1338 40 million going to the New 
World between 1850 and 1913.1339 Studies of this European emigration have 
revealed some general causes of this great exodus. Cheap long distance travel 
coincided with the availability of unsettled land. As an example, in 1881 
America had 1.8 billion acres of public land, of which 752 million acres had 
been surveyed and was available to settle.1340 This land could supply world 
food and commodity markets.1341 Rates of natural population increase and 
income gaps between home and overseas destinations were important factors, 
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whilst industrialisation made a modest contribution. The Scottish response to 
the global economic environment described above was significant for Scotland 
and led to the formation of what is known as the Scottish diaspora. 
Diaspora Assimilation: Effect on Support for Nationalism at 
Home 
A decision was made early on in the research to use other diasporas for 
comparison purposes. The Irish and Norwegians were selected. Table XII tries 
to simplify the demands a nationalist movement may have of its diaspora; 
physical evidence of assistance such as funds to buy guns or influence, 
soldiers to fight or influence on host land polities to support the nationalist 
projects at home. Recall, four elements were identified that would support 
pressure groups and political parties. Money was ubiquitous, followed by the 
sort of influence that would promote the use of soft power. Next, people 
returning from the diaspora for grassroots campaigning or fighting in the home 
land, and finally arms to provide hard power. 
Table XII: Enablers Identified for Diaspora Assistance to Homeland 
Nationalist Causes 
 Scotland Ireland  Norway 
Money     X 
Influence       
Returnees       
Arms X   X 
Sources: Derived in part from table I. 
The table illustrates the universality of these factors, but also highlights two 
anomalies; the Scots and Norwegian nationalist endeavours were non-violent 
and the Norwegians did not call for funds from the diaspora. The argument 
moves now to a deeper description and understanding of the assimilation of the 
diasporas and how that may have affected their response to nationalism at 
home. In the case of Scotland and Ireland, the nature of their dispersal, earlier 
examined in chapter two, receives some further attention. 
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Diasporas operate as ethnic lobbies in liberal host lands.1342 They attach great 
emphasis to kinship identity and have a unique status, being outside the state, 
but in identity, inside the people.1343 With diasporas, identity matters. However, 
whereas diasporas and emigration have received their due investigation by this 
thesis, this area, has not been explored, for reasons of space and direction. 
The question of identity has been shunned, save from the issue of assimilation, 
to avoid the additional layer of complexity it adds. To give an example of this, 
the issue of the Highland Games in the US will suffice. These events seem on 
the surface to affirm a Scottish identity. However it is an identity fixed in the 
past, in a pre-industrial Scotland not in a real world Scotland.1344 It has been 
shown that the Caledonian Clubs’ objectives usually focussed on preserving the 
past, in culture or dress. It has also been shown that emigrants can chose their 
own romanticised past rather than a factual one.1345  
Claude Wilson in North America wrote to Muirhead in 1933 that ‘the cause’ gets 
occasional mention in the San Diego papers but ‘with the gradual passing of 
our connections with the old country we see fewer home papers.’1346  Claude 
was referring to a symptom of the phenomenon of assimilation. At its simplest 
level assimilation refers to the absorption and integration of people ideas or 
culture into a wider society or culture.1347 In migration studies, this usually 
makes the assumption that there is a ‘dominant’ group or norm to which a given 
ethnic group is assimilating.1348  
The term ‘acculturation’ has also been used, sometimes to mean the same 
thing as assimilation. This describes the phenomena which result when groups 
of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first hand contact, 
resulting in changes to the original cultural patterns of either or both groups.1349 
This notion supports a development of the definition that distinguishes between 
cultural and structural assimilation. The former includes the acquisition of 
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language, social and ritual characteristics of the host society, whilst still 
maintaining a degree of differentiation. The latter is the large scale involvement 
into the institutions of the host society, including intermarriage and the 
disappearance of particularism.1350 It is possible to identify stages in this 
assimilation process which provide more granularity. These are summarised in 
Table XIII below, derived from studies of immigrants to America. 
Table XIII Assimilation Variables  
Sub-process  Type of Assimilation 
Change of cultural patterns to those of the host society Cultural or behavioural 
Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions 
of the host society 
Structural  
Large scale intermarriage Marital 
Development of a sense of peoplehood based 
exclusively on the host society 
Identificational 
Absence of prejudice Attitude receptional  
Absence of discrimination Behaviour receptional  
Absence of value and power conflict Civic  
Reproduced from Gordon, 1964, p. 71 
These types of assimilation quickly coalesce into two distinctive groups, culture 
and society, which serve as a useful distinction, as cultural assimilation (or 
acculturisation) can be performed by the immigrant ethnic, but assimilation into 
society can only be done with the permission of the core group. For this reason 
the former is usually faster than the latter.1351 This deconstruction of 
assimilation begs an all-important question, that of identifying the ‘host society.’ 
There is no intention here to write a comprehensive analysis of these 
phenomena, merely to draw upon the discourse to illustrate the characteristics 
of the diasporas under scrutiny. It is useful therefore to look at studies of 
assimilation in relevant countries, for example America. Here there is some 
agreement that the host society, the ‘core group,’ of the Scottish diaspora in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a white Protestant one at any social 
level.1352   
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This could lead to a presumption that the stages of assimilation would be easier 
for the Scottish emigrant to America as they were in the main Protestant and 
almost exclusively white. However successful adaptation was not easy and the 
immigrant depended more upon living in an immigrant group than on 
participating in American life, particularly for agricultural workers.1353 Industrial 
workers welcomed the atmosphere of social equality they found in America.1354 
It is clear, however, that not all immigrants are assimilated to the same degree, 
if at all. This pluralism1355 or multiculturalism1356 can, like assimilation, mean 
many things; a set of institutional accommodations, the objectives of a political 
movement or the multiculturalism through which black and other ethnic 
minorities in the US have called for greater or separate recognition.1357 It is 
tempting to see the pluralist and assimilationist views as bipolar. However, the 
study of diaspora assimilation is longitudinal and the study of new immigrations 
into the early colonial host lands will probably find a mix of relatively rapid 
acculturisation with slow assimilation.1358 
This process should be by no means taken for granted. Host land states could 
manage relationships with foreign immigrants in one of three ways. Firstly, by 
maintaining and enforcing pluralism. If the Chinese in Malaysia converted to 
Islam and absorbed into the community, they would still not have the same 
rights as ethnic Malays.1359 Secondly, governments could react by promoting 
and rewarding integration or thirdly by tolerating pluralism and respecting 
diversity.1360  A proportion of most diasporas becomes, through intermarriage 
and through social, political and lingual integration, identifiable more readily with 
its host land populous than that of its home lands. The phenomenon of 
assimilation affected the Scottish and comparison diasporas. The selected 
diaspora are now discussed below to assess the impact it had on the support 
for home rule and nationalist movements.   
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Scotland 
The Scottish diaspora was subject to assimilation. What matters here is 
whether degrees of assimilation and acculturation affected the propensity to 
support home land nationalism. The Scots were emigrating over all of the 
period from 1885 to 1979. Therefore there was at all times a tranche of new 
arrivals, which might offer more radical support to nationalist projects at home.  
Set against this ‘latest arrivals’ scenario there is the ‘third generation’ theory. 
This holds that the ethnicity of the first generation gives way to an acculturated 
second generation, but that the third could return to an interest in the home 
land. Recall that remittances for certain reasons, for example to assist family 
left behind to migrate, are likely to be the province of first generation diaspora. 
However, it was noted that third generation Irish-Americans were more likely to 
fund a cause like Noraid due to a romanticised longing for the homeland. As 
assimilation progresses so the propensity to support homeland nationalism may 
change.   
The Scottish experience as an eighteenth century American immigrant was 
initially one of unpopularity driven from, amongst other things, the likelihood of 
the Scots being Loyalist at the time of the American War of Independence.1361 
Whilst it is unwise to generalise, the diaspora of the Scots in America had a 
series of different experiences as immigrants. Farmers, artisans and clerical or 
professional arrivals had experiences of a different character. A successful 
economic adaptation was the indispensable basis for an immigrant’s 
adjustment in the US.1362 Money for farms could be saved from employment, 
those with a trade or without could take employment to save.1363 By the middle 
of the nineteenth century, a generally positive stereotype of the Scots abroad in 
the US was emerging, asserting that they were more desirable as American 
citizens than the Irish.1364 The Scots were praised as exemplary citizens.1365 If 
the Scots succeeded in making the economic adjustment to life in the US, then 
few apparent obstacles blocked the social adaptation of these peoples. Fewer 
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difficulties seemed to have presented themselves to these invisible immigrants 
for rapid assimilation into nineteenth century America,1366 and it may not have 
been an exaggeration to claim that ‘no new citizens are more cordially welcome 
to the new republic’1367 than the Scots.  
From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Scots in America were not an 
oppressed group that suffered the kind of discrimination afforded others such 
as Italians or Irish. The Protestant religion and English language of the Scots in 
North America made their assimilation relatively easy. Perhaps as a 
consequence of this, there can be no doubt that Scots in the US were sensitive 
to being accused of being a member of a foreign political party. Donaldson was 
acutely aware of this and this has been reflected earlier.  
This was a continuing theme in the nationalist engagement. In 1931 Donaldson 
wrote to Muirhead to say that the name (at this stage the National Party of 
Scotland) was a problem. He suggested ‘Friends of Scotland’ as an 
alternative.1368 This was still an issue for the party in 1969, when the National 
Organiser wished to go direct to the relevant government department in the 
host country to ensure that membership of the SNP would not threaten the 
supporter’s citizenship.1369 A year later a note to the National Executive 
suggested the need to form a ‘Scottish Independence Society’ to overcome 
fears of US citizens becoming members of a foreign party. Coupled with the 
orientation of the Scots associational groups towards culture and philanthropy 
rather than politics highlighted earlier, this can be seen as a barrier to 
membership and support of a foreign political party. 
The invisible nature of the Scottish diaspora and its generally more comfortable 
position in society may have made contrariness more difficult for them to 
contemplate. This in turn may have led to a reluctance to support ‘old country’ 
politics. The Scots diaspora, invisible as it has been described,1370 did not in 
general have the same difficulties as that of the Irish, detailed below, and had 
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no need of supporting its nationalist causes to strengthen its cohesion in 
America.   
Previous analysis has emphasised the nature of the dispersal of a diaspora as 
being important to its characteristics. There was a difference in the support for 
nationalism in the lands from which the streams of emigrants entering the 
diaspora came. There was no support in depth for the first SHRA in Scotland 
itself. Both it and the League after it were elite organisations unable to find 
significant indigenous support. Membership numbers shown later in this chapter 
show it was not until 1927 that membership of the second SHRA rose above 
3,000. Therefore in all probability those leaving for America and elsewhere 
would not have been aware of the movement. This contrasts with the Irish 
situation.  It is useful here to recap what is known about these two similar 
diasporas. Both dispersals were significant and largely voluntary but with 
undertones of exile and hardship from famine and clearances. Both 
demonstrated boundary maintenance and homeland orientation. Both inhabited 
similar destinations, albeit the Irish were concentrated in the US. Neither had a 
significant return movement but they were similar in that the Scots had their 
roots tourism and the Irish their emotional loss of home. What was different was 
the nationalist support in the regions from which the Irish in the main came and 
the treatment they received in the host countries.  
Ireland 
For different peoples, the same host land could react with different responses. 
The attitudes of Americans to the arrival of large numbers of poverty stricken 
Irish Catholics in the slums of Eastern cities were characterised by fears of 
Popery and Rome.1371 This reflected the earlier reaction of the nervously 
Protestant seventeenth century England which had constructed a legislative 
framework that had confined Catholics and their civil rights, excluding them 
from national and local government and the Army. These laws were harsher still 
in Ireland.1372 However, by the time of the major Irish and English emigrations of 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Catholics found a more relaxed 
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regime in England. From 1764, they could enlist and by 1793 hold a 
commission. Powerful opposition to the Penal Laws grow from this time, leading 
to the emancipation in 1829.1373 The American reaction could be characterised 
as an exaggeration, all the more so as there were a considerable number of 
Protestants amongst the Irish immigrants.1374 
Although the Protestant Northern Irish were by far and away the most 
numerous emigrants from the British Isles in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, those that left later were predominantly Catholic, and Irish 
speakers.1375 The Irish that emigrated to the US between 1845, the first year of 
the famine, and 1891, the death of Parnell, were prisoners of their own 
poverty.1376 The majority of them, 85%, were living in the cities. They were the 
exploited and proscribed poor, not accepted by the Protestant majority but used 
by it.1377 Irish emigrants interpreted their experiences in ways which were 
distorting and alienating, and sometimes conducive to Irish nationalism.1378 
If the Scots were invisible immigrants, the Irish were more visible. They were 
segregated in slums in the urban centres of the Northeast, cut off 
occupationally and culturally from their Anglo-Saxon neighbours. They 
developed a distinct group consciousness and separate institutional life.1379 
There were fears mid-century that the Irish immigrants would prove to be an 
unassailable proletariat.1380 However, after 1880, new immigrant Irish were 
joining a largely American born Irish-American society that showed signs of 
increasing affluence.1381 The image of the homesick Irish emigrant in 
English-imposed exile would be easier to dismiss if the emigrants themselves 
had not deployed it so readily.1382 This self-image, powerful in rendering 
homeland orientation, is not however, the whole story. Although many regarded 
themselves as exiles, or as acutely homesick, this standard nationalist 
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explanation for their self-image does not reflect the whole reality.1383 Recall that 
many left voluntarily to better themselves.  
Their homeland orientation was demonstrated not only by the characteristic 
homesickness for which there is much literary evidence,1384 but also their 
support for the cause of Irish nationalism,1385 which was at least partly a 
function of their having derived from the more intensely nationalistic parts of 
Ireland.1386 In a powerful expression of this, Patrick Ford, child immigrant who 
became editor of the radical US Irish organ, Irish World,  came to see himself 
as the victim of poverty and enslavement that gripped Ireland and considered it 
‘necessary for everyone of Irish blood to do all in his power to change that state 
of things.’1387 
The boundary maintenance of the Scots was revealed by their cultural and 
associational activities in host lands in their continued ‘Scottishness’ abroad. So 
too with the Irish, particularly in the US. There were mutual aid and other, open, 
Irish associations similar to the Scots’ St. Andrew’s Societies, such as the Irish 
Catholic Benevolent Union, and secret societies such as the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians (AOH). Since its founding in the 1970s, the American Ireland Fund 
and its international associates has raised hundreds of millions of dollars for 
Irish charitable causes.1388 Thus a tight boundary joined the nationalists at 
home and those abroad in the US. 
Support shown by the Irish diaspora for Irish nationalism was much stronger 
amongst the diaspora in the US than in the British Dominions.1389 The US had 
been through a War of Independence, and had been at war with Britain in 1812. 
Whilst Irish nationalism offended the Anglo-American protestant establishment, 
other ethnic groups were indifferent to, or shared, the anti-British feelings. 
Additionally, most of the emigrants from the Great Famine went to the US, 
taking an anti-British grudge with them. Many came from the south and east of 
Ireland where pronounced social and economic changes had been taking place 
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before they left for the US.1390 However, much of the anger that Catholic Irish 
immigrants and their descendants visited on Britain was an emotional reaction 
to the unpleasant experiences and discrimination they found in their new home 
in the US.1391 This generated an ethnic and religious chauvinism as a result of 
the psychological stress of assimilation and the social rejection that the Irish 
suffered.1392 
In the late 1880s an agricultural crisis in the US and the rise of Parnell fuelled a 
significant rise in nationalist support in the country.1393 This support built upon 
earlier cohesion around the Fenian cause after the famine emigrations1394 and 
the American Civil War. A Fenian Society was founded in New York in 1859,1395 
built on a nucleus of organisations such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
from the 1840s.1396 Irish people around the world bought the Fenian 
newspaper, The Irish People.1397 The most distinctive institutions were primarily 
the Fenian organisations Clan na Gael and the Irish National Land League of 
the US.1398 Clan na Gael was to become the most powerful Irish revolutionary 
body in the US at this time as it supported the Land League’s campaigns for 
tenant proprietorship in Ireland.1399 
Arguments put forward in chapter two supported the view that a diaspora 
generated by a conflict in the home land was likely to support nationalist 
projects there. Conflict-generated diasporas living in liberal states channel the 
sovereignty-based claims of their original home lands through state-based and 
transnational means.1400 It has already been concluded that there was no 
conflict-generated Scottish diaspora beyond that of the Jacobites. The powerful 
nationalism of the Irish diaspora provides a temptation to regard it as being at 
least in part driven by a conflict-generated dispersal. The Irish nationalist 
revolution and civil war, 1919-23 undoubtedly led to a surge in emigration from 
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the new country. Although the absence of a 1921 census makes emigration 
numbers difficult to obtain for this period, they are estimated to have numbered 
around 167,000 in the period 1911-1923. Although there were Catholics in this 
cohort, there were over 100,000 Protestants. These left for Great Britain and 
North America.1401 The Protestants would have made unlikely nationalist 
supporters in their host lands. Additionally, the nature of support must have 
changed as the nationalists had partly achieved their objectives. 
The only other armed conflicts in Ireland in the twentieth century were the 
Easter Rising, and the ‘Troubles’ of the late 1960s onwards in Northern Ireland. 
Although the threat of Home Rule in Ireland in 1912 saw the founding of 
Protestant Northern Irish volunteer forces and Southern Irish responses to this, 
there was no armed conflict then. The romantic myth of exile has already been 
described and so has the fact that although many left due to the mid-nineteenth 
century famines, millions more left voluntarily. The Irish consistently regarded 
emigration as an exile, although with varying degrees of intensity and 
sincerity.1402 There was, in short, no conflict-generated diaspora to strengthen 
the likelihood of Irish diaspora support for nationalism during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. This makes the absence of such an element in the 
Scottish diaspora less likely to explain the absence of significant interest in 
home grown nationalism.  
There has already been comment that their dispersal affected the nationalist 
support of the Irish in the US. Many migrants were from areas of Ireland strong 
in nationalist support. Support was much stronger, not only in Ireland but in the 
diaspora in England and Scotland, where branches of the United Irish League 
had 2,600 members in Glasgow alone in 1908,1403 as many as the SHRA had in 
total in 1925. The Irish diaspora was more nationalist in part because the parts 
of Ireland that were its home were more nationalist. 
By the mid-nineteenth century Irish revolutionaries were well aware of the 
potential of the Irish communities abroad.1404 As a result of the factors outlined 
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earlier, there was a large population in the US that was predisposed to support 
any Irish nationalist movement that offered the prospect of success.1405 A 
‘Fenian Fair’ in Chicago in 1863 raised $50,000 for the cause.1406 The success 
of the Irish in mobilising cash and support from its diaspora can be seen in the 
example of John Redmond’s tour of Australasia and that of the fund raising 
success of Noraid highlighted earlier. Successful fundraisers even carried out 
paramilitary acts with Skirmishing groups.1407 These groups operated secretly in 
the US. They were not political parties, they were more akin to terrorist funding 
organisations.  
Irish-American nationalism was a response to their needs in a land in which for 
the most part they were amongst the lowest social and economic strata,1408 
taking the form of open institutions like the Irish Catholic Benevolent Fund and 
secret societies such as the freemason-like AOH. Whereas the ostensible 
function of Irish nationalism in America was to help Ireland gain 
self-government, its hidden purpose was to enable the immigrant Irish to gain a 
self-respecting place in American life and was the most effective way open to 
them to help their morale.1409 Even though after the 1880s the Irish generations 
were becoming wealthier, the new arrivals still fed the ghettos1410 and the 
working class dominated nationalist societies. 
Recall from chapter one, one of the characteristics of nationalism was 
conformity of actions to interests, as the coincidence of birth could not be strong 
enough alone to ensure coordinated activity. What was at work with the Irish in 
America was this matter of interests. It was in the interests of the 
Irish-Americans to support Irish nationalism because it would, as Michael Davitt 
wrote in the Irish World, November 13th 1880, ‘help remove the stain of 
degradation from your birth and the Irish Race here in America will get the 
respect you deserve.’1411 
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There can be no question of the support offered to Ireland’s nationalist projects 
at home by the diaspora. With their anti-British sentiments, the nationalism 
extant in their home land and their position of relative subservience in the chief 
host land, Ireland’s diaspora was very different from the Scots.  The 
Irish-Americans were described earlier as the wolfhound of Irish nationalism. 
The suppression by the Fenians of Irish Home Rule organisations, during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, was also noted. It may have been that 
the nature of the Irish diaspora, concentrated at first in urban ghettos, its visible 
nature, may have meant its members were less attached to the social 
structures of the US than were the Scots.  
Norway 
The chief similarities between the Norwegian diaspora and that of the Scots 
were; a large contemporary emigration to the ‘new world’, no conflict generated 
diaspora and although many emigrants returned,1412 there was no return 
movement. There was also the fact that the home country was in a Union with 
another state, Sweden. The differences were that Norway was a predominantly 
rural state at the start of the emigration and Scotland was industrialised, there 
was no tragic element of dispersal and that there was no nationalist movement 
in Norway.  
Extending this comparison to include factors from the analysis of the Irish 
diaspora above, whilst the Norwegians went to the US with a foreign language 
they were predominantly Protestant. They established schools, churches and 
Norwegian-American newspapers.1413 They formed associations like the Irish 
and Scots, but like the Scottish examples these were predominantly cultural 
and philanthropic groups. By the 1890s, Norwegian-Americans began to raise 
their interest as voters which soon matched that of other Americans.1414  
It has been demonstrated that one of the conditions which encouraged the Irish 
in America to support nationalism at home, that of emigration from regions of 
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nationalist support, could not apply in the Norwegian case as, although the 
Union was not popular, the active opposition was parliamentary in nature. 
However, the Norwegian-Americans did take an interest in the pressure for 
separation at home, due to a natural interest in activities in their home lands. By 
1905, the Union issue had become a public affair in New York, Chicago, 
Minneapolis, Seattle and the Mid-West.1415 Norwegian newspapers like 
Busstikken and Norden hailed the movement toward parliamentary 
self-government in Norway and both editors spoke for a growing number of 
Norwegian-Americans.1416 However, prior to the crisis in 1905, Norwegians in 
the US exerted no significant pressure upon the US government for their 
cause.1417 In point of fact, recall that Senator Knute Nelson, the leading 
Norwegian-American politician of that time opposed the dissolution of the Union 
until it became inevitable.1418  
It can be seen that the Norwegian diaspora, irrespective of its inclinations, had 
a reduced opportunity to engage, although as has been demonstrated earlier 
that there was some contribution. However although the diaspora had little 
impact there was a level of engagement with the subject by the diaspora in 
America. In the Scots case there was little of this.  
This review of the comparison diasporas has highlighted that the nature of the 
assimilation of a diaspora into the host country can affect its characteristics. 
The Irish case demonstrated most similarities to the Scottish situation, and yet 
the response of the diaspora to nationalism in Ireland was quite different. The 
visible, initially poor, Catholic Irish immigrants found that serving Irish 
nationalism also served their interests. For the invisible, more assimilated and 
welcome Scot, interests were not best served by adherence to old country 
politics. 
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Nationalism in Scotland 
The issue of the nature of Scottish nationalism during the period under review 
has not been explored yet and this will discussed next. It is not unreasonable to 
examine this in an enquiry that asks why something Scottish did not appeal to 
large groups of emigrants who otherwise celebrated much that was. 
‘for the SNP  it (Bannockburn) represents a long and unfinished history of 
Scots trying to define themselves politically; for heritage, the frequent 
reference by most clan societies to Bannockburn asserts the family’s 
participation in a legacy removed from contemporary images of cultural 
and political resistance.’1419 
Ironically, one of the more mobile populations on earth appears to have 
developed the most home-bound nostalgic ideology.1420  
The Act of Union in 1707 created something called Great Britain. This was a 
union of policy rather than affection and the reasons for it and the process of its 
negotiation have been described in detail. The progress of the Union was 
marked by ambiguity and reluctance on both sides of the border; those Scots 
wealthy or ambitious were torn between the loss of the ancient state and the 
opportunities provided by the wider stage now provided to them. The English 
were torn by the affront to older English identities and resentful of sharing 
opportunity with the poor neighbour, but keenly balanced this with fear of a 
Catholic succession. Over the early years of the Union the fear of more 
invasions like the ’15 and ’45 provided further encouragement to make it 
work.1421 The new British identity was not easily grasped by either the English 
or the Irish, who later seceded.1422 The Anglo-Scottish union failed to produce a 
comprehensive British identity, only one of which is Anglo-British, dependent on 
the evolving constitutional solution of the Crown in Parliament.1423 
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It has been argued that Scottish identity was substituted by the end of the 
eighteenth century by a sort of Britishness.1424 An alternative view is that 
nationalism as it emerged in the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
was a response to the spread of capitalism creating unequal societies. These 
societies responded to the inevitable imperialist colonisation with locally based 
popular struggle; nationalism.1425 Scotland’s early onset into the industrial 
revolution preceded this and so it did not develop nationalism in the same way 
as Greeks, Czechs, Polish and Slavic states. It never developed a nationalism 
contemporary to these, so the argument goes, because the Scottish 
bourgeoisie did not need nationalism to achieve their economic purpose.1426 
Scotland was not unique in this, Western Europe has experienced the demise 
of many historical nationalities; Burgundia, Aragon, Galicia and Etruria to name 
but a few.1427 What was different about Scotland, is that this occurred in the 
eighteenth century not the Middle Ages.1428 The Scots therefore, despite lacking 
full political autonomy, missed out on the development of a full blown ‘romantic’ 
nationalism.1429  
Scotland’s weak response at the time of the nationalist surges in Europe has 
also been attributed to a failure of Scots politicians to sustain themselves in the 
face of the overwhelming power of the English Whig tradition into which they 
were absorbed. History too, became irrelevant to political discourse after the 
fading of the Jacobite threat.1430  
This ‘weak’ nationalism had alternative explanations. Rather than the 
Anglo-British identity inferred by the explanations above, the weak Scottish 
nationalism could be accounted for by the paradox that Scotland’s nationalism 
was already enshrined in the Act of Union and that late nineteenth century 
home rule activity was focussed on returning Scotland to its position of equality 
in it. The second sentence of Dr Clarke’s opening speech on the first motion on 
Home Rule for Scotland Bill ever to be raised in Parliament begins: ‘I have no 
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desire to repeal the Union between England and Scotland, and I think that 
Union has been mutually beneficial-a good thing for Scotland, but a better thing 
for England.’1431 He goes on; ‘the main practical ground on which I urge this 
Motion is that Scotch business is neglected.’1432 He lists police, public health 
and education as areas of public policy that had suffered because legislation 
has not been attended to.1433 Scottish nationalism in the nineteenth century 
was, this accounting proceeds, challenging England’s failure to preserve the 
independence of Scottish institutions guaranteed in the union.1434  
This weak nationalism, or cultural sub-nationalism1435 has, it has been argued, 
been superseded by a neo-nationalism1436 ignited by the discovery of oil and 
the nationalist’s campaigning response to this.1437 This occurred during the 
decline of the United Kingdom in the post-World War Two environment of the 
dissolution of the Empire.1438 This neo-nationalism is seen as a response to the 
age of the multi-national and the internationalisation of capital. The relative 
depravation flowing from these realities generates a response through the new 
nationalism, aided by a weakening political system in the UK.1439 
At the time of this suggested fracture in the nature of nationalism in Scotland, 
the organisational embodiment of its aspirations was the SNP. Whilst it can be 
recalled it began to achieve political success in the 1960s, the SNP began the 
1970s with a brief decline.1440 The rise and fall of its share of the popular vote in 
the 1970s has been described. The rise of the party’s electoral fortunes 
seemed to be a result of more successful organisation, fundraising and a shift 
to the left,1441 in other words transactional causes rather than systemic. There 
followed many years of decline in the party’s fortunes, outside of the chronology 
of this study, but it seems that the tectonic shift identified from the globalisation 
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of capital and the intrusion of multinationals into the Scottish political economy 
were not obviously at work. What remains unanswered here is whether the 
‘weak’ nationalism was a cause of the diaspora’s indifference.  
This more systemic rather than transactional view of Scottish nationalism leads 
this enquiry to the question of whether this shift between a cultural 
sub-nationalism to neo-nationalism affected the response of the diaspora. It has 
been argued that the major communications channel to the Scot abroad was 
through the associations. These have been characterised as ‘British’ and elite, 
so could be regarded as likely to respond poorly to a call to amend an 
arrangement that had suited the Scottish elite well in their colonising of the 
Empire.  
As evidence, here are two examples from London of the opposition or 
indifference of the associational Scot in the diaspora. The following cutting from 
1929 recalls this theme; 
‘The Scottish Clans association which has a membership of 1,500, has 
snubbed the Scottish National League London branch by refusing to 
insert a paid notice about it in the souvenir of its Burns Concert in the 
Albert Hall.’1442 
A Scottish Clans Association annual dinner in London was attended by 350 and 
addressed by Lord Meston, as Ramsay MacDonald was unwell. Meston made 
mention of the home rule issue, saying that it was ‘swollen into something more 
serious’ and the ills of Scotland did not need to end the Treaty of Union to be 
fixed.1443 
Recall the earlier assertion that not all migrations lead to a diaspora. They may 
instead lead to an ethnic community. As with diasporas, these will mark and 
maintain symbolic boundaries and preserve a collective identity. However, they 
differ from diasporas in that the latter maintain a connection with the home land 
and its kin communities in other states at an institutional not individual level. In 
ethnic communities this is weak and intermittent.1444 It may be argued that in 
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this context, the Scots abroad were acting more as an ethnic community than a 
diaspora. The Scottishness of the associational culture could be seen as a 
Scottish heritage identity that links not with modern Scotland but with ‘auld 
Scotia’ and the commodities of early Scottish life.1445 
Success in Scotland Brings Support from the Diaspora 
The first SHRA aimed to publish propaganda and convene public meetings with 
the aim of garnering the support of the MPs already representing Scots in 
Westminster. Its success could be judged by laws passed in Parliament to bring 
self-government to Scotland. Although by 1908 most Scottish MPs who voted 
on Scottish home rule motions were voting in favour,1446 the organisation itself 
had little impact1447 and received no more than token overseas support in 
return.  
The success or otherwise of the 1919 movement can be judged in the early 
years by the same measures as above, and by membership. From the 
beginnings of the movement as a political party, membership, branch numbers 
and electoral success were the yardsticks of progress. The first two would 
demonstrate the level of individual and institutional support for nationalism, the 
third its progress in gaining representatives in the only body which could help it 
achieve its aims, the Westminster Parliament. Chapter four dealt at length with 
the correspondence and travel between Scots in the diaspora and officials of 
the second SHRA. Membership records for the period from foundation to the 
time of the visit of Thompson to North America, shown here in table XIV, show 
a growing organisation. 
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Table XIV. SHRA/NPS Membership, 1919-32  
Year Members 
Affiliated 
organisations 
District 
secretaries 
English 
secretaries 
Foreign 
secretaries 
Foreign 
branches 
1919 327 81     
1920 1,115 138     
1921 1,680 213 18    
1922 1,888 220 63    
1923 2,283 227 71 1 2 1 
1924 2,325 300 69 1 3 1 
1925 2,658 326 66 1 5 2 
1926 2,952 333 70 1 6 2 
1927 3,148 335 72 2 7 5 
19321448 8,000      
Source: An undated summary, and additionally notes for the Hon. Secretary’s. Report 14th April 
1927 in Acc. 3721/42/35; NPS data from Lynch, 2002, p.39 
Although the organisation grew during the period its membership was tiny 
compared to the population at the time, growing from 0.034% in the census 
year of 1921 to 0.16% the year after the 1931 census. Thompson’s assertion 
that success abroad would come with success at home is supported by the low 
number of foreign secretaries at this time of poor support in Scotland. Chapter 
four charts how the failure to succeed drove a change in the nature of the 
organisation, from pressure group to political party and it was as the SNP that 
the nationalist movement bridged the years of the Second World War.  
This was a time of correspondence with the diaspora by Muirhead, and 
members like Donaldson in the US were organising, drumming up support for 
meetings with Thompson, Muirhead and MacCormick. However, these were 
busy times at home for the SHRA, which in 1919 alone organised 173 meetings 
attended by almost 19,000 people.1449 In 1924 it established the Scottish 
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Convention which met until 1927 with the intention of designing a home rule bill 
that would get support in Scotland and Westminster.1450 Recall the letters 
written to MPs in 1924. Whereas it is clear the diaspora did not respond to the 
SHRA, so it is also possible that the SHRA had other priorities. The 
Convention’s third session in 1927 had 116 attendees from Town and Parish 
councils, Co-operative movements, Guilds, Unions and MPs. Additionally, 12 
MPs declined their invitations. All appeared to have been invited individually by 
Muirhead.1451 
After an immediate post war period where the SNP continued to be a tiny 
organisation, the 1960s saw it ‘transformed to a mass political party in a matter 
of a few years.’1452 By 1968 the party had 125,000 members,1453 or 2.4% of the 
population based on the 1971 census. It fielded candidates in 65 out of 71 
Scottish constituencies in the 1970 general election. This success in 
membership was reflected in electoral results, as is demonstrated by table XV 
below. 
Table XV; UK General Election Results for Scotland – SNP % of votes 
cast, 1945-79 
Year 1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 
 Vote 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.4 5 11.4 21.9 30.4 17.3 
Seats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 11 2 
Source: Lynch 2002 p.16 
Another indication of SNP success was the increase in the number of branches, 
reflected in table XVI below. 
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Table XVI; SNP Branches 1960-69 
Year Number of 
branches 
1960 23 
1965 140 
1967 333 
1968 484 
1969 499 
Source: Lynch, 2002, p.100; Acc. 6038/7 Minutes of the Organisation Committee 16th 
November 1968; Acc. 6038/8 Minutes of the Organisation Committee 22nd March 1969. 
Yet at this time of significant growth, overseas members were only around 
200,1454 with a further 250 in England and Wales in 1969.1455  During 1964 there 
was a significant re-organisation of the party, and still some considerable 
disagreement as to how the party should proceed. At one point, Arthur 
Donaldson effectively resigned by leaving the chair vacant at an NEC 
meeting.1456 This may explain a lack of attention to the diaspora. Recall also, 
the party’s priority was winning elections 
In October 1976 the SNP founded the SNPA to bring together all overseas 
branches.1457 Clearly there was some expectation that the diaspora would 
deliver something to the SNP. The failure of this organisation has been 
described in detail. By 1977, there were estimated to be only about 700 
members not based in Scotland.1458 In the case of the Scots abroad it is 
reasonable to conclude that in the time frame examined, success at home had 
no impact upon support from abroad. Equally, that success was a drain on 
resources and focus. Success abroad was not a priority.  
 
 
                                                          
1454 34th Annual conference, 31st May 1968, Reports of office bearers. 
1455 Author’s estimate, see chapter four 
1456 Wilson, 2009, p.12. 
1457 34th Annual conference, 31st May 1968, Reports of office bearers 
1458 See chapter four 
232 
 
Soft Power and the Promotion of Nationalism 
Soft power is important in any analysis of the actions of a pressure group 
because in the absence of violence the application of soft power is an important 
way the group can achieve its objectives. Just as with interstate relations, soft 
power in intrastate dynamics is less visible than hard power and is 
characterised by the ability to influence others to set a given agenda rather than 
use threat or coercion.1459 The application of soft power has been described in 
chapter four. The argument was that it appeared to depend upon influencing 
another actor to accept a particular argument. Resources for that influence 
were culture, values and policies. The difficulty with this paradigm in assessing 
the engagement of the movement with the Scots in diaspora is that the SHRA 
and nationalist movements were non-state actors, as were the Irish until 1921. 
The argument presented the position that the original conditions for soft power 
to be effective were in fact flawed and hard power was needed as a fall back to 
make it effective.  The example of the Irish success given is not directly 
comparable to the Scots’ position. The Irish were a state actor at that time, 
even if the PIRA were not. Also the absence of violence in the Scots efforts was 
arguably a metaphor for the lack of hard power.  
The introduction noted that the soft power paradigm was devised with interstate 
relations in mind. It was demonstrated that soft power flows from one actor 
influencing another to do its bidding using resources such as culture, values 
and policies to bring this about. Whilst accepting that there may be alternative 
concepts of power,1460 Cochrane extends the soft power model to intrastate 
relations.1461 As pressure groups can only work with soft power, influencing 
legislators, this appears a reasonable position to take. Diasporas are complex 
constructs that must distinguish between the membership of a trans-state 
community and the rights and duties of the legal construct of citizenship of the 
host state.1462 
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To add to this complexity, the examples used in the present argument do not 
lend themselves to classification in a straightforward way. Firstly, a number of 
different relations can be deconstructed from the Irish-American contribution to 
the Good Friday agreement. Secondly the nature of soft power may have other 
facets not accounted for by an attachment to a given culture or set of values. To 
take the relationships first, these are both intrastate and interstate. 
The relationship between the Irish-Americans and the US policy making elite 
was of an intrastate nature. Part of the reason why US governments have taken 
an interest in Northern Irish politics is the size of Irish America, around 19% of 
the US population at the 1910 census. This had been accompanied by the 
Irish-American civil society formed from associations such as the AOH. From 
time to time, this has provided a shallow interest in Irish issues outwith the 
US.1463 
Additionally, two interstate relationships were in play, that of the US and the UK 
government and the Irish government in the form initially of the Irish 
ambassador to Washington, Sean Donlon. There was also that of the SDLP 
leader John Hume, a UK party leader and the ‘four horsemen’ alluded to earlier. 
They played government roles in their attempts in the early 1970s to take public 
positions opposed to British government policy, including Senate 
resolutions.1464  
As well as this they played roles that placed them as a buffer between the US 
administration and the more radical sections of Irish America.1465 In this latter 
they played a role as intrastate actors. The extent to which the soft power 
model can account for this complexity is doubtful, yet the attitudes of the UK 
government and the US government were altered without apparent hard power 
application. Figure I presents this complexity graphically. 
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Figure I: Graphical Representation of Interactions, Northern Ireland 
‘Troubles’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It has been asserted that Nye’s original concept was flawed as a means of 
explaining international politics because it was not America’s culture or values 
that gained it so many allies1466 in the post war world. Its hegemony rested on 
its military preponderance,1467 or hard power, which cannot be asserted by 
those unable to outgun the hegemon.1468 However, there was a change in the 
application of hard power at the time of the acceleration of the 
internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict, with the involvement of 
President Clinton and the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires. This was that the IRA 
was in a situation of relative failure.1469 This brings with it the likelihood that the 
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soft power approaches, the ‘other means’ referred to by Gerry Adams,1470 were 
only successful because of a change in the hard power configuration. The IRA 
and its provisional wing were being out-killed by the British Army and the 
loyalist paramilitaries. This makes the success of the Irish-American influence 
on the Northern Irish conflict easier to understand alongside the utter failure of 
the contemporary Scottish attempts to use the Americans to influence the UN. 
However, the argument would benefit from further research to prove the link 
between the success of hard power by the Loyalist cause and the success of 
the soft power initiatives.  
Scottish Nationalists and soft power 
The Scottish home rule and nationalist movements attempted to raise their 
agenda formally to an international level on a number of occasions earlier than 
the Scotland-UN events described earlier. This section will deal with three 
occasions where an attempt was made to involve the League of Nations, The 
Commonwealth and the UN. On none of these occasions was the attempt 
supported by an appeal to Scots abroad.  
Firstly, in response to President Wilson’s call in 1918 to support 
self-determination for some nations, specifically Poland and peoples within the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Irish had been at lengths to assert 
their independence of Britain to the French leader at the Treaty negotiations in 
Versailles, evidenced by Eamonn De Valera’s note to the Irish delegation in 
Paris.1471 During the war Irish-American leaders had hoped for a German 
victory to ensure Irish Independence. With the US entry to the war they sought 
to include Ireland in Wilson’s principle of self-determination. However, after the 
Easter rising, US sympathy for the Irish situation waned. Although soft power 
did not aid the Irish this time, it was the violent nature of the nationalists’ project 
that influenced the American policy makers against them. However, the Irish 
diaspora in return failed to support Wilson on the war effort, the Treaty and the 
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League of Nations.1472 There was no such mobilisation of the Scottish vote, 
something which was seen as a positive for them as American citizens.1473 
The Scots also found the League a tempting target for self-expression. Just as 
the Irish had demanded a seat at the League at Geneva, so it was seen in 
some quarters as a gross anomaly that Scotland had no separate voice at this 
table, especially when ‘it is remembered that the political psychology of 
Scotland is so different from that of England.’1474 In 1927, The Scottish National 
Convention would ask the League of Nations ‘to remove the wrongs under 
which Scotland is at present suffering under the existing ‘treaty’ with 
England.’1475 Canada was a non-permanent member of the League council at 
this time, but no effort to engage the Scots diaspora in Canada has been 
revealed by research in the Muirhead and SNP archives.  
The second occasion was after World War Two; this involved requesting the 
help of Commonwealth Prime Ministers as well as the UN. Muirhead wrote to 
five Commonwealth prime ministers, those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This letter asked them to raise the issues 
of self-government for Scotland at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. Other 
than a reference to the fact that their countries were states in which ‘so many 
Scots are happily established,’1476 there is no apparent effort to mobilise the 
diasporas to pressurise local politicians in the way the Irish had done to punish 
Wilson after the establishment of the League of Nations.  
Muirhead wrote to the Secretary-General (S-G) of the newly founded UN 
organisation, asking for it to review the Treaty of Union of 1707 on the grounds 
that England had broken its terms.1477 This was front page news in the Chicago 
Daily Tribune in February 1947. The Tribune wrote to Muirhead asking for a 
comment on the UN’s reply and finally published the news that ‘Scots’ Freedom 
bid to UN fails’ as the UN S-G stated it was not empowered to deal in such 
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1476 Acc. 3721/104/19, letter dated 9th May 1946 
1477 Acc. 3721/36/1207 
237 
 
matters.1478 This was not the end of the SNP’s attempts to use the UN to serve 
their cause. The SNP appealed to 55 members of the new organisation on the 
basis of a claim for sovereign independence on the basis of equality with those 
nations.1479 
Later in 1947, Muirhead drafted a letter to Jan Smutts, PM of South Africa, 
asking that he raise the subject of Scotland having its own seat at the Council 
of Commonwealth Nations during the visit of King George VI. It is not clear if it 
was sent.1480 In 1954, Muirhead wrote to Dag Hammarskjold, S-G of the UN, 
putting the case that Scotland could contribute more to the UN if it had a 
national government of its own. Muirhead’s case centred on the ability of the 
S-G to act on occasion to prevent blood being shed.1481 He wrote in similar 
terms to the Prime Minister of India, cautioning that ignoring Scottish protests 
tends to encourage the use of violent methods. Nehru was attending a 
Commonwealth Conference in London.1482 Muirhead also appealed at a later 
conference for the intervention of John Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of 
Canada.1483 Muirhead’s correspondence of this nature spanned ten years, and 
is pursued through the United Nations Association as well as the UN itself.1484 
Many news clippings and handwritten notes bear witness to his eagerness to 
pursue this line of attack. However letters to the UN and the PMs of Canada 
and South Africa do not invoke the support of the Scottish diaspora in their 
territories, they are a direct request to a national leader to intervene on behalf of 
Scotland. No corresponding communication with the diaspora in the US or 
Canada, such as that evidenced in the 1979 Scotland-UN case, has been 
found.  
Muirhead’s repeated correspondence came at a time when the SNP itself was 
in some sort of decline, with candidates put forward at elections declining from 
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8 in 1945 to 2 in 1955.1485 There was a party split in 1955.1486 Muirhead 
favoured extra-parliamentary tactics at this time and he founded the Scottish 
Congress in 1950 as his term as SNP president expired.1487 This context makes 
the ‘soft power’ approaches better understood as amateurish attempts. That the 
help of the diaspora was not invoked is more easily understood as part of 
Muirhead’s lack, first of resources and later of executive power.     
Summary 
This chapter began with some historical context for the big emigrations of the 
nineteenth century. Although the popular diasporic imagination is dominated by 
a rhetoric of exile, the reality was one of a morally ambiguous history of 
emigration and colonisation.1488 This has displaced the proposition which 
accounts for the vast majority of emigration from Scotland; that is the expansion 
from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial 
ambitions.1489 The nature of assimilation of migrating peoples has been dealt 
with, and how the strength of assimilation affected the nature of the Scots 
abroad. This was contrasted with the experience of the Irish and Norwegians.  
That of the Irish, a visible diaspora with a less successful assimilation provides 
compelling evidence of the reasons for that diaspora’s support for its homeland 
nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century to early twentieth century. In contrast 
to that of the Scots, Irish nationalism helped the Irish define themselves in an 
environment of poverty, suspicion and exploitation. The Scots were a very 
different kind of diaspora, an invisible one, a more welcome one, which 
eventually assimilated well and whose interests lay not in the support of old 
country politics. The paradigms of assimilation have not been a major part of 
this study, but it can be seen from the above that there could be significant 
interest in looking at the effect of assimilation on diaspora support for home 
land causes. 
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The nature of Scottish nationalism has received some attention, identifying its 
late development in European terms, noting the nationalism of the early part of 
the chronology of this thesis was more British, in the sense that the Scottish 
elite could achieve their aims through the Union and had no need of a different 
nationalism. It was noted that the main communication channel to the diaspora, 
the associations, were more British in character and their Scottishness could be 
seen as a heritage identity without modern links.  
The notion that success at home would bring success abroad had been noted 
in earlier chapters. This has been examined with more detail and the evidence 
presented implies that success of the SNP in Scotland did not improve their 
ability to draw support from the diaspora. Finally, the issue of soft power was 
returned to with a further analysis of the Irish-American interest in the Northern 
Ireland ‘Troubles’. The notion that success came without any change in the 
hard power configuration was argued against, making the Scottish failure easier 
to understand. More research here would usefully clarify the impact hard power 
had on those outcomes. Some further Scottish attempts to use soft power 
emphasised the failure of method.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Further Steps 
 
Appeal: to ‘all Scotsmen all over the world’ for funds to enable the 
Association to organise in Scotland. 2nd Annual Conference of the 
SHRA, 25th September 1889.1490 T. Napier. 
(The SNP) ‘is anxious to broadcast its aims in the USA, looking for,’ and 
certain of receiving ‘at least moral support from Scots or those of Scots 
descent.’1491 R. Muirhead. 
There has been an ‘unmistakable increase’ in overseas interest in 
subscriptions to the Scots Independent.1492 SNP 1956 annual 
conference. 
‘It is hoped to cover the world by member’s contacts’ to help build ‘the 
foundations for a future Scots Government’  ‘also help party finance.’ W. 
S. Orr, Overseas Secretary to the Publicity Committee, 1st October 
1967.1493 
These comments, spanning the beginning, middle and end of the time period of 
research, demonstrate the longevity of the ambitions of the nationalist projects 
of Scotland to connect with and exploit the diaspora of the Scots. This final 
chapter of the thesis will summarise the forgoing research under the familiar 
headings; those of emigration and diaspora, associations as gatekeepers and 
the concepts of nationalism and soft power. The theoretical framework outlined 
in chapter one with the main concepts employed are summarised alongside the 
selection of case studies and sources for the research. The activities first of the 
home rule pressure groups in their engagement with the Scots abroad, then of 
the SNP and finally the performance of Scots in the diaspora in Parliament in 
Westminster are examined in three chapters. These are followed by two 
chapters of arguments to explain the position of the diaspora to nationalist 
projects in the Scottish home land. These summaries will use additional, 
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previously unreferenced, primary sources. Finally, further possible research 
projects will be signposted. 
Theoretical Framework, Case Studies and Context 
The framework laid out the key concepts to be employed during the thesis. 
These were; the propensity of diasporas to engage in nationalist projects in the 
home land, the history and nature of the relevant emigrations, nationalism, 
diasporas, soft power and gatekeepers. The analytical strategy was to use 
comparative case studies, one of the basic methods of general empirical 
propositions.1494 Comparison across several countries enables research to 
assess whether a particular phenomenon is simply a local issue or part of a 
broader trend. The issue of many variables and few cases was addressed, and 
the variables selected to identify cases were laid out. They emphasised 
emigration, diaspora formation, union with another state and nationalism at 
home. Table I clearly makes the case for using two of the top three nineteenth 
century European exporters of people; Norway and Ireland.  
The sources for the research have been described in detail, including as they 
do considerable original material as well as the use of secondary sources from 
the discourse for matters such as diaspora and nationalism. Analytic 
descriptions of nationalism, diasporas, soft power and gatekeepers introduced 
the concepts which were deployed to attempt to understand the Scottish 
diaspora’s reaction to nationalism in its home land. These were followed by a 
short history of the Union the nationalists wished to amend or put aside, as well 
as a description of Scottish nationalism itself. The chronology for the period 
studied, from 1885 to 1979 was described and justified. Its beginning anchored 
in the re-establishment of the Scottish Office and the founding of the SHRA, its 
conclusion in the failed referendum on the Scotland Act of 1978.  
Emigration, Diasporas and the Scots 
The study has described the well documented historical emigration of the 
Scots. This emigration was significant in its size relative to the Scottish 
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population; 1.8 million people left in the nineteenth century and around two 
million in the twentieth century. 
Such was the popularity of emigration that on the 150th anniversary of 
the first Scots landing at Pictou in Canada, The President of the 
Highland Association of Canada, visiting Scotland, declared that Nova 
Scotia could take all of the population of the Highlands and this would 
have the benefit of keeping Highlanders together rather than scattered 
across the globe.1495 
This emigration was not exceptional in European terms. It has been shown that 
the emigrations of Norway and Ireland equalled or exceeded the Scottish 
contribution to the great nineteenth century emigrations from Europe. These 
emigrations exploited the coincidence of availability of cheap unsettled land in 
North America, Africa and Australasia with technological improvements which 
resulted in cheap long distance travel. Once exploited, this land could supply 
global food and commodity markets.1496 National labour markets had become 
integrated with the global labour market. Emigration was the result of a stronger 
national supply of labour than demand. Workers moved from economies with 
higher population density to those with lower labour supply. They also moved 
for greater political and religious freedoms.1497 
The emigration is important to the theme of this study because emigration is a 
necessary forerunner of the formation of a diaspora. The size of the emigration 
matters because whilst multitudes do not always make a diaspora, where there 
is a diaspora, a large emigration will contribute to it being large in size. 
Characteristics of diasporas have been studied from the many sources in the 
discourse, distilled to a dispersal, homeland orientation and boundary 
maintenance over time. The characteristics that made the millions of Scots 
abroad into a diaspora included their propensity for homeland orientation, 
demonstrated by attachment to the Kirk and culture to the extent of 
appropriating highland-type symbols and activity irrespective of origin. Likewise 
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their boundary maintenance, evidenced by the associational culture they 
enkindled, is a recognised mark of a diaspora formation. 
 Studies of diaspora also highlight the characteristic of special dispersal, 
perhaps precipitated by disaster, exile or war. The Scots’ dispersal, though 
significant, was in the main a voluntary one. However, there is in literature and 
culture a strong flavour of exile generated by the clearances. This was also true 
of the Irish in America, one of the comparison diasporas. Outside of the 
timeframe of the study but within scope for the purposes of understanding the 
dispersal to the diaspora, the Jacobite exiles must get some consideration. As 
has been highlighted, a conflict generated element to a diaspora can contribute 
to support for nationalist projects or insurrection against the expelling forces in 
the home country. In one other respect the Scots perhaps failed the litmus test 
of diaspora characteristics, that of the lack of a return movement. Whereas for 
some the concept of homeland is elusive,1498 it is at least geographically clear 
for the Scots: there is a place called Scotland.  
Whilst it is true that around a third of emigrants from Scotland returned home, 
there was never a movement to return to the homeland. Notwithstanding, there 
is the phenomenon of ‘roots tourism.’ These are journeys made by people of 
Scottish descent living in those parts of the world where Scots have historically 
settled. They are made to places associated with the traveller’s ancestry. This 
kind of visit has been a key market segment for the Scottish Government’s 
Tourism Strategy,1499 and is an activity which was undertaken during the whole 
time frame of this enquiry. A devolved Scottish government, concerned about 
falling population numbers in Scotland considered returnees from the diaspora 
as one option to explore.1500 Despite contact and attendance at Tartan Day in 
the US, the result was that although the diaspora were happy to indulge in roots 
tourism, they were unlikely to return. This was supported by academic 
research.1501  
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However it is enabled as a mass activity by the Internet and cheap 
intercontinental air travel which post-dates the time period of the enquiry. One 
view is that the discourse of the clearances, including as it does the meanings 
of exile, loss and dislocation is translated for some into a desirable form of 
self-identification. If this is the case, the argument proceeds, then the Scots 
have indeed formed a diaspora despite the voluntary reality of their leaving.1502 
With the exception of Zionism, the role of ‘homeland’ in diasporas has been 
largely symbolic and additionally the definition of diaspora has come to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive.1503 If the characteristics outlined in Table III are 
accepted, then it is certainly possible to posit the existence of a Scottish 
diaspora.1504 
Having determined that the Scots abroad can be analysed as a diaspora, the 
next question addressed was that of the propensity of diaspora to encroach 
upon the activities of territorially bound states. Diasporas are a force in identity 
formation.1505 They reside outside of their kin-state but can in some ways claim 
a stake in it. Many diasporas are deeply involved in the nationalist projects of 
their homelands. Insofar as such projects are usually democratic and 
emancipatory, those in the diaspora can feel free to endorse ethnic and 
exclusionary movements.1506  
Non-state actors do impinge upon the traditional actors on the international 
arena.1507 These include NGOs of many types. Numbered amongst these are 
the world’s diasporas.1508 The many different ways diasporas can obtrude upon 
home and host land affairs have been described. Significantly for analysis of 
the Scottish diaspora, burnished as it has been by popular associational 
culture, diasporas can influence homeland policy and contribute huge sums to 
nationalist projects. The analysis has demonstrated that diasporas do try to 
influence the nationalist projects in their home lands and have many ways to do 
so.  
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Engagement with the Scottish Diaspora 
In chapters three, four and five, the analysis moved to examine the 
engagement of the various actors promoting more Scottish self-government 
and independence with the diaspora and its proclivity to support them. Context 
was provided by an attempt to understand what these organisations expected 
to achieve from their engagement with the Scots Abroad, and this in turn was 
driven by what they needed to do at home to achieve their aims, initially as 
pressure groups and ultimately as a political party. Democracy and 
constitutional change in the home and host states provided an understanding of 
the stages of self-government and independence the host states passed 
through, and the likelihood of the diaspora having the vote at particular stages 
of the chronology.  
The actions of the major home rule and nationalist groups have been examined 
in some detail from original manuscripts; minutes of meetings, reports, notes 
and letters. For the whole of the period under study, outside of the two World 
Wars, there were few periods when the attempts to engage the Scots abroad in 
the activities of the various groups promoting self-government for Scotland 
were interrupted; the early twentieth century, and the period immediately after 
the second World War. Both as pressure groups and as a political party they 
attempted in many ways to contact and gain support of the diaspora; trips to 
North America, dedicated journals, correspondence and organisational change 
all played their part. For many years during the period, senior officials were 
given responsibility to engage the help of the overseas Scot.  
There were, of course, some activists amongst the diaspora or its returnees. R. 
B. Cunninghame Graham, an ex-cattle rancher from Argentina, spoke to an 
early Home Rule Bill whilst an MP and was recruited by Roland Muirhead for 
the second SHRA in 1920.1509 The case of Arthur Donaldson has been covered 
in some detail. Compton Mackenzie, born in West Hartlepool, was a founding 
member of the NPS. John Leng Sturrock , MP for Dundee and supporter of the 
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April 1920 Scottish Home Rule Bill,1510 was born in Hull in Yorkshire. The more 
famous case of Andrew Carnegie was recorded in chapter three.  
In some cases, the emigrants took abroad with them an interest in Scottish 
nationalism. Duncan Mallock in Christchurch, New Zealand was a Young Scot 
supporter of home rule before emigration. He wrote to Muirhead complimenting 
him on his campaign, yet did not appear to have joined Jessie Mackay’s 
Christchurch branch.1511 Mr. Young in Toronto emigrated in 1951 and had 
business interests in Canada, England and Scotland. He wrote in 1969 that he 
was certain that many Canadian Scots would support the cause if they could be 
satisfied that the SNP had reasonable and sensible people. According to a note 
from W. T. Martin, convenor of SNP policy on Finance and Tax, to Donaldson 
and other senior figures, Young was keen to meet senior party officials.1512 This 
individual activity does not obscure the absence of a supporting movement or 
campaign in the diaspora. 
Aspirations by the SNP to engage the diaspora were clearly expressed in 1969 
in a letter to all members headed ‘Recruitment - Overseas Members’ and was 
published by John McAteer, SNP National Organiser. During the May 1969 
SNP 35th conference, reports of office bearers revealed that correspondence 
was carried on with many members and sympathisers all over the world and 
consideration was being given to establishing the role of overseas secretary.1513 
The letter claimed there were members in Australasia, USA, Holland and 
elsewhere and asked members to help in an effort to recruit more. Overseas 
members, it urged, ‘can be of great value to the party.’1514 The letter was sent 
out, as there was a reply found in the same archive. However, even after the 
failure of previous attempts the members were still urged to recruit in the 
Caledonian societies. The letter acknowledged the elite nature of these by 
claiming they needed to be coerced away from their being beholden to ‘the 
hereditary leaders of Scotland who have nothing in common with the ordinary 
Scot’. This latter issue was emphasised by McAteer in a memo to Gordon 
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Wilson a few weeks later. The strategy was to engage through the Scottish 
Societies but to counter the failure of the past, the ‘grip of the establishment on 
the US organisations’ was to be challenged. No remedies were offered.1515  
This letter is quoted because it demonstrates a number of themes of the thesis; 
firstly that the aspiration to target Scots abroad as recruits was still making 
policy as it had been in 1889, 1913, 1939 and 1956. Secondly, that the 
associational groups were consistently used as a channel to generate activism. 
Although Muirhead’s letters to Australian newspapers to promote the second 
SHRA proved an exception to this, they produced little correspondence, as was 
demonstrated earlier. Thirdly, the elite nature of these groups was understood, 
and that this was itself an issue, and finally that the SNP was unable to imagine 
another route to the hearts and wallets of the Scots abroad. As early as 1929, 
Jessie Mackay, correspondence secretary of the Christchurch branch of the 
SHRA summed up this issue quite well in a letter to Muirhead, writing that ‘the 
wealthy Scots stand aloof from us.’1516 
The persistent absence of any appreciation by the nationalist organisations of 
the gatekeeper role of the associational Scot was mirrored by the failure of the 
gatekeepers to stop them trying, despite the class differences Jessie referred 
to. From NcNaught, Colonial Secretary of the SHRA in the 1880s to Spens, 
Convenor of the International Council of the SNPA in the 1970s, activities of 
varying intensity have been described in forgoing chapters. In 1977, 
membership outside Scotland was around 700 in total. All efforts failed to 
generate more than a minor, passing interest with overseas members counted 
in their hundreds whilst Scottish members numbered many thousands.  
It was mainly for money that the home rule and nationalist movements targeted 
their supporters overseas. Remittance contributions have been hard to quantify 
but McNaught’s target of a £100,000 could not have materialised as the SHRA 
was low on funds only a few years later. In the interwar period contributions, as 
recorded in the archives of the second SHRA as well as the later Convention, 
were limited to the low hundreds of pounds. During this period, the Irish 
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nationalist project received considerable support and the evidence produced in 
further chapters demonstrated that the financial and organisational contribution 
of the Irish abroad in this period significantly exceeded that of the Scots, even 
in Scotland itself. 
Norwegian liberation was in 1905, leaving a period of twenty years at the 
beginning of the research timeframe when its diaspora might have engaged 
with the movement to free the country from its union with Sweden. Like the 
Scots and Irish, Norwegian-Americans found it impossible to shed their national 
interest in the problems of their homelands.1517 Nevertheless prior to 1905, 
Norwegians in the US exerted no significant pressure on the US government. 
However, there was pressure after the Union ended for the US to recognise the 
new country. 
This picture continued into the post-World War Two period. In 1969 the 
Kelvingrove Constituency Association placed a resolution before the National 
Council to encourage the emigrant Scot to remit funds.1518 The National 
Treasurer suggested extending the successful ‘1,000’ Club scheme to the one 
thousand or so names on the ‘overseas’ records.1519 This was supported but 
commuted to a pilot scheme. This was not reported in later minutes or records 
so may have foundered.1520 In the 1970s, as at other times,1521 the SNP were 
frequently short of funds. Nevertheless, overseas branches affiliated through 
the SNPA were constitutionally discouraged to raise funds for the party in 
Scotland. As with recruiting, the attempt to generate remittances from the 
diaspora was always under consideration but never well executed. This may 
not only have been a failure of process. There may well have been a successful 
prioritisation of effort which pursued near and present goals in favour of the 
distant and future benefits. 
By contrast, the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland raised hundreds of 
thousands of pounds from organisations like Noraid in the US. The Irish 
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Republicans relied heavily on support from the US and sources claim that 
$3-$5 million dollars were raised.1522 The Irish were also apparently successful 
at the application of soft power in this conflict, to be discussed in more detail 
below. The Scottish attempt at this, the Scotland-UN movement in 1979-80 was 
a complete failure. 
The Diaspora in Westminster 
There were many unsuccessful attempts made in Parliament to legislate for 
self-government for Scotland. Their chronology falls roughly into two parts, 
1889 to 1927 and 1975 to 1978. Chapter five examines the actions of the Scots 
in the English diaspora who served in Parliament in these times. The lack of 
success in the many attempts to bring self-government to Scotland in 
parliament has also been examined. Home Rule Bills were passed by the 
House of Commons on seven occasions between 1885 and 1914.1523 However, 
the status quo remained. It has been argued that the nineteenth century home 
rule activity was focussed on returning Scotland to its position of equality in the 
Union, as it was felt that the Treaty had been broken in some ways.  
A variety of governments were in power on these occasions; Conservative, 
Liberal, Labour and coalitions. The importance of parliamentary activity was 
recognised and results of votes in the Commons were often published by the 
SHRA.1524 The policy of depending upon the existing political parties for 
obtaining self-government was tried for many years and found wanting, hence 
these debates were of vital interest to the home rule promoters and the failure 
of this strategy led to the formation of a political party trying to win seats in 
parliament. The debates in the late 1970s took place at a time when the SNP 
were at a height of success in the polls.  
The actions of the Scots in the diaspora in England and Wales who were in 
Parliament at these times was examined through their speeches in Parliament, 
recognising whilst doing so that these would never be the whole story of a 
Member’s interventions. The early home rule debates were examined through 
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the words of Scots in Parliament. Whilst a majority of those identified supported 
home rule, around half felt that devolution would strengthen the UK and the UK 
parliament’s ability to govern. Some of those who opposed appeared 
unconvinced the Scots wanted home rule. For the later debates, the argument 
assumed that as the SNP was enjoying considerable support in Scotland, the 
interests of the Scottish people could be advanced by self-government. It 
follows that support for devolution by a Scot in the Commons would be 
advancing the interests of the Scots. Yet in the speeches of the parliamentary 
Scots abroad there was in both Lords and Commons a mix of indifference, 
support and dislike of the Bill. On the occasion that a devolution Bill became an 
Act of Parliament, in 1978, the Scots did not support it in sufficient numbers to 
persuade the government to promulgate it. In the British constitution 
referendums are regarded as advisory to the government and the incoming 
Conservative Government repealed the Act.  
Whilst it appeared that some did support home rule or devolution, it was clear 
from the analysis that the Scots abroad in either Lords or Commons never 
acted as a coherent group to promote these constitutional changes. This may 
well have been because, as a Scottish elite, they were capable of achieving 
their goals within the Union and had no need of independence to do so. It was 
clear that although some of the Scots in parliament supported home rule and 
devolution bills and motions, they failed to exploit their privileged position at the 
centre of government. 
Some Explanations Offered 
Having established that the diaspora viewed Scottish self-government with 
indifference, the thesis has advanced a small number of likely reasons for this 
unconcern. Firstly, that the process of the engagement with the diaspora by the 
groups in Scotland was for the main part amateurish, spasmodic and a low 
priority for most. Secondly that the objectives of target groups in the diaspora 
chosen for involvement were primarily non-political and their membership was 
small in relation to the diaspora as a whole.  
Although the associational culture was and is quite visible, it was not the whole 
part of the diaspora. It can be regarded as an organising, active elite. Elite 
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because membership of the associations was expensive, and they were to an 
extent lent to exclusivity with their glittering social occasions and 
philanthropy.1525 Recall that studies of diaspora activity in homeland projects 
differentiate between core, passive and silent members of the diaspora. To an 
analyst of the Scottish diaspora, these associations appear as core actors in 
preserving a Scottish heritage identity.1526 However they also acted as 
gatekeepers to the passive and silent members, organising them for Highland 
Games whilst preserving their own British flavoured identity. Other reasons 
have been explored for the lack of concern of Scots abroad for the nationalist 
projects of their homeland. Assimilation can destroy the distinctiveness of 
diaspora and so has been explored further. The alleged use by the Irish of soft 
power led to the need to understand why the Scots failed to exploit this with 
their peaceful, latterly electoral, activism.  
In considering the comparison diasporas, nationalist activity at home was 
relevant to understanding why the Irish diaspora’s approach to home land 
self-government was so different. Evidence that a forced dispersal can lead to 
considerable diaspora involvement in nationalism at home has been presented. 
Host land conditions for a given diaspora can make it more visible and therefore 
alienated, something that at least is regarded as a contributor to the activism of 
the Irish in their nationalist projects. It can be seen that the comparison 
between the activism in home land nationalism of the case studies gave rise to 
two further areas for discussion. The first was the extent to which the lack of a 
conflict-generated diaspora affected Scots’ desire to support nationalism at 
home. Secondly, the ‘invisible’ nature of the Scots abroad could be a 
contributory factor in determining its approach to projects to promote self-
government at home. 
Of the arguments above, that of the approach to engaging the diaspora and the 
nature of the channels to the Scots abroad, the associations, has it is 
considered, been adequately disposed of. The explanations are attractive 
because of the transactional nature of engagement activities. By this is meant it 
relies on examining the nature and effectiveness (or otherwise) of activities. 
                                                          
1525 Bueltman, et al., 2009, p.69 
1526 Bueltman, et al., 2009, p.5 
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The nature of the associations can be seen from their activities, the speeches 
of their guests, their objectives and priorities. Therefore the commentary can 
now proceed to examine two further notions to lay out in the search for an 
understanding of the Scots’ diaspora’s failure to support the promotion of self-
government in their homeland.  
Irish-American nationalism was a response to the needs of the people in a land 
in which for the most part they were amongst the lowest social and economic 
strata.1527 It took the form of institutions like the Irish Catholic Benevolent Fund 
and secret societies such as the AOH. Whereas the ostensible function of Irish 
nationalism in America was to help Ireland gain self-government, it also 
enabled the immigrant Irish to gain a self-respecting place in American life and 
was the most effective way open to them to help their morale.1528 Even though 
after the 1880s the Irish were becoming wealthier, the new arrivals still fed the 
ghettos1529 and the nationalist societies. 
The appraisal of the Scottish diaspora in the US, describing it as invisible, more 
successful and welcome in the late nineteenth century, migrating from a 
Scotland with little activism in nationalism, contrasts with that of the Irish to 
understand their differing responses to nationalist projects at home. These 
differences fall into two categories; Firstly, It was established that the Irish had 
emigrated from parts of Ireland that were already nationalist in character, and 
there was no equivalent in Scotland. Secondly, the nineteenth century Irish 
diaspora in the US, a visible catholic diaspora in the lowest echelons of society 
satisfied its own interests by supporting organisations set up to support 
nationalism.  
With Norway, a Protestant diaspora, albeit one with a new language to learn, 
the diaspora conditions were similar. However the apparent similarities in the 
cases of Norway and Scotland become less clear as the process of ending the 
Swedish Union is considered. Whilst there was no significant fund raising in the 
diaspora, there was equally no demand for it, unlike the Scottish case. It is the 
case that the Norwegian press in the US supported the case for separation, and 
                                                          
1527 Moody, 1967, pp.438-9 
1528 Ibid. 
1529 Brown, 1956, p.329 
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eventually the diaspora came out in favour and with the press, influenced the 
American recognition of the newly independent state. There was no 
comparability to the Irish situation, but there was support in some visible ways 
once the Union was under fatal pressure. No such support came from the Scots 
in America at any time in the chronology of this study.  
The argument considered the possibility that the nature of Scottish nationalism 
may have influenced the response of the diaspora. It has been shown that early 
home rulers supported the Union and thought their task was to strengthen it. 
This, it was argued by some in the discourse, reflected a ‘weak’ nationalism, a 
sub-set of Britishness. The turnaround in the SNP’s fortunes may have been a 
response to the globalisation of capital in the intrusion of multinationals in 
Scotland through the oil industry. However, the conclusion was that the success 
was due to transactional not systemic reasons. Moreover, the associational 
Scots were still the conduit to the diaspora at this time, with their ‘Britishness’ 
and elite nature. These Scots had no need of independence to further their 
aims. The possibility that the Scots abroad act more like an ethnic community 
than a diaspora was examined, with the associations reflecting a heritage 
identity, not one rooted in modern Scotland. It had been asserted by an SNP 
activist that when the movement was successful in Scotland, the diaspora 
would support it. This was researched using membership and electoral success 
as measurements and found to be unsupportable as an argument. 
There were a number of attempts by Scottish nationalists to influence supra-
national bodies and other heads of state through the use of what has been 
termed soft power. One attempt, referenced earlier, followed the failure of the 
devolution referendum in 1979 to generate sufficient support to make a Scottish 
Assembly possible. The case that Scotland had in fact said yes was taken to 
the UN in a process described in some detail. A later chapter described how 
there was an attempt to support this by writing to US congressmen pointing out 
the debt the US owed to the Scottish diaspora, a petition was raised but in the 
main supported only by Scots in Scotland. In none of these cases was the 
institution to institution level relationship of an active diaspora core at work. 
They were individual transactions between one official and another. 
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Final comments; further research 
This thesis began with the proposition that many diasporas are deeply 
implicated in the nationalist projects of their home lands and has concluded that 
the Scots in this time period were not.  All the groups established to promote 
first home rule, then independence for Scotland attempted to enlist the help of 
the Scots abroad, as the introduction to this chapter demonstrates. It can be 
stated with reasonable confidence that reasons for the lack of support in the 
diaspora for the nationalist projects in Scotland have been identified, analysed 
and confirmed or, like the notion that success at home would bring more 
support abroad, refuted. It is clear that the globally acknowledged hallmarks of 
Scottish identity, its associations, commodities and culture, did not translate into 
the support for the long running movement to provide Scotland with more 
self-government or independence. 
Apart from an appeal directed through Australian and New Zealand 
newspapers, and the brief life of the SNPA, they did so almost exclusively 
through the many Scots associations that had become established in the 
countries of their settlement. These outward representations of the diaspora 
were however not political organisations but cultural and sporting associations. 
Recall from chapter one, where Walter Macintyre of St. Louis was reported in 
the Scottish Nation in 1914 to hold that a patriotic interest in home rule for 
Scotland in no way conflicted with a devotion to the highest interests of the 
Empire. He did not link this patriotism with the interests of his brother Scots in 
the US. It will be recalled also that in the discussion on nationalism in chapter 
two, aligned interests were seen by some as a key contributor to a nationalist 
endeavour. Simply being born in a place was not enough. 
Chapter six confirmed two ‘transactional’ reasons for the failure to engage; the 
poor organisation of the groups targeting the diaspora and the fact that they 
were targeting the associational Scot, groups whose stated objectives were 
cultural and philanthropic. They had politicians as members and guests, 
however what politics was to be seen was more British and there is no 
evidence that they embraced Scottish nationalism. As relatively elite 
organisations, their members had succeeded without it. 
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Further from these conclusions, closer examination of the comparison diaspora 
highlighted some significant differences that could account for the lack of 
nationalist success. Firstly, the Irish dispersal had been in the main from 
militant nationalist areas of Ireland. Therefore the nationalism travelled to the 
US and the dispersal was a component of the reason for the nationalist support. 
There was no nationalist movement or conflict in Norway, and whilst there was 
some support in the diaspora it was not key to the success the nation had in the 
ending of the Union with Sweden. 
Additionally, the impact of conditions in the host country was seen to be a point 
of difference between the Irish and the Scots in the US, with the nationalist 
fervour of the Irish providing the immigrant Irish with a means to improve 
morale and gain a self-respecting place in American life. As an invisible 
diaspora, the interests of the Scots did not align to a nationalist fervour to get 
respect in America. While most Scots seem to have had an initial advantage 
over most Irish Catholic immigrants, this general picture obscures the granular 
reality of varied circumstances. More detailed research should be done in this 
field than has hithertofore been the case, to produce a more accurate 
picture.1530  
At one level, the diaspora’s core can be seen to be mobilising the diaspora, but 
not for the purposes of supporting autonomy in the home land. This mobilisation 
was and is for organising cultural and sporting events tending to support an 
idealised, Highland, Scotland. Without re-opening the discussion about whether 
the Scots form a diaspora, it is possible to look more closely at the nature of 
that diaspora and see that it exhibits the characteristics of an ethnic group; 
maintaining a connection with the home country and its kinfolk but at an 
individual level rather than an institutional one. Thus the associations 
connected with like-minded citizens in other states and Scotland. Irrespective of 
the fact that members could be involved in political activity in their host land, it 
has been shown that those Scots did not deal in a coherent way at a national 
level to further Scottish nationalism with pressure groups or political parties or 
institutions of State.  
                                                          
1530 Devine, 2012, pp.146-7 
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This made the exercise of soft power impossible, with the engagement being at 
an individual level rather than, as with the Irish, at a level which would mobilise 
labour union and political party support through the vote. The analysis of the 
Scots associations abroad highlighted the lack of firm evidence of the 
penetration of these associations into the Scottish expatriate body. Further 
research could emphasis membership numbers and an ‘outside-in’ view of the 
associations from the view of the migrant Scot.  
Further research on the part soft power plays in diaspora impacts on homeland 
nationalist projects, by which it is meant between states and non-states would 
be needed to make firmer judgements about the failure of the Scots. Further 
research would also clarify the link between the success of hard power by the 
Loyalist cause and the success of the soft power initiatives which brought a halt 
to hostilities in Northern Ireland. The impact of the nature of Scottish 
nationalism would also benefit from deeper analysis, as would whether or not 
the absence of violence in all of the campaigns, in short the lack of martyrs, 
affected the diaspora’s interest in the cause.  
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Appendix I: Motions and Bills in the Commons, 1889-1978 
Gov’t PM Event Mover/ 
seconder 
Date Result Division  
MPs 
Scottis
h MPs 
C
o
n
s
e
rv
a
ti
v
e
 
 
S
a
lis
b
u
ry
 
Home Rule 
for Scotland  
motion 
Dr  G Clark 
Dr Hunter 
9th April 
1889 
Defeated 
in the 
commons 
200 to 79 
 
19 for 
22 
against 
Amendmt. in 
response to 
Queen’s 
speech 
Dr G Clark 19th 
February 
1890 
2nd division 
defeated 
183 to 143 25 for 
17 
against 
Federal 
Home Rule 
motion  
Dr G Clark 
Sir S T 
Evans 
6th March 
1891 
Counted 
out 
 
  
Govt. of 
Scotland 
Dr Hunter 26th April  
1892 
Proposed 
for 2nd 
reading 
House 
adjourned 
 
Federal 
Home Rule 
motion 
Dr G Clark 
Sir John 
Leng 
Sturrock 
29th April 
1892 
Defeated 
in the 
Commons 
74 to 54 
 
14 for  
10 
against 
Liberal Gladstone Scottish 
Home Rule 
motion 
Dr. Clark 
Mr. R.J.Reid 
23rd June 
1893 
Defeated 168 to 150 37 for 
22 
against 
Liberal Rosebery Scottish 
Home Rule 
Resolution 
Sir H Dalziel 
Mr Birrell 
3rd April 
1894 
Carried in 
Commons; 
No bill 
 
180 to 170 
 
35 for 
21 
against 
Liberal Rosebery Amendmt. to 
Local 
Legislative 
Assembly 
Bill 
Sir H Dalziel 
Lloyd 
George 
29th March 
1895 
Carried in 
Commons; 
no action 
128 to 102 29 for 
15 
against 
Liberal Asquith Scottish 
Home Rule 
Bill 
D V Pirie 26th May 
1908 
1st reading 
carried. No 
2nd reading 
257 to 102 44 for 
9 against 
Liberal 
 
Asquith Scottish 
Home Rule 
bill 
Dalziel 16th August 
1911 
1st reading 
carried, no 
2nd reading 
172 to 73 31 for 
4 against 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
      
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 Asquith 
 
 
Scottish 
Home Rule 
(to follow 
Ireland)  
motion 
Dr. Chapple 
M Fergusson 
28th 
February 
1912 
Carried 236 to 128 43 for 
6 against 
Federal  
Home Rule 
bill 
A M Scott 3rd July 
1912 
1st reading 
carried. No 
2nd reading 
264 to 212 43 for 
7 against 
Scottish 
Home Rule 
bill  
Sir W H 
Cowan 
30th May 
1913  
First read 
13th March 
1st reading 
carried. No 
2nd reading 
204 to 159 
 
45 for 
8 against 
Scottish 
Home Rule 
Bill 
I. 
Macpherson 
15th May 
1914. 1st 
reading 
13th Feb. 
2nd reading 
adjourned  
No division  
Scottish 
Home Rule 
bill  
As above 20th May 
1914 
PM rules 
no time for 
debate 
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C
o
a
lit
io
n
 
L
lo
y
d
 G
e
o
rg
e
 
Govt. of 
Scotland Bill,  
Sir H Cowan 16th May 
1919 
2nd  
reading 
counted 
out 
No division 18 in the 
house 
Federal Sub-
legislature 
 Wood, 
J M 
Macdonald 
3rd and 4th 
June 1919 
Carried 187 to 34 35 for 
1 against 
Scottish 
Home Rule 
Bill  
J. Johnstone 
D Maclean 
16th April 
1920 
Counted 
out 
(inquorate) 
65 to 53 36 for 
9 against 
Coalition Lloyd 
George 
Govt. of 
Scotland Bill,  
J Wallace 
A.Shaw 
February 
10th 1922; 
26th May 
1st reading 
 
2nd reading 
Adjourned, 
not 
resumed 
 
 
 
 
Coalition Lloyd 
George 
Govt. of 
Scotland and 
Wales Bill 
J, M 
Macdonald 
May 8th 
1922 1st 
reading 
2nd reading 
ordered for 
22nd May – 
never 
occurred 
 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
 
n/a 
Labour Ramsey 
Macdonald 
Govt. of 
Scotland Bill 
G Buchanan 
T.Johnston 
8th / 9th 
May 1924 
Talked out 
by Leng 
Sturrock 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
Cons Baldwin Govt. of 
Scotland Bill  
James Barr 
T. Johnston 
13th May 
1927 
Talked out 
before 2nd 
reading by 
P.J. Ford 
 
 
 
n/a 
 
Cons Baldwin Govt. of 
Scotland Bill 
James Barr 27th March 
1928 
First 
reading 
given 
  
Labour Wilson Scottish 
Self-Govt. 
Bill 
R Johnston 30th Nov. 
1966 
1st reading 
adjourned 
to 28th April 
1967 no 
2nd reading 
 
 
n/a 
 
Labour Wilson Federal 
Govt. 
J Thorpe 21st 
February 
1968 
First 
reading 
  
Labour Wilson Scotland and 
Wales 
Referenda 
bill 
James 
Davidson 
14th 
February 
1969 
2nd reading n/a  
Labour Callaghan Scotland and 
Wales bill 
Lab Govt. 28th 
November 
1976 
Guillotine 
defeated 
1977 
 
See 
chapter 5 
 
Labour Callaghan Scotland 
Bill/Act 
Lab. Govt. 1978 Repealed 
1979 
See 
chapter 5 
 
 
Sources: Mitchell, 1996, pp.303–305; NLS Acc. 3721/46/102; NLS Acc. 3721/7/114; NLS Acc. 12735/6 
  
Gov’t PM Event Mover/ 
seconder 
Date Result Division  
MPs 
Scots 
MPs 
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Appendix II: Full list of speakers in Commons Home Rule activity 
1889-1927 
Robert Munro Sir William Raeburn Sir James Greig Sir Charles Barrie 
Dr Clarke David Lloyd George W. Pringle Frederick Macquisten 
Dr Hunter J. Redmond T. P. O’Connor Sir Patrick J. Ford 
Sir Shaw M. Stewart Ralph Neville R. Falconer Russell Johnstone 
A. Elliot J. Dillon Sir James Ian Stewart 
Macpherson 
(Strathcarron) 
George Buchanan 
C G Cunninghame-
Graham 
Dr Donald MacGregor William Young Sir John Baird 
Donald Crawford Duncan V. Pirie William Watson Duchess of Atholl 
W E Gladstone Sir Henry Craik Sir James Duncan Millar Neil Maclean 
A. J. Balfour Munro Ferguson James Clyde James Maxton 
R.T. Reid Sir Halford J. Mackinder Daniel Turner Holmes Sir Samuel Chapman 
C Hozier A. Wilkie John Wallace Peter Raffan 
Wallace Dr Chapple Alexander Shaw, 2nd 
Baron Craigmyle 
Sir F. C. Thomson 
E. Robertson Marquis of Tullibardine Sir Donald Maclean Duncan Graham 
Sir Herbert Maxwell Sir W. Menzies Lord Eustace Percy Edwin Scrymgeour 
Sir G Trevelyan Stephen Gwynn Dr Murray Sir A Hunter-Weston 
Sir C Pearson Eugene Watson Sir Robert Thomas Hugh Ferguson 
A. C. Morton Sir G. Younger Joseph Johnstone John (leng) Sturrock 
Sir Walter Thorburn McKinnon Wood Charles Murray, Lord 
Advocate 
David Kirkwood 
A. Graham Murray A Bonar Law Gideon Murray Col. Ralph Glyn 
Sir H. Dalziel Sir W. H. Cowan Captain Walter Elliot William Graham 
Augustine Birrell Murray Macdonald Rev. James Barr James Kidd 
H. Lewis Scott Dickson Thomas Johnston Capt. John Jameson 
Seymour Keay Mark Stewart Mr. Majoribanks D. Crawford 
Source; Hansard 
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Appendix III: Scots Abroad; Speakers to Home Rule Motions and Bills: 
1889-1927 
Speaker Constit’ncy Party Scot 
abroad 
Position 
on the 
Bills 
Comments 
Dr Clarke Caithness Crofters 
Party 
then 
Liberal 
Yes For Medical practice in London. 
Spent time in South Africa – 
was Consul General in 
London, 1881-91 
Dr Hunter Aberdeen N Liberal Yes For Academic career in London 
Cunninghame- 
Graham 
Lanark N.W.  Sojourner For Sojourner from South America 
Mr. Gladstone Mid Lothian Liberal Yes Against Prime Minister 
R.T Reid, 1st Earl 
Loreburn 
Dumfries 
Burghs 
Liberal Yes For  
E.Robertson, 1st 
Baron Lochee 
Dundee  Yes For Worked in Government and 
Law in England 
Sir H James Dalziel Kirkcaldy Liberal Yes For London address, worked there 
Sir Henry Craik Aberdeen and 
Glasgow Unis 
Scots 
Unionist 
Yes Against Lived and worked in London 
Sir W H Cowan Aberdeen E Lib Yes For Also two English 
constituencies  
Murray Macdonald Falkirk Burghs Lib Yes For English address. Served on 
Marylebone schools board 
W. Pringle Lanarkshire 
NW 
Cons Yes For Numerous Scottish and 
English cons. Law work in 
London 
Sir James Ian 
Stewart 
Macpherson 
(Strathcarron) 
Ross and 
Cromarty 
Lib 
 
Yes For – no 
vote but 
moved 
1914 bill 
Law in London, and address, 
Scots interests e.g. Freeman 
of borough of Dingwall 
Mr William Young Perthshire East Lib Yes Unclear Director of London Bank,  
London address 
Alexander Shaw, 
2nd Baron 
Craigmyle 
Kilmarnock Lib Yes Unclear Lived and worked in London, 
director of many large 
companies, e.g. P and O, 
Bank of England 
Sir Donald Maclean Peebles and 
Southern 
Lib Yes For Son of a Scot. lived in London. 
President of Board of 
Education 
Frederick 
Macquisten 
Argyll Cons Yes Against Lived in England after 1919 
George Buchanan Glasgow 
Gorbals 
ILP/ Lab Yes For Scotland in early life, then  
National and Government jobs 
in England 
Sir F C Thomson Aberdeen S. Scottish 
Unionist 
Yes For In Law and Army in Scotland,  
then England for Law, London 
address 
John (Leng) 
Sturrock 
Montrose Coal. 
then Natl 
Lib 
Yes For and 
Against 
Address In Bournemouth 
Seymour Keay Elgin and Nairn Liberal Yes For India for 20 years, then lived in 
London 
Sources: Hansard, Who was Who, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Wikipedia. 
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Appendix IV: Scots with English Constituencies in the October 1974 
Parliament 
MP Constituency Party Place of birth and 
education 
Speeches in 
the house 
Speeches 
on the 
Bills 
David Wright 
Young 
Bolton East L Born Greenock,  educated 
Glasgow University 
997 0 
Robert 
McCrindle 
Brentwood and 
Ongar 
C Lived in Scotland until 
1964. Anglo-Scot by his 
own words1531 
3837 0 
Albert (Jock) 
Stallard 
Camden St. 
Pancras 
L Born Hamilton (English 
family) moved to London 
aged 16 
2311 0 
Sir George 
Sinclair 
Dorking C Educated in the Colonies 
Scots colonial family 
788 0 
David James Dorset North C Family seat in Torosay, 
Mull. 1979, a.k.a. David 
Guthrie James 
493 0 
Geoffrey 
Johnson 
Smith 
East  Grinstead C Born Glasgow.  2129 0 
George 
Cunningham 
Islington South L Born Dumfriesshire 3492 64 
Norman 
Lamont 
Kingston C Born Shetland, educated 
Loreto, near Edinburgh 
9820 5 
David Knox Leicester East C Born Dumfriesshire 4378 9 
Sir Arthur 
Irvine 
Liverpool Edge hill L Other information not 
known 
1532  
John 
MacGregor 
Norfolk South C Born London, educated 
Edinburgh, St. Andrews. 
Describes himself as a Scot  
11,339 4 
James 
Lamond 
Oldham East L Born Perthshire, educated 
Edinburgh. 1533 
1584 14 
Willie 
Whitelaw 
Penrith  and the 
Borders 
C Born Dumfriesshire, brought 
up in Nairn, educated 
Winchester. 
10672 27 
Hugh Fraser Stafford and Stone C Younger son of 14th Earl 
Lovatt. Born Inverness, 
educated Ampleforth  
3283 6 
Roderick 
MacFarquar 
Belper L Born Lahore, educated  
Fettes, Edinburgh. 
Identified himself as 
Scottish.1534 
609 5 
Patrick 
McNair - 
Wilson 
New Forest C Identified in the House1535 970 11536 
Source: Hansard; Wickipedia; Who’s Who; Who was Who. 
                                                          
1531 Hansard, 25 November 1976, Education and Social Services, col.277 
1532 Hansard entry suspect due to confusion with Bryant Irvine 
1533 Hansard, 18th March 1976, col.1697 
1534 Hansard, 14th January 1976, col.501 
1535 Hansard, 25th November 1976 col 269 
1536 Also spoke at length on devolution in the above speech (ibid) 
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Appendix V: Scots Abroad in the House of Lords 
    
Title Location of title/ 
given location 
Commentary Location of residence 
Lord Auckland  Anglo/Irish Self-identified  as ‘ex pat’ 
in a speech 
England 
Lord Ballantrae Scotland Created 1972  Retired to Scotland but spent 
most of his life overseas in 
Army or Government jobs 
Duke of 
Buccleuch and 
Queensbury 
Scotland  Seats in Scotland, two 
Residences in England 
Baron Burton  Anglo/Scots The baronetcy was 
inherited by Scots 
Scotland /Burton on Trent 
Countess of 
Loudoun 
Anglo/Scottish  England 
Duke of Atholl Scotland  Scotland / England 
Earl Cathcart Scotland  England, SW10 
Earl of Glasgow Scotland  England, SW10 
Earl Of Perth Scotland  Residences in England and 
Scotland 
Earl of Selkirk 
 
Scotland Representative. Peer for 
Scotland  
England ,  SW1 
Lord Alexander of 
Potterhill 
Scotland Created 1974 England 
Lord Douglas of 
Barloch 
Scotland Born Canada, educated 
in Scotland 
England 
Lord Drumalbyn Scotland  England 
Lord Fraser of 
Kilmorack 
Scotland  England, SW10 
Lord Glendevon 
 
Scotland  Two residences In England 
Lord Hamilton of 
Dalzell 
Scotland  England 
Lord Howe of 
Troon 
Scotland Created 1978 England 
Lord Spens Scotland Refers to himself as an 
‘expat’ in his speech 
England 
Lord Strathcona 
and Mount Royal 
Scots/Canadian  Main residence England, also 
Colonsay, Scotland 
Marquis of 
Aberdeen and 
Temair 
Scotland Spent his life in England England 
Viscount Colville 
of Culross 
Scotland  Two residences in England, 
one in Scotland 
Viscount 
Lauderdale 
Scotland Used clubs in Scotland England  
Viscount 
Massereene and 
Ferrard 
Anglo/ Scottish/ Irish Freeman of the City of 
London. Claims to be 2/3 
Scot 
England 
Viscount Thurso 
 
Scotland Seat in Caithness England 
Home of the 
Hirshel 
Scotland Ex P.M. England residence and two in 
Scotland  
Sources: Hansard, Who’s Who, Who was who, Dictionary of National Biography, Wikipedia.  
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